

Analytical Syntax of English*

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Preface

The present essay attempts to present a personal view of English syntax and subsequent grammatical affairs from an observer whose native tongue is Japanese, a language fatally different from English or from general Indo-European languages. The author intentionally avoids recourse to the established lore of English linguistics, so that his view may, though much mangled and ignorant, present an outsider's view, and show how the language strikes a foreigner as he is exposed to it and comes to comprehend. His English itself symbolically expresses his understanding of the language. He tries his utmost to comply with the established usage but more often he invents the expression within the possibility of expression he ascribes to the language. At least his attempt is not for a well-precedented, well-mannered English, or aesthetic English, but for a logically possible expression. His un-natural English could be as much a Frankenstein as his impudent opinions about the English he thinks he understands. In condemning such un-English English, a native speaker and scientist of the language is asked to assert the reason rather than the fact.

Sheer ignorance is the licence for this bold attempt and the assertion herein is never intended to challenge the established order of grammatics, if there is such a word. This will however, add one more, insignificant but thoroughly dogmatic, view to the language; this may improve or may impair the understanding or aquisition of the language. To atone the sin so committed, the author remains modest in hoping that the native speakers of English, the lawful owner of the language, be tolerant of the un-English English, though offending and ticklish to them, as long as it is categorically possible. If a day come when every body speaks an English which is thoroughly un-English to the present day English-speakers, I think it will be the day when English has attained the status of more-than-English, and in that language a culture and literature will be founded according to the standard of that very language.

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General note: *The entire text was originally written in spring 1959; presented here without revision.

Introductory

The purpose of this essay is essentially pragmatic. It does not attempt to explain all the phenomena that take place in a language for their own sake, but it intends to introduce a technique for a better understanding of a particular language called English. What is proposed in this essay is not a new idea or a theorem. Enough has been pointed out by many and is a common knowledge to all who learn and use the language either as their native tongue or as an adopted tongue. The main point of this essay is to make such knowledge serve for a better and a sooner mastery of the language.

Our study is exclusively in this particular language called English, but since it is a language, the observation about the language naturally yields the facts that are inevitably the affairs of language in general. Language exists only as particular languages...English, Japanese etc.; and when we are to discuss the affair called language in general terms, it becomes abstract by necessity. We shall not commit each time, whenever we state an observation in this study, that the fact is purely English or is the phenomenon general to linguistic affairs.

It should be, however, understood that some of the observations and the theories here can be said only of the English language, and that such cases are quite numerous and do constitute the principal assertion of the whole discussion. The unique characteristics of the English language are inadvertently enumerated and described without purposeful comparison with other languages cognate or otherwise.

We begin with the postulate that human mentality is by its own nature comprehensive before it is analytical. It is somewhat like an organism that grows from a single whole into a larger whole rather than an assembly of a machine from isolated parts. The actual cases of communication in language are, in each, organic units of mental awareness and activity. **Speech** is defined as each of such actual verbal communications committed in a context of actuality — a single, independent and competent verbal incarnation of human motivation to communicate something. Thus when we designate a speech or speeches, it is done firstly in terms of distinctive motivation, the impulse for the expression. This may, however, confuse considerably the established concept of the **sentence**; let's not allow what is merely the threadbare transcription of it to assert too heavily over what is actual and living. The motivation to communicate may take to various channels; language being one among them.

The motivation towards communication may be analysed by two coordinates: i.e., **emotive** and **notional**. These are mere categories and not the statistical grouping of actual speeches, in so far as a speech may in certain proportion emotive, and in another notional.

In a similar way, emotive-motivation in communication may be divided into **exclamatory** and **imperative**, whereas the notional-motivation may be divided into, **indicative** (declarative) and **interrogative**. An actual speech may be plotted over the site of coordinate, definable in these four dimensions.

The primary stage of comprehension of speech is to be done at this level. Human instinct usually allows us to communicate at this level without much difficulty. Unless first comprehending a speech at this fundamental level, no analytical apprehension will be contributory to the comprehension. This ability denied, no one could have learnt even his own native tongue.

When we are compelled to communicate, and we are to do it through an established language, i.e., a culture of verbal code, human intelligence is to be called upon. This is because, fundamentally, a language, to an individual, is an arbitrary, artificial, and abstract convention of symbolism. A speech, the conveyance in language, if it eventually registers results by probability, is a conveyance throughout, never the property that is so conveyed.

The human awareness of a state of affairs, within or without, is a total and timeless mental phenomenon and is an affair that cannot be transferred to the other nor be observed from outside. Communication, in a stricter sense, is the use of an objective means to cause in others the corresponding awareness and experience, and perhaps, as the results of which, to cause the other to act or react to the prescribed stimuli.

To repeat, the individual, actual experience is there before and without analysis, and as such, it cannot be transferred as is. When we are compelled to communicate what there is to be communicated, we either consciously or unconsciously pick up those elements of the situation that can be either represented by or loaded upon proper linguistic symbols and other linguistic devices. Because of our highly developed linguistic inertia, our conscious recognition of the immediate perception is often done according to the linguistic pattern in which one habitually expresses what he has in mind. The inter-relationship here seems to be an unrefutable fact which we only seldom challenge.

One of the lingering fallacies is the belief that there should be an naturalistic parallel between the linguistic expression and the actual state of affair thereby referred to. When we say 'It rains.' one is inclined to presume there is something, somewhere, standing for 'it' in the actuality. Of course, however, this does not in any way impair the parallel between the pattern of the analytical conception of the actuality and its expression in language.

Our practical proposal is to find something that may concurrently designate the units of linguistic analysis and the corresponding units of conceptual analysis of the single state of affair perceived and motivated towards the communication.

Of course, this is fated to be a practical compromise based on the apparent parallelism between what is called inner-language and the expressed language.

It seems to be not only a statistical fact but also a logical (at least to those who speak in English) fact that most of the notionally-motivated speeches are first analyzable into subject and predicate, and that the actuality is not only so conceived, but also the expression in such patterns through conditioned reflex gives rise to an image that corresponds to the original reality. We fully subscribe to this theorem (as long as it is concerned with the English language.) We might, however, presume that our point of emphasis is the fact that there is a whole before anything can be analyzed, and that the major analysis goes before the minor analysis. The valid term of analysis is not to be sought in the lower extreme of the analyzed but to be drawn from the original whole, the totality of the experience and the meaning.

Thus statistically obtained models, or prototype speeches in English language may be said to divide itself into two major segments, namely **Subject** and **Predicate**, even as a typical of English mentality conceives its experience somewhat unconsciously in the corresponding two factors. Though taken for granted, this is rather an amazing mental propensity, when viewed from foreigners whose linguistic structure is utterly different from English.

At any rate, we acknowledge fully that the first order of analysis yields **Subject** and **Predicate**, with the above stated considerations.

The next stage of analysis of English speeches will yield only four kinds of tangible segments if analyzed from the maximum context, i.e., the original unity, and not analyzed

from the mechanical divisions. We propose to call the four kinds of language segments, speech-syllables, in analogy to the syllables of a word in articulation.

Speech-syllables are defined by two orders of terms; firstly, by the function they perform as organic members of the speech, and secondly, by the inherent quality of the language segment so enacted.

The four speech-syllables are named respectively, **nominals**, **predicatives**, **adjectivals** and **adverbials**. **Nominals** are those segments of a speech that occupy the position of Subject, Object and Complement. Morphologically they are units of language recognized in some way as nouns or pronouns, noun equivalents. They may be either in the form of individual words, group of words, in phrases, in clauses, or in fragments. The only difference is not only the dictionary-classification of words or phrases according to the statistical or morphological distinction of each word or an unit in itself, but also the designation of language segments in the actual context of enacted speech. Thus, **nominals** absorb all the attributive adjectives and adjective equivalents which include articles, indefinite pronouns, etc., to the largest possible expanse in a speech.

The **Predicative** is the segment of the predicate of a speech with other separable speech-syllables relegated. Eventually the predicative will be the predicate verb itself in various formations. It **must be** the predicate verb of a speech plus the subordinate verbal elements; that is, at the same time, morphologically, it **must be** the finite verb and its subordinate accessories. Phrasal verbs may be diversely construed according to their syllable-hood, however.

Adjectivals, is the name given to those adjective elements that stand in the speech as predicative complement, thus, eliminating the inconsistency of holding the attributive use of adjectives on an equal term with complimentary use.

Adverbials, is the name given to all the adverbial units in the maximum context; thus, the attributive use of the adverbs lose their syllable-hood to the attributed, whatever it may be.

Having thus designated the four functional, organic units of a typical speech, we are better prepared to discuss the syntax of speeches. The term **syntax** is, in our essay, much limited in its connotation. The syntax is to define the mutual relationship with-

in a speech of the component speech syllables in relationship to the original whole, the maximum context. And since there are only four kinds of syllables, the possible collocational patterns are mathematically simple and statistically much reduced. The result will be somewhat close to so-called sentence-patterns, and it is extremely fortunate a fact that in the language, the syntax is not (morphologically) explicit in words themselves but is invested in the collocation of the syllables. While the order is so fixed and the types so extremely limited for the other syllables, the position of the adverbials are much optional between the other syllables, which enables us to disregard the adverbials, the fourth member of the combination.

Thus we schematically obtain only a few speech-patterns into which most of the actual speeches fall, and other irregularities become significant in contrast to the norms thus given. It is not the word-order, but the syllable-order that really constitute the pattern of English at the syntactical level.

The utility of the analytical units, speech-syllables, may be found in the teaching and learning of the language because of its unusual simplicity, free from the discussion as its word-forms ... now that everyone knows that inflection has been going out of English. As we have come to be in possession of so reduced a term of linguistic abstraction as the proposed four speech-syllables and the several speech patterns, the advantages thereof should be utilized to the utmost in the teaching and learning of the language. For complicated sentences, we may put in many indications showing the beginning and the end of each syllable therein, which will eventually bring out the pattern in which the speech is delivered. Some such practical suggestions for teaching are discussed.

Now that the analysis at the level of speech-syllables is attained, further analysis may be conducted, by necessity, in analogy of the speech-syllable to the whole speech. The segmentation of a speech may be only valid if it is done in terms of the whole which is now the syllable. For distinction, we will use another term **subordination**, instead of syntax for the internal relationship of the members within a syllable in respect to the maximum context. For instance a **nominal** of a speech may contain an adjectival clause modifying the head-word of the syllable, or participial clause with objects and complement and even with adverb, modifying the head-word as a whole in grammatical consistency as if the participle were a finite verb of an imaginary sentence these affairs are

described more or less in the way we do in grammar, except that they are, in our proposition, all classed as the affairs of subordination, i.e., affairs within speech-syllables.

We must reflect, however, that our point of departure, the theorem that anything must be a whole before it is to be analyzed, is a tentative platform from where we view the culture of human speeches for the sake of consistency. We know that any affair of actuality is beyond analysis of mere terms and the language and actual speeches assert themselves beyond logical verifications.

Thus, in declaring of the above theorem, we tacitly acknowledge the possibilities of reality that do not comply, and by which it is not to be disproved but to be counter-distinguished.

Analysis is naturally one of the two directions of human mentality at work. The fact is well repeated in the speeches, the human communication through sound symbolism: the process up to the expression is reverse in the process that comes from the expression. Thus, one comprehends a state of affairs as it stands (to his mind), then mentally (but sub- or un-consciously), he analyzes it into prominent factors which are further replaced by linguistic equivalents ... so far is the out-going phase of communication.

The other mentality, the receiver of the intended and expressed communication, perceives the expression along the time sequence. Thanks to the inclination of human mentality (called “closure”), the segments of the expression are progressively registered and apprehended as they reach the receiver, forming the maximum gestalt at each stage of apprehension in anticipation of the final enlightenment ... the comprehension.

Hence, we have the incompatible title of this essay **analytical syntax**, although the emphasis is on the analytical phase of speeches.

The speech-syllables are introduced as the intermediate actual units of language as well as of speech for analysis and synthesis. The speech patterns according to the collocation of speech syllables present most efficient and logical classification and handling of the language.

The application of the present proposition may find its ways into several aspects of language studies and applied fields. Firstly, it is applied in order to clarify the affairs of language for their own sake; it proposes another approach and another introspection and interpretation, not thoroughly new but somewhat newly organized. Secondly, it

can be applied as the recourse of English teaching, in its analytical exercises as well as its constructive aspects, thus eliminating what is ultimately an un-linguistic waste of energy spent in translations. Thirdly, it can be applied as a new factor to study the style of English expressions in its structural patterns which seems to reflect the structure and pattern of creative thoughts and aesthetic effects.

The proposition does not pretend to be the only and ultimate, but is proposed as one additional approach to the pragmatic study of the language.

Finally, we shall discuss some of the unavoidable dilemmas and conflicts the theory has to face in spite of its intentions, and some problems that it may confront.

At any rate, in the actuality of speeches, the theorem was an abstract measure to assess the facts, and never the final reality of the language. The more or less a priori presumption has equipped us with a class of tangible units of speech elements that can be beneficially applied for a better understanding and a better mastery of the language. This has been one of the ways, there could be many more, and all of them in their own way promote understanding, though perhaps none of them shall claim to be the sole, ultimate, golden rule for language.

PART I

1. Speech

Language and speech: Instead of the usual categorical definitions, perhaps we might venture an analogy. A language, say for instance that of English, is like the monetary system of the nation, while actual instances of speeches are like acts of buying and selling commodities. Much like other human affairs, language is not a premeditated, or logically structured convention of code, nor is it purely a natural phenomenon like electricity. Explanations may define it to a degree but can never be complete or ultimate when confronted with the actuality of the language. What is essentially parallel between the monetary affair and the linguistic affair is our recourse to the objectified abstract system for the purpose of transaction in actual items. What makes the communication through language possible is the human mentality that spans the discontinuity between the fabricated symbolism and the correlative actuality. Because of this, primitives often mystically identify the two, while we moderners depend too much on the expression rather

than on the facts themselves.

However, when we say “speech or communication through language”, in an attempt to define something we know so well but which is only too vast and complex, we are in trouble in many ways. What do we mean when we say “communicating something”? What can we really communicate by any means? Speech seems to do something besides communicating, while it is not through language alone that we can communicate if we can ever communicate.

What is done when we have communicated something? Two agents, one communicating the other being communicated to, are presupposed and perhaps so with the means through which it is accomplished and the thing that is thus communicated. And to which part of the whole process is the language incorporated?

Not to dodge these radical questions, but to be more pragmatic and efficient, we may begin with what we take for granted. Almost instinctively we think that a set of mental substance is transmitted from one mentality to the other i.e., an identical experience is undergone, so that the intended reaction is reciprocated such is the general term in which we consider the phenomenon called communication; and when language happens to be the tool for such a transaction, the process is called ‘speech’ with more stress on the outgoing phase of the transit.

We often say that “speech conveys meaning,” as if the linguistic property so activated transports the meaning to the receiver somewhat like a load being transferred by carriages; or else we feel as if the meaning is incarnated, fixed, or perpetrated and actualized in the form of speech, more like sound-waves being fixed in a disk for conveyance and preservation. We also feel that the original concept is converted into speech and sent forward by the intension of the speaker to the receiver, who in return re-converts it into the original actuality we are conditioned to imagine the actuality whenever we are exposed to live- or hypothetical-speeches, and are convinced that all the mental reality is expressible and eventually communicable. This is the latent consciousness in which we engage in the practice of language unless challenged.

Our original analogy fails here. We engage in daily exchange of speeches but nothing takes place in the realm of the things referred to. It is a figurative statement that speech conveys something mental or actual. If such alone is the reality of communication through

language, we often do more than that with language.

We must, however, limit our discussion of language and speech only to those cases where language is employed and enacted in speeches with definite intensions of communication.

This animistic belief in language and its function is universal though in different degrees, and is so intimate to our instinct that unless mentally handicapped, one never finds difficulty in the manipulation of this most sophisticated kind of human behavior.

However, for the mere sake of enlightenment and better use of language, we shall do some reflective thinking upon communication in language.

Firstly, we must realize that one mentality is so fatally isolated from the other that nothing is transferable as it is. An identical object in an identical or the same circumstances may cause parallel, resembling impressions and like reactions in several individuals at the same time, but never can the taste of a certain food be imparted or transported to others. The actuality is final, and is helplessly individual. No account of rich food will feed a hungry stomach ... one may imagine that he is fed, but will certainly starve to death unless actually fed. With language no one can hope to transmit any actuality, either objective or subjective, to the other or be bequeathed with such. So when we say we communicate, we mean that we communicate only that which can be communicated; that which is ever so much more limited than we usually wish to believe.

A truer description of our communication may be that we fabricate an objective formation so that it will affect those who expose their individual mentality to it in such a way that they may, either passively or actively, undergo a prescribed reaction according to their respective conditioning and individual background. If anything is conveyed under such circumstances, it is the very parallel, but never a concrete particular of mental reality of the originator of the speech. Popularly we say "speech communicates the idea," clearly intimating that it does not communicate the actuality, but the idea and concept, while language does a lot more than simply communicating the ideas and concepts, if such is what we mean by verbal communication.

We may draw another bold analogy. Every speech is more like a piece of creative art, which does not convey an aesthetic sensation, but, as a created, self-asserting object, causes in the mentality of the audience some relatively orientated effects among

which aesthetic sensation is that which was originally prescribed by the artist. The language and the idiom for the artists are far more general and natural than that of speech, which is much fixed in compensation to its abstractness.

Thus, when we say that language communicates, we no longer mean that a speech is a substitute or an equivalent to the actuality any more than a portrait is the substitute of the actual individual portrayed. If the portrait does ever legitimately **convey** or **communicate** anything, it is the recognition that the portrait is of a certain person therein portrayed; the awareness or the recognition of that relationship is strictly human and is duly called “representation.” Speech represents but never substitutes or copies the actuality. When speech is enacted, it becomes another actuality from which one is to form his own reality and into which one is to project the substance of his own background and imagination. What is literally transmitted is the abstract parallel between the original actuality of the artist, the abstract fabrication of the speech, and the induced actuality conceived by the audience. Language, if it is only for communicating something, communicates only that much, no matter how it invokes diverse linguistic and extra-linguistic phenomena and effects.

Now that we have realized what is not meant, rather than what is meant, by saying “language communicates”, we are better equipped to discuss the affairs concerning the speeches and language. Whatever the motivation, if there is a verbal representation of something demanding due reception, we deem it a speech. And if such speech is received and registered and takes effect upon the receiving mentality, we deem that a speech is accomplished.

Our discussion should now go into the classification of actual speeches according to the most fundamental and autonomous criteria of the speeches themselves. We consider that the actual behaviors should be first divided by the type of motivation that gave rise to the utterances. Motivation is the impetus of the speech without which the speech would not have taken place. The motivation is the factor that selects the mode of exposition. It covers the span from the mental affair before the language to the final reaction of the receiver, and is far more drastic a factor for any verbal expression than the patent factors of actual speech.

However, before going into the discussion of classifying the types of speech accord-

ing to the types of speech motivation, we shall clarify our direction of approach to our subject, namely analysis and synthesis. Then we shall discuss the idea of maximum context as the basic principle for further analysis of speech in English.

Synthesis and analysis: Human mentality being what it is, the reality is perceived and comprehended over the two opposite mental processes, namely synthesis and analysis. Any discussion asserting either as the sole direction of mentality, will be like arguing about the precedence of eggs and hens. Human mentality is such that it can perform two logically conflicting performances at a time and its practical vitality always resides in the tentative reconciliation of the incompatible components. An ironical parable may be introduced to illustrate the situation: One can keep himself afloat by raising foot above the surface before the other submerges, and doing likewise with the other, thus repeating the process till time catches. Analysis is not possible unless synthesis is done, whereas synthesis cannot be done unless analysis is presupposed, and unless both are done at a time, nothing can be done! But we have language and we can speak to make sense in it! Such is the dilemma we face, and if it is not for the practice of speech, perhaps we can deal with them one by one as we analyse a pull into two forces in different directions though there are no actually distinct coordinate forces. And we might say that even in the practicing of speeches, one phase is often more unconscious than the other. For an instance, when we compose a complicated sentence, synthesis may be more prominent a factor than analysis, whereas in easy non-prefabricated, spontaneous talks we are least conscious of the elements of the speeches, and analysis is only done with an effort. This is because, in the first place, we have isolated members to begin with, while in the second, we first have a solid continuity, the whole.

It is more than clear that unless we have perceived all the minute characteristics of the sounds uttered in single file, we shall never come to the ultimate unity of the meaning; but for the apprehension of the parts, the whole will not emerge . . . that is a truth. But is it not also true that unless we know the entirety, the function played by its member-parts cannot be definitely known,...the gestalt first? That is another truth; and our final truth is that we can keep ourselves afloat by attempting at the two at the same time.

However, due to the artificiality of language in itself, the partial perception of the members of a speech is usually done sub- or un-consciously and what strikes our aware-

ness as the reality invoked is the sense of totality.

This is more so, if we consider the freest practice of speech where we do not synthesize or assemble piece by piece. The totality is spontaneously comprehended and it is only when demanded that analysis follows to confirm the initial impression. Hence our discussion in this essay will proceed always with more stress on the whole, from which are derived levels of analysis.

The title of this essay “Analytical Syntax” is not an irony, but is an orientated study of language in the form of speeches, not of words or accidents. Speeches are considered and comprehended as a whole and self-explanatory entity induced by, and incarnating in itself, the single and solid impulse, the motivation to communicate. The inner structure or the structure of elements (if there are any) are recognized analytically according to the order of analysis from the whole to the ultimate elements, priority being given always to the higher order of analytical level, namely the maximum context for the given portion of a speech.

Thus, we propose the idea of analysis as an artificial, conscious effort applied to the essentially self-evident fact of language which in itself is a pragma of analytical-synthetic continuum, so to speak.

The study is also exclusively synchronical by necessity, even though there is a tacit hope that the strictly synchronical description may eventually comply with the diachronical views of the living language, and perhaps it may reveal some prospect of the future.

Maximum Context: What we have as grammar, is metaphorically a study of mechanically obtained elements and its evolution into a live organism from lower inorganic elements through half-organic molecules up to such an integrate being as a speech. The mechanically obtained lowest analyzable elements, for the physical realm.. (grammatical level) .. are molecules, or words. Whereas, the mechanically analyzable lowest units of speech .. (chemical elements, so to speak) are perhaps the phonemic sounds.

From such un-orientated isolated materials, gradually higher molecules are formed according to the laws of cohesion particular and innate to each word. The synthetic process will be incomplete and tentative unless final synthesis is attained. And since the initial elements were apparent units of tangible meaning and function, the final

product is tangible and significant. The validity and the actuality of the final comprehension derives its reality from the lowest possible unit of meaning which is indorsed by the authority, not within the words themselves, but from the exterior precedence and of evidences.

However, if we begin from the totality, it is usually felt and taken for granted, though tentative and imaginary, that the speech is comprehended without being known why or how, and if challenged, analyzable elements are recognized and separated according to the role they play respectively in the whole context. And whenever an analysis is to be made, the totality is the authority for the analysis. A whole speech may be analysed into parts, and each part further analysed. In such cases, it is the rule that the maximum possible continuation, the maximum contextual span possible for the analysis, should be the authority of the given situation. Such a tentative unit from which the analytical standard is derived is named “maximum context” for the analysis and separation of elements of a speech or a speech syllable.

Types of speech motivation: The recourse to communication is a basic impulse and necessity not limited to humanity. We share much of our living impressions and impulses with the majority of creatures of the animaldom, and some of our basic inner and outer experiences are as unconscious as spontaneous. But it seems only true with us that it is done consciously. What makes everything exclusively human is the intelligence, namely the ability to be self-conscious in two ways, i.e., analysis and synthesis, and the willing respect of the objective order established among the intelligence of plural man, the community.

Communication logically presupposes a community, i.e., the plurality of the agencies involved. For any individual man or beast in a community the most nascent and basic impulse and need of communication will be to call the attention of others, whether to attract, to warn, to approve, to refuse, to demand, to threaten, or even to please, etc., and to respond. In this capacity some of the human speeches are not much removed from the utterances of the rest of the communicable animals. In a word, some of our human speeches are essentially **emotive** in their motivation. It is true that such utterances range from natural and almost zoological articulation such as ‘Ah!’ ‘Oh’ to a most elaborate kind of elocution, but when everything is said, this type of emotive

utterance will be reduceable in its function to a curt and universal vocalization; take for instance ‘Ah!’ which is not much different from a waving of hands or a frown. The emotive motivation to communicate or to be communicated may be schematically divided into two categories, the **exclamatory** and the **imperative**. It may be (recalled) that these two are emotive in their **motive** and not in their notion. The other major division of the communication by motivation is the notional. Man alone is prompted to this type of communication and he is the only animal that can perform it. Without his intelligence i.e., the ability to abstract the concrete and to apply the result back into the reality around him, notional communication is an impossibility. It is a manipulation of an abstract system that bridges a man with another as well as with his world. It is more a replica than a representation of the mode of affairs that takes place in man’s intellectual existence. Notional communication may or may not be done through the linguistic channel; such restricted language as mathematic formulae may be as notional a communication as any spoken or written statement in verbal language. In this type of communication, what is intended to be communicated is something that is not **emotive** but demonstrative and it is done usually by representative expression in a set of arbitrary convention of rules and symbols. Animals seem to have their own memory, judgment and all the other mental notions of their own but they have no urge to communicate them. They lack the faculty to reduce or induce, which deprives them of the means to think in representation and hence leaves them cut off from communication through symbols.

The impulse and the need for notional communication may be categorically divided into two divisions, namely the **indicative** and the **interrogative**, about which much need not be said.

Thus we have divided by the nature of its motivation the actuality of the human communication into major realms, i.e., the **emotive** and the **notional**, each further branching into two divisions, respectively **exclamatory** and **imperative**, and **indicative** and **interrogative**. In short, whatever the content, whenever we are inclined to communicate, we find ourselves in one way or other doing it in either of these four categories or in combination of varied degree.

When a language, an artificial convention, is called upon and adopted as the means of communication under the influence of emotive or mental urge, each of the actual cases

is called a **speech**. Or conversely, when a group of people have become able to communicate among themselves, whatever they wish to communicate by means of speaking and hearing in verbal symbols, they have a language among them.

The very first capacity necessary to participate in such a site of communication is of course the ability to differentiate the sounds uttered and received.

We are sophisticated enough to be satisfied in discussing the affair of language without going into the entire reality it involves-- sounds (with all its musico-physical features), cultural connotations (aesthetic, literary, etc.) -- but we can discuss the affair of language at a latitude where we can handle it without carrying too many concrete matters that it involves. Such are the reasons that we can consider and practice the written language which is so much destitute of the physical existence as speeches.

At any rate, however, the primary apprehension and expression of any speech may be the recognition and awareness of the motivation. Is one exclaiming because of the emotional strain? Are we demanding or inhibiting something being done? Or, are we stating something we think or see? Are we asking for some intelligence?

A natural speech may be quite vague in its motive, yet upon reflection, it may be analysed in terms of the four categories.

2. Sentence

The Expression and the expressed: Language has become so much an indispensable tool of life to Man that he receives the basic training while young, before he is exposed to the complexity of the phenomenal world, and as the result, this most artificial, arbitrary and abstract of all the human skills is mastered long before the feat becomes no less unconscious performance than his kinetic activities.


Unless hampered, one usually cannot tell if he is thinking in language or if language in his mind forms what he thinks, and less often he is conscious of the distinction between what is expressed and the expression. A speech may be emotive or notional or the mixture in every possible proportion of the two, by natural necessity, there seems to exist, whatever the language be, a somewhat analogous, though arbitrary, parallelism between the state of semantic notion and its expression in a convention of linguistic symbols and their collocations. The parallel also seems to prevail, to a certain extent, throughout languages.

Apparently, every thing or affair Man can perceive or conceive in or out of himself seems to have the corresponding linguistic counterpart in his mind. We seem to believe that whatever is, or takes place, can be designated and described verbally, i.e., it can be expressed in linguistic formulae of some kind. Moreover, we, by some prenatal inclination, take it for granted that there is a verisimilitude between the nature and structure of the two corresponding worlds, the expressed and the expression, i.e., between the thing or state of affair itself and its linguistic counterpart.

As for the emotive speeches, the immediacy and spontaneity preventing participation of semantic awareness, we are less concerned with the relationship between the emotional reality and how it is expressed. It is however, mostly in notional speeches and their convention where the formal logics and grammar find each other confronted.

What we perceive or conceive is usually a totality, a mental experience or a sight that defies analysis, and unless one intends to communicate, usually it calls for no analysis. But when one is motivated to communicate, he must, though perhaps subconsciously by first of his skill, analyze the totality into the catalogued units of universal (apparently to him) denominations. It is as if we have to express a sense of some volume in terms of accepted measures; the concrete and whole must be taken into parts, abstract and formal. Formal logics may tell us how most of our mental practices fall into patterns, and into what kinds of units and elements they are reducible. We are not interested in the formal logics nor in the feat it will accomplish in its own realm until any parallelism or relationship between the affairs in the logics and those of linguistic order is insinuated.

However, human nature being what it is all over, there seems to be a striking parallelism between the scheme of our thinking and the scheme of its expression even though we admit that there is an essential fallacy in assuming a continuum between the timeless, spaceless matterless experience and the physical actuality of language. The **speech** ⁽¹⁾ is actually a dual affair, in the sense that it is the **mental notion, the expressed** (to be), being activated by the motivation, i.e., the conscious or unconscious **impetus** towards formulated expression. **The content**, a total inner experience indissoluble in nature, being subjected to the pressure of conscious effort to formulate, is not exactly **analysed**, into but is **replaced** by a set of smaller units ⁽²⁾ of consciousness and a mental strain that holds them together. Then mobilizing and selecting the proper material and segments from the



convention of language (vocaburary, grammar, all the other features included) the **formulated content** is ⁽³⁾ again replaced by a set of representative fascimile in language, which is the **expression**. The expression in language, if everything goes as intended, will evoke a corresponding structure of mental particles ⁽⁴⁾ forced together by a mental inertia into an apparent whole, which, when comprehended, induces a total, timeless mental reality which may be called either enlightenment or conviction, the total **comprehension**. The passage from phase (1) to (2) may be called exposition, which is either conscious or unconscious, optional to a certain degree and more often habitual. We have noticed that there is a close mutual influence as well as resemblance between the mental structure of the phase (2) and the linguistic structure of the phase (3), even though some mental strains may be replaced by explicit linguistic particles (forms) and more often by implicit factors. The passage is inversely followed along the phases through (3) and (4) to (5).

The parallel between phases the (2) and (3), as well as of (3) and (4) is quite natural and we may parenthetically assume that closer the resemblance, better off is the speaker of the language. Our profficiency in a language often leads us to think that internal logic is inherently linguistic and vice versa. There is a great deal of confusion caused by erroneous identification of the **mental exposition** with the **linguistic expression**. A further confusion is caused when the mental and linguistic affairs are naively confused with the actual state of the affairs referred to.

At any rate, our concept of **speech** is the entire process of communication through its five phases, even though actual speeches are either in first half of the process anticipating the rest, or in the second half presupposing the first.

Since the process of speech is only observable as objectified phenomena in its phrase (3), the expression, we shall henceforward handle this phase of a speech as the embodiment of the speech.

Expression and Syntax: We have been using the term “speech” to designate individual occurrences of competent communication in language phenomena across the field of facto-mental continuum. The term connotes the entire inner process of the sayer and the sayee as well as the physical (acoustic and visual) objectivity of the expression.

However, since the expression is the only observable property of the entire process of a speech, we conveniently use the term as if it means the actualized phase, i.e., expression

a static, self-existing object, independent of the motivation, of the situation and of its eventual effect upon the receiver. Now, since the motivation of each expressed speech, or simply **speech**, is a whole and solid impulse, every speech is likewise independent, self sufficient, indivisible and final.

However, to express a totality in any language is nothing but a rendering of a whole in an assembly of the many and the different. In other words, no notional or emotive substance is inherently a structure, whereas, its expression is inevitably a structured synthesis. "Syntax" is the imaginary or imposed force that binds the assembly into a whole so that it will match the oneness of the intrinsic speech. Historically and metaphorically, a language is a field of syntactical consistency where every expression falls into some prototype-channels and where an established consistency, somewhat resembling a set of natural laws, governs.

To borrow another of a psychologist's parables, we may say that syntax is the mental capacity of reducing a given triangle into three dots and of comprehending the triangle when only three dots are given.

As an audience, one is exposed to the expression in three dots and sees a triangle, only to acknowledge the inclination called "closure" governing the entire process as if independent of the individual mentality.

Syntax may make itself felt as the inner consistency and coherency that resists the anatomy of live-speeches. There will be no syntax unless there is the indivisible totality, the single, intuitive mental entity corresponding to each impulse.

Our analysis of speech in terms of its syntax begins from the comprehended whole ... namely from each actual speech in its expression ... and then to the next largest attainable unit in their relationship to the whole, ... namely in respect to the order of the syntax of the speech concerned.

Any analysis of a whole is an artificial, hypothetical and often speculative, mental performance, whereas the whole is created, enacted and perceived almost intuitively, whether it is in the process of a speech or in reflective consideration of speeches. In the performance of a speech, analysis is always a second thought, or is consciously done prior to the expression, or, to a certain degree, is subconsciously done while proceeding. Unless such spontaneous skill is acquired, an utterance is only an artificial mani-

pulation of arbitrary code. It is our knowledge that we perform most of our speeches without ever consciously analysing it any more than we conceive an idea or perceive an inner or exterior stimuli by way of analysis.

When we say “syntax”, we mean the mental (either imposed or projected) cohesion that holds the structured expression not only organized but also instituted as the equal to the integrity of the intrinsic speech. Syntax is, in a way, the mental strain that is to compensate the essential loss incurred as the content is being replaced by, or still better, displaced by a set of lower units whose total sum is something short of, and different from the original whole.

There is logically a difference between the syntax of a speech of phase 2 and that of phase 3, the sequence of which is inversely repeated in the passage from phase 3 to 4. However, since there is an approximate parallelism between these phases, and since we cannot objectify the mental state of affairs as such, nor can we describe the syntax of mental structure (inner language) or very well differentiate the two stages of syntax, we shall consider syntax as insinuated in the expressed portion of the speech, with the whole mental process behind it unexpressed. Hence, hereafter, the term “syntax” may often appear as if it is an inherent force invested or latent in the expression. In the later sections we shall further restrict the term to define the syntax only of the highest order in a given speech.

As often repeated, the actual practice of language is always part spontaneous and part conscious in varying proportions. Any phase of actual speech is theoretically a whole, but more often a cluster of broken ideas annexed one after another additively, and could even be a conglomeration of a variety of mental feats. In some speeches the structural and notional meaning is totally foreign to the actual content of the motivation, as in “Here you are!” used when calling one’s attention to a thing. On the other hand, we seem to have a vague vision or anticipation of analytical frame in the abstract (that which psychologists call transportable gestalt quality), before, during and even after the transit of speech process. It may be theoretically necessary to trace the development of syntax after each stage of transit, yet it is practically and objectively only beneficial to anchor our discussion upon the expressed actuality of language. To use a parable again, we must regard a sculpture, the art of it, as it stands

in its actual product as the embodiment of the whole process in its creation, on the part of the artist as well as the receptive reaction on the part of the audience.

Thus, by analytical syntax, we are dividing the consciousness (it may be sub-conscious or even un-conscious syntax), not the expression, consciously into segments whether expressed or unexpressed. Some segments may not be explicit in the expression while some factual elements of the expression will be thoroughly insignificant in the view of the intrinsic syntax. Compare “I gave it him.” vz. “I gave it to him,” and consider the difference caused by the absence or presence of “to”. In spite of the mutual influence and parallel between the two realms of the affair i.e., inner syntax and the syntax of the expression, correspondence is not always the law. Some adjectives in the inner and logical context may take an adverbial status in the expression and vice versa: some phenomena of gender, number or case may be purely an affair of expressed language and never a mental reality, yet because of the language, the mentality back-forms the corresponding syntax in the inner syntax. “You” of “If you please” is now the subject and we have adapted and rearranged our mental syntax investing new meaning into the verb, which has finally come to be used as “Do as you please.” etc.

And since the factualized expression is the only available fact, we must take from the expression, the clue to the potential, inherent syntax. If we are exposed to a series of verbal sounds standing alone, demanding our recognition and reaction, we acknowledge, first of all, its status of being an intended speech. Then consciously or unconsciously we strain ourselves to see the image of the total speech behind the suppressed expression (or the sound-replacement), picking up clues in the expressed forms, filling in the gaps haphazardly or skillfully according to the experience ... namely projecting our own syntactical orientation already acquired. Syntax is, in a way, a kind of sympathetic reaction supported by orientated imagination on the part of receptive mentality, and at the same time it is a filter or a formula through which the expresser analyses, reduces and formalizes his speech content.

Let us remember that it is our mental capacity that spans two still images on a screen shot one after another, and sees a motion. Let us also remember that we see images in inkblots and we can even choose an image if we strain ourselves. Is not linguistic expression far more suppressed and yet elusive?

If we are exposed to an expression, say “A daers B.”, we can read into it almost an infinity of possible states of affair concerning A and B, which are supposedly some things or persons, actual or imagined. What are the clues we are given here towards the optional syntax we choose, and how much of them are explicit? Perhaps the order of the three words, the ‘s’ suffixed to the apparent verb “daer”, which, accidentally is the reverse of “read,” are the only indications we have. Syntax is almost a preoccupation without which we only have the sounds parrots perceive and utter, or the pattern on a printed pages signifying nothing.

As in the case of electricity, we do not see syntax itself but we see its effect in the expression by which we can guess how it works. Syntax is not inherent in the items of language, i.e., vocabulary and grammar, however arranged, but wherever there is a speech, there is a syntax of some kind and the expression may most likely though not always reflect it in some way.

The Sentence: The traditional term “sentence”, as well as the other subordinate grouping of words i.e., “clause”, “phrase”, “words”, “affixes” and “inflections” are ambiguous in many ways and their application is often to be negotiated. Theoretically, the classifications are valid only in an atomistic view of the linguistic culture. In English especially, words are the atoms of language by which not only the way of writing but also the thinking is anchored ... words, the pragmatic atoms that are separately printed or written on paper and so entered into actual and mental dictionaries. Words may be further divided into affixes, and then into phonemes and then into phonetic or acoustic sounds beyond the realm of meaning. Whereas, words may combine themselves in various ways and manners into another entity as specified by such term as “adjuncts”, “phrases”, “clauses”, “sentence equivalents”, and “sentences”, and perhaps into “paragraphs”, “chapters”, “volumes” and so on. This is absurd and our use of classification is limited within the range of utility, and such is again not a logical but a practical compromise.

It has been the usual practice to recognize words first as tangible self-asserting entities and classify them according to the behavior and its immediate relationship to the other words, and building up to the final structure which is perhaps a sentence. The process is much in affected conformity to the method of objective sciences and

perhaps we might call that synthetic process from the linguistic atoms, “synthetic grammar”; (the very opposite mental process to the “analytical syntax”.) The mental process and its direction in the synthesis is no less an actuality to us than are those in analysis, when we consider the empirical fact of speech.

However, for the sake of consistency, we shall eliminate some of the traditionally accepted compromises in the terminology as well as in the concepts concerning these classifications which ought to be of the atomistic order of thinking.

The atomistic view must be purely mechanical and objective in its process toward generalization. It must even be a statistical, tentative presentation of the facts in the linguistic culture and never a logical assumption. In order to prove a series of sounds to be a word, we have only to present the statistical data of how frequently it is used as a word, along with other external evidences. In order to prove that a word is a verb, we must show the frequency in which it is used as a verb. In order to assert that it is a transitive verb, we must show the overwhelming frequency of the use over the cases where it is used as intransitive. Since we cannot hope to exhaust the factual data of such frequencies, we simply depend upon some significant, representative evidences and more often upon our own subjective a priori judgements.

It is obvious that this approach alone will not constitute a thoroughly scientific view of the human behavior called speech. It is as meaningless to classify words according to their physical forms, as it is impossible to consider the kind of word without considering its function in a given context. It is not always the popularly or statistically accepted meaning that makes a word a verb or a noun. It is not the statistical probability that makes a noun object or complement; it is the whole context, the speech, that determines it. Classification of words into so called parts of speech seem convincing and even useful, but the logical purpose of the classification is the classification itself and nothing more; the criteria involved are not the logical aims.

A speech or its segments may be incarnate in either of these classes of words in groups, but they do not constitute a speech or a segment of a speech unless there is the prescience that brings them together to stand up as an unit expression of the committed speech.

The term **sentence** is ambiguous in many ways and its application is often confusing

because of its unchallenged identity with the speech and perhaps it is not a false identity after all, (we hope.) It often denotes a speech in the expressed form while it may apply to a portion of the expressed speeches or even loosely to a continuation of such. In some languages the very category of sentence is non-existent or often so vaguely applied that it defines no actual units in the linguistic affair. Why a sentence, when it is a clause?

However, for practical purposes in the discussion, we might re-define the word as to designate any actual single or assembled linguistic element that, as a whole, constitutes a unit that embodies a speech, satisfying the original impulse by which the expression was effected. Sentences are houses, but not homes. It is the syntax, the latent vitality, that gives life to the assembly of linguistic items mobilized from the communal culture of language, and capacitates it to be the expression of the intention-charged speech. It is the syntactical “closure” of our mentality that beholds the speech in the mechanical and meaningless assembly of linguistic materials. Psychologists report that some brain injury causes a patient to be deprived of this ability. The patient may be able to tell what each word means and even translate word by word into that of another language he knows but he cannot make sense out of what he reads.

At any rate, speech and sentence are the two aspects of a single fact; one regards it from its function, the other from its substance. A speech, consciously performed or not, can be recognized as a synthetic body of analyzable segments with or without sufficient clues in its expressed form, and such is called a sentence.

Subsequent classification of word groups i.e., sentence-equivalents, clauses, phrases and adjuncts are merely relative norms, but convenient and useful without necessarily being re-defined here.

The other traditional term “grammar” has its basis, historically, in the atomistic view of the language with considerable encroachment upon the syntactical view of the language. Grammar is, in short, a consistent view and interpretation of the phenomena that takes place in the linguistic culture of a nation, but it can be made to denote something more precise. Synthetic grammar should, at least theoretically, investigate and draw statistical generalizations as to the formal changes that words undergo in themselves apart from the speech, the actual operations thereof. It should be like

dynamics of elements among themselves. If it has to be concerned with some syntactical aspect of the situation, it has to be that of a local syntax or of a presumed context. Grammar is a mechanical order and the mutual bond among the parts of the electrical instrument, while syntax is the mentality that operates the instrument. The instrument is idle unless both are present and functioning.

Unless one acquires sufficient experience and training in the syntax of a language, it is almost impossible for him to command the language as a language no matter how grammatical knowledge he may have about the language. One cannot play tennis only with a knowledge of its rules and associated culture.

To return to our discussion, we usually consider each distinguishable feature of the property of language (of vocabulary and of grammar) as having its proper meaning and function, or their segments, furtherly any group of such features will, by their inherent force, form themselves into a higher class of unity whose value is the mass of the individual units so assembled. And that eventually such an assembly will come to be the final entity, the structured whole, called a sentence, whose function and meaning is theoretically the gross total of all that is assembled. Such may be a practical and even an efficient procedure to study the affairs of languages. However, no matter how plausible the result may be, this procedure is not the only and the sufficient one. What we are proposing here is another direction of approach to the human activity called speech, and its culture, language.

After all, a speech is expressed in the form of sentences in a language which may most probably but not always come in parts distinguishable in themselves and bearing some indications as to their mutual relationship. Because of the statistical frequency, the sentence is often defined as a clause that stands alone in the capacity of a speech. But is not 'clause' a grammatical norm and never a syntactical norm, i.e., a certain inter-words relationship? We shall tentatively anchor our terminology of 'sentence' and the subsequent word-groups somewhere at this compromising conciliatory level. But of one thing we must agree, that an expression is not a 'sentence' because of its inner structure or quality, nor because of its formal features.

3. Analysis

Sentence patterns: This is another of the practical names of grammar-syntax complex

which we think has profound utility and wisdom in it. To be abrupt with our intention, what we are proposing is to replace the accepted concept of “sentence patterns in the word-order” with some syntactical denominators. In the place of **word** in the phrase **word-order**, we are trying to give a more precise idea, even though we may retain the “sentence” of the “sentence-pattern”. And the purpose of this section is to set up a classification of speeches (or sentences) in its utmost state of reduction in terms of their inner structure, i.e., (the structure of the mental syntax and its counterpart in the expression with more stress on the latter.)

Now, we have somehow defined the term “sentence” as a linguistic structure so bound by syntax, explicit or implicit, that it embodies a speech. As speeches are divided according to motivations into four classes, the corresponding grouping of speeches, and hence the sentences, i.e., the expressions, may be possible in somewhat corresponding ways.

However, what with the thousand slips between the content and its expression, and what with the fact that language and human life being such a pragmatic flux of historical, cultural and even irrational nature, classification of sentences according to the meaning, the referential actuality, imagined actuality etc., will result in no definite a system worth arriving at.

Hence a classification of sentences seems only significant when it is done in terms of its internal structure, and the classification of sentences according to the kind of motivation does not, though fundamental in speech, constitute significant classification. Accordingly such classifications are relegated from our present discussion. It will be almost absurd to classify such utterances as “Yes” in all its possible turns of insinuation and the shades of meaning. For the comprehension of an utterance as a speech, a directed talk into which the hearer is invited to participate, the grasping of the basic intent of the speaker in terms of his basic direction of motivation is the first essential. But we distinguish that classification from the present one called “sentence pattern”. The sentence pattern is an affair within a sentence: sentence as the expression, the observable phenomena.

We must only recall that a sentence is defined by the presence of a complete syntax and not by its internal state of affair such as structure or other attendant attri-

butes, and that once the sentence-hood is acknowledged to a group of words or even to a single word, the internal elements and their structure may begin to assert themselves. “Sentence pattern” is a catalogue of sentences according to their internal status, especially to their mode of structure, and never to the correlative actuality or insinuated intention referred to or effected under a particular situation where the speech is committed.

The classification logically presupposes two conditions. Firstly, we must establish some major common denominators among the structural units of sentences for the comparison. Secondly, such denominators must concurrently embody the corresponding syntactical norm and the linguistic unit. Our optimistic view is that we can arrive at such units of empirical block at a certain depth of syntactical analysis that corresponds to a certain height of grammatical synthesis.

Since our life is much conscious and mental, emotive speeches are more often borrowed from referential speeches in their structure than they are purely emotive. Also of the two types of notional speeches, interrogative speeches are often modifications of indicative speeches. Thus, simply for the sake of economy, our statistical norm for the classification of sentences according to the internal structure will be done over the indicative speeches committed in sentences. How do we usually analyze and formalize our descriptive, referential or notional motivation and content into language? If we could psychologically reduce the actual and possible cases into a minimum set of patterns, the results would reveal a consistency through which the syntax is habitually manifested and is perhaps, habitually, in some corresponding way, expressed in sentences.

Since individual speeches are empirically concrete and unanalysed, the classification according to their inner structure leads us only to abstract, formal speculations. It is only sentences, the objectified phenomena consisting of observable elements, that can be classified in terms of its attributes and the inter-relation of the elements. However, sentences, being the affair of actual language in its arbitrary operation, differ from one another, and there is an indefinite number of kinds and possibilities within and without a particular language and then it will be no longer possible to discuss the sentence patterns in the abstract without reference to some actual language, which in our case the English language.

Unless there is first a possible segmentation in the speech, the sentence will not significantly divide itself into parts. Disregard the total sense of a speech, then any arbitrary segmentation is possible and valid, and the reduction of such meaningless fractions of language will go long way to come to feasible set of patterns. A speech is embodied in a sentence (or perhaps in sentences) and if we are to boil it down to the bare pattern according to its internal formation, the constituent internal segments must be each a syntactically significant unit. The popular term of “sentence pattern” is not the pattern of the word-order, but of the syntactically significant segments of the speech and of the sentence concurrently.

The surprising simplicity of English sentence patterns in this sense is the strength and weakness of the language, and whether a progress or a degeneration, English is at the foremost of the linguistic evolution among the European languages. Even a grammar school child of a foreign country like Japan is taught the several basic sentence patterns of English even though it never, alas almost never, becomes his mental habit. We are not proposing anything new about this, or refuting the well established facts of English language and its lore, but we are trying to give more consistent logical support to the importance of the “sentence pattern”, especially in English. It is told by psychologists that the fundamental acquirement of the patterns, and the feasible usage thereof, is established before a native speaker is four years of age. This makes more often less suited teacher of a native English speaker to teach foreign adults than it makes him a better one. One may disregard the entire discussion here about the theorising of sentence patterns, but without the full command in the conscious or unconscious operation in the patterns, his adopted English will never become a living language to him. And unless it is a living language, it will not organically grow of itself. And the organic growth is, after all, the most efficient way of acquiring and understanding a language.

A little more should be said about such practical aspects of the sentence patterns, before we proceed into the discussion of speech-syllables, which is the main proposition throughout the present essay.

Each speech has its own syntax by virtue of which the aggregation of the individual items of linguistic convention are instituted as one self-explanatory unity. But there is an infinity of alternatives in the selection of proper forms and items from the vocabulary

and grammar of the language... which is one of the facts, while there seems to be only one **le mot just** to every individual speech...another fact of our linguistic experience. They are conflicting when thus stated, but they are not only compatible but also are the real feel of using language as means of expression. Each speech is valid only once for the particular situation with that particular intention of the speaker and that particular response anticipated from the receiver. Our motivation and experience is concrete and significant only to each particular happening in a circumstantial context.

However, because of our relative uniformity in our mode of perception and expression and also because of the constant conditioning by and conformity to the convention, the speech is by nature, the result of compromise between the abstract uniform formula and the concrete and original experience. The thinking patterns as well as the perception patterns can be observed for different individuals and then statistically classified into some types, and similarly, perhaps, the general cast of intrinsic syntax pattern for each individual may be obtainable. We may presume that if such is done comprehensively some day for a vast number of individuals and for many languages, the results will prove that the empirical reduction the grammarians have attained stand confirmed, and as long as the English language and the English speaking population are concerned, their syntax patterns and sentence patterns may be expected to show a striking correspondence and a parallel....they are originally so closely connected. Whatever the language, we are empirically capable of handling our intermediate pragma of language drifting between the speech and sentence, so proficiently and unconcernedly, as if they are objective tools concrete and self-asserting in themselves. Poetry is an art of language endowed with such actuality.

In the formulating process, we convert the motivated notion into the expression, firstly by designating linguistic representations of some prominent centers of attention, then by distributing the functional (or syntactical) forces among other linguistic features, either explicitly or implicitly, according to the convention. The syntax is the conscious command that is exerted and registered in the whole process of speech either out-going or in-coming.

The inclination of the mentality in the manner and type of speech formulation is at the same time influenced by the kind of the notion itself, reflecting the actuality

of experience as well as by the subjugation of the linguistic property to the language. It is very often an optional and expository design, when it is done consciously and deliberately. Our spontaneous talks are too often unconscious of its internal construction, either syntactically or grammatically. The a-grammatical corruption of idiomatic set-phrases are due to such unawareness or disregard of the internal structure of a speech, or a sentence.

A speech pattern, a mental frame, is closely related with sentence pattern, the linguistic routine, and vice versa. The classification of sentences according to their structural pattern presupposes the analytical common denominators of a speech-language combination or a syntax-sentence combination that can be handled and will work as mental and linguistic operative units. If such elements can be reduced to a minimum number of categories, we may hope to classify the sentences, actual and possible, according to the collocation of such blocks, or syllables of speeches embodied in indicative sentences. And these may be catalogued as the norm for all the sentence patterns.

Subject-Predicate Division: The very first major division of a speech, and therefore of a sentence or “parsing” in traditional term, should be traditionally and logically that of Subject and Predicate. Perhaps it is one of these Indo-European obsessions that any fact should be conceived in dual aspect, the static and the dynamic, the matter and the function, etc. We do not know exactly how this basic structure of speech, as well as of sentences, in Western mentality has been established. We neither know if the formal logic is the sublimation of such linguistic habits or the linguistic routine is the inadequate incarnation of the complete logos at work. We only know that in some languages, the Subject-predicate division is not distinct as in English or some other European languages. In such languages, often, it seems that not only the sentences, but also the speech fails to evince the distinctive apprehension of the speech motivation and content in these dual-factors. And in such speeches, there is no way to sound out if there is an awareness of division in the mental reality before and during the speech. At any rate, as long as English is concerned, the dualism seems to be not only a linguistic but also a psychological or even a logical pattern. At least the Subject-predicate juxtaposition of the logic and of the speech, expressed or unexpressed, is an established norm, against which anomaly is to be contra-distinguished.

Obstinate conformity to the Subject-predicate-frame of English is often puzzling to a foreigner while the looseness of the latter's language seems as much a riddle to an English mentality. In Japanese, for an instance, the subject, especially when it coincides with the speaker or the hearer, scarcely presents itself in one's linguistic consciousness. It is either too obvious or too insignificant. Thus, the subject is always, if necessary, presented as an adverbial element at the equal level with other adverbial information in the statement. It can be somewhat imagined by the English speaker if he reflects the addition of "you" in an imperative sentence in his own language. (Ref. historical development of subject)

However, we can at least agree realistically that the Subject-predicate division is a principal reality for English mentality and speeches, and that statistically it is safe to assume that a speech may potentially divide itself into the two parts, though either of the members may be, under certain situations, only implicit. The underlying moral is that the fundamentally unanalysable, whole impression and comprehension of the outer or inner state of affairs, is, either consciously or sub-consciously, analyzed into two factors. For whether such dual-mentality has constituted the language to fit itself, or reverse, we cannot produce evidences, but there seems to be a close mutual influence between them. And the irony of the thing is that the division applies only to those cases where the division is possible. Some discrepancies are always incurred when such reductions are extendedly imposed upon unapplicable cases. The traditional definition of a sentence as "a complete speech in Subject and Predicate" will only prove significant when the sentence happens to have such a division. Any other "defective" sentences are considered something short of a sentence forced to perform the duty of a would-be-perfect sentence.

Statistically, it is perhaps true that most English speeches in sentences are of this type and the mentality behind them must have been of a similar cast. But it is to put the cart before the horse if we should start defining sentences and clauses in terms of Subject-predicate relationship. It is, no doubt, safe enough, within the statistical probability, to anticipate the Subject-predicate division in a complete speech either fully or partially explicit, but it cannot be the law.

Suppose, for a linguistic purpose, we collect as many samples as possible of English

sentences in the Subject-predicate formation and distinguish them from each sentence, what are we to expect? Firstly, we obtain the fact that they are so divisible (no wonder for we have collected those that can be so divided!), secondly, the Subject is not only definable by its syntactical function but is also determinable from the linguistic nature (form and quality) of the language segments performing the duty. Thirdly, the predicate part is undefinably various in its structure as well as in its quality and is beyond any generalization. This is to mean that the predicate is the sentence or speech minus subject, but this is by no means a positive definition.

As for the speeches that do not fall into the dual-frame patterns in their expressed portion, the application of the scheme often proves meaningless. Say, for an instance, the imperative “No smoking!”; is it the predicate of the unexpressed sentence or the subject? Is the intention, the meaning of the speech, because of the ambiguity above, ambiguous? Certainly no.

On the other hand, is it really necessary to say “It rains.” when “Rains.” fully expresses the idea? Why should we need to say “I am....” when “Am....” will indicate who is the subject of the situation, and was it not the original Anglo-Saxon way of speech and in some way generally Indo-European? To be sure, these cases cited, have in themselves some indication of the Subject-predicate division, though not in separate words. Yet, why simply “Yes.” when it must indicate who is assenting. And if such a looseness suffices, there is no dictate that the missing part should be the subject. It could well be an adverbial phrase, as if to say, “As for me, am.” or “for my part, yes.”

We are not defining something by saying, “In such sentences as divide themselves into subject and predicate, subject is such and such, in function and in kind, and the predicate is what remains of the sentence.” Grammar often goes too far and uses the word “Subject” for some portions of speech in protracted senses. The pseudo-subject emphatically interjected into an imperative sentence, the seeming subject or participial phrases (which should be clauses actually, however), or the so-called sense subject for verboid phrases etc., are all of this type. It is almost a sin to teach that “Subject” is supplied, when an active sentence is to be converted into a passive voice, by means of an adverbial phrase introduced by a proposition **by**, **with**, etc....

At any rate, the vehemently upheld concept of a sentence, the speech in embodiment, as the bringing together of the two indisputable factors, is more or less a mental back-formation and is theoretically only a statistical probability, but actually a near-truth.

In order to classify the patterns of speech in their expressed actuality, the Subject-predicate preoccupation does not yield much, except when the subject may be definable in the context as one of the functional, syntactical units and when it is filled by a certain type of language item in a definable construction.

Some speeches are, thus, syntactically unanalyzable....as an atom of iron being at the same time a molecule of iron. In such as curt dialogue as, "Book?" "Yes.", each utterance is not a fragment or a representation of some hypothetical complete sentence with a built-in Subject-predicate distinction. It is rather, the whole meaning being so compressed, that the suppressed mental elements hardly come to the consciousness of the conversants.

Where a so-called sentence equivalent or even a fraction of one suffices, it will be an idle zig-saw puzzle to imagine how it would have been if it were to have been expressed in stereotype full-dress in two pieces; no less idle would be the discussion in the functions of each element of the hypothetical bona-fide completed sentence.

To conclude the section, we shall perhaps say that the Subject-predicate division is not an operative division of speech for a speaker or a hearer. It is a categorical abstract not always sanctioned in the actuality of speech.

And if we want to come down to some units of speech-language continuum definable in function and in property, we must look for them at a lower level of analysis. Thus, we proceed to the discussion of the analytical level one step lower than the speech-syntax level but some levels above the word-classification, both concrete and functional... And we are trying to re-define the speech or sentence patterns according to the collocation of such elements instituted by the syntactical function in the speech and according to the inherent quality and behavior of such units of language as observed by themselves. To quote the above samples, the dialogue "Book?" "Yes." are of two independent speeches; they cannot be further syntactically analysed, yet we know they belong, as words, to respective types of words. We are to propose new units, speech-syllables,

in four kinds, to handle this task.

Speech-syllables: In the preceding section, we have dwelt upon the division of speeches into Subject and Predicate, whenever such a division is possible, and come to the realization that Subject is distinguishable by two orders of criteria. Firstly, the Subject in a sentence is to be recognized by the inherent linguistic features...it is necessarily either of the grammatically recognizable noun-units, namely nouns and pronouns in the nominative case, other noun-equivalents, (either phrasal or clause or fragmentary.) It encompasses attributive modifiers, either preceding or following. Secondly, the Subject of a sentence, as the embodiment of the subject force can be designated syntactically. The recognition may or may not depend upon the formal symptoms that such a linguistic unit may carry. These two dimensions of clues are complementary to each other in locating and handing the Subject in speech practices. Theoretically speaking, it is somewhat like acknowledging a person by two different orders of criteria. The person is a woman and a wife. * Notice that the original equation is implicitly restricted by another equation that any wife has to be a woman. Subject is a syntactical capacity which has to be filled by nouns or their equivalents, while nouns are partially defined by their function to fill the capacity of Subject, (and, of course, of object, and of complement). The partial encounter and over-lapping between synthetic grammar and syntactical analysis at this level of actuality is a fortune for the English language. In an agglutinative language, as in Japanese, nouns will never go unpostpositioned in sentences, while, as I was told, in inflectional languages other than English, almost every noun must, in one way or other, be in one of its inflexional forms when enacted.

Once the recognition of such syntactical-noun units is established, we, by designating a section of a sentence, concurrently define it as a syntactical-noun which is at the same time a bona fide noun or noun-equivalent. Conversely, if we could know, by whatever way, a word or a group of words, out of their context, to be a grammatical noun or a noun-equivalent, we may assume that it can be mobilized into a sentence, actual or hypothetical, to fill its subject capacity.

Such is the way we reached one of the common denominators of sentences, namely

* Grammatically she is a woman and syntactically she is a wife.

nominals at the level of **speech-syllables**. This was possible as every subject is found to be enacted by a definable kind of word or grouping of words. Then could we do something of this kind for the remaining part of a sentence i.e., predicate as a whole, if there remains any? Before we proceed into the analysis of the Predicate of a sentence, perhaps we might review our principles of analysis by an analogy, which also is an apology for our set of ungainly neology.

Let us consider an isolated case of the utterance of one word, say “beautifully”. The idea and the mental content corresponding to this word is not only comprehensible, but also it is there before the word presented itself, and it can be there even if there is no word which, in this case, happens to be this “beautifully”. When prompted, we utter the word without much awareness of its internal construction or etimological divisions, or of its sound collocation and hyphonation, much less of its orthography, the order in which the letters are arranged. We say it in one single impulse even as the motivation is one. We might have said “so” with an equivalent or identical mental property and structure.

However, if we become a little analytical in the spontaneity of our utterance, the mere “so” may be displaced by “beautifully”; then we shall find ourselves almost sub-consciously aware and selective in the suffixation of the final “y”. The separation is not only semantic but also structural within the constitution of the physical word. If we go one level lower in our consciousness, the similar division between **beauti** and **ful** comes to awareness, while the latter segment **ly** can be no further divisible and remains as is. The division was again semantico-structural within a unit **beautiful**. Although the ultimate syllabication above the meaning surface will be beau-ti-ful-ly, the division is of a different altitude of analytical order, thus, schematically, we have,

Order of analysis	Unit analysed	Segment separated	Comparable equivalents
0	context	beautifully	uglily, nicely, kindly etc.
1st	beautifully	-ly	beautiful-ler, -est, -ness etc.
2nd	beautiful	-ful	beauti-less, -fy, -shop, etc.
3rd	beauti	-ty	verity, sorrow, joy, etc.
4th	beau		emi-, sinceri-, ami-, etc.

where the members in the right column are the comparable equivalents among which the indicated selection for the segment in the second column is respectively made.

What is asked is the recognition of the imperative order of analysis. Analytically speaking, we will never come to feel the division between **beauti** and **fully** unless we have first separated **ly** from **beautiful**, and likewise the break between **beau** and **tiful** unless the separation of **ful** from **beautiful** is already done. The isolated recognition of the word **beautifully**, on the other hand, will never come to our mind unless a higher unity, the back-ground, the context in which the word finds itself, is already accepted in a situation of actual speech. Unless by habit and illusion, one seldom spells his speech while he is thinking, speaking or hearing, nor perhaps even in rapid writing.

After so much about an analogy in word-syllabication, we may return to one original discussion. The individual speech may be subject only to a similar type of segmentation not only in mental awareness but also in factualized expressions, namely in sentences. The syllabication of the whole does not begin from the lowest order of the affair, but from the highest and the total gestalt. So a speech is either in itself an unanalyzable syllable or it is divisible into a number of syllables. *

*Theoretically, a speech is a undivisible whole, comprehended as a single instantaneous mental fact and act. And it is only by reflection and deliberate mental effort, and through non-spontaneous analysis that it can be segmented into parts. Practically, however, the actual speech is performed in **time**, where memory and anticipation are juxtaposed upon each other at the time-less moment of **PRESENT** in the whole mentality. Hence the dilemma of the expression of timeless affair in time. We can think of several items at a time, but we cannot say them at once ... we must memorize, without comprehending, the portion of speech that has gone before until the last word is said, while at the same time anticipating, through analogy and imagination, what is to come. Another dilemma is the fact that the whole cannot exist without the substance that incarnates it, and being objective phenomena the latter is subject to analysis and we have the resultant parts. Thus in a word, what is intrinsically a whole and mental is incarnate in the assemblage of self-asserting entities, the parts. What makes the reality more complex, but more actual, is the fact that such isolated materials of speech out of language are assembled not instantaneously but gradually and additively up the already complete speech and even oftener the mental image is being fabricated by selecting, collecting and compiling the inanimate linguistic materials into a structure as if in chemical synthesis (rather than assembling of an auto.) This not only applies to the out-going phase of speech, but also to the incoming phase of speeches.

Such is the reality of the speech in practice, but what we assert is that when we are to analyse we assume that the subject of analysis is the time-less whole.

Thus the parts of a speech may be apprehended as distinctive units even while the whole speech is comprehended as a whole unity.

A speech may be almost consciously composed in manipulation of the speech-syllables or even in its lower component elements down to the very phoneme of each sound element. A speech may also be extended with additive elements. The additive members of a speech usually stay away from the syntactical core of the expression. The additive members of a speech may be separated upon reception on the part of the hearer or the reader from his total comprehension.

The next thing we must decide for our analysis is the criteria. As language and speech is a communal growth, part actual, part mental, though autonomous yet not a premeditated fabrication, one finds it something more than impossible to come to some clear-cut principles as the ones we expect from the observation of the natural phenomena. Hence, in spite of the vigorously thorough-going logicity of the attempt and the method, any laws or reduction attributed to language and to speech is fated to be some form of a practical compromise and exceptions are always anticipated. Laws point out where they do not apply, but without laws, we will never know the exceptions. Our analysis always presupposes the comprehended whole, whose sovereign consciousness is imparted, if it must, to the primary divisions, and each unit of divided prescience may be further imparted, if it can, to the subordinate segments down to the N-th degree. The process is inversely reciprocated by the synthetic fabrication of linguistic items mechanically into the ultimate integrity. And somewhere, we might expect, these opposite progressions will meet, and perhaps our pragmatic mentality is operating the language in a band of area along the line of the encounter. To put it in a simplest way, we might say, that actual operational units of our linguistic activities are the actual language units that are concurrently the syntactical units. Since our mentality is not, by nature, too radically analytically orientated nor so blindly atomistic, the half-way actuality appears to be the truest to the fact and perhaps most handy. The speech-syllables are not a set of new facts, but a set of adapted names given to the well acquainted, only too obvious, linguistic actualities.

The primary division of usual sentences into subject and predicate was discussed in the preceding section. The division is logically the first order of analysis, if analysable, of a speech and more of a sentence. Each division if not subordinate to the other, but is only subordinate to the whole syntax. (It is like a relation of each letter in a word: they belong not to each other but to the word. The letters and the order in which they are spelt as a whole constitute the word.) However, the division is too much an abstract because it is solely the division by syntactical capacity and not by the physical feature and quality of the expressed language. No doubt, the subject has to be embodied by grammatical elements called nouns and the equivalent phrases and what not, but they may be found in the identical status in the predicate (as object or

complement). So the analysis at the level of Subject-predicate distinction does not yield tangible linguistic units for practical use or for reflective analysis.

The first and only thing we can do about the indiscriminate body of expression after we have decapitated a sentence by separating the subject, is to look for the similar kinds of word-groups syntactically significant and not subordinate to other sections but only directly to the whole sentence, disregarding predicate unity to which, however, it logically is subordinate. Whenever we find such syntactical nouns in predicate of a sentence, we find them usually filling the position either nominated as Object (direct or indirect) or as Complement in the ordinary grammar. It is perhaps to put the cart before the horse, that we should use such conventional terms as complement or object before defining such capacities of sentence elements. This must be tolerated, however, at least for the time being. The situation is much like building of an arch; one has to do two things at a time until both meet at the key-stone.

Thus, we found that the same quality of words or word-groups that fill the capacity of subject are also found syntactically significant and distinct in predicate, either filling the syntactical capacity of object or complement subordinate only to the total syntax. Then we must also notice that the ability to fill all of these three syntactical position is one of the major criteria of determining the class of word or word-groups as noun and its equivalent. Plotted by these two dimensions of factors, the syntactical-noun or **nominals** are fully conceived.

One more essential thing about nominals is that unless nominals are single pronouns, usually there is no explicit indication to show which of the three capacities the nominals are enacting. The order in which these nominals appear in the sentence (not in the speech, which is a timeless experience) is the only clue. The order of the nominals in the sentence carries the syntax in English language, more than the words or inflections do. We shall have further discussion on the nominals, but this is the way the nominals are instituted in our theory as one of the common-denominators of sentences so that we may reduce a sentence pattern according to the inner-structure not of words, but of the speech-syllables.

In the following sections, we shall define four syntactical part-of-speeches, or **speech-syllables**, namely **nominals**, **predicatives**, **adjectivals** and **adverbials**. The syllables are

not only introduced as a set of new names to the old facts, but also as a pragmatic aid for operating the language with clearer awareness of the structure, and for easier acquirement of the English language as a second language by foreign learners.

It will be benifitial if we use two terms with a differenciatic meaning to each: The term **comprehension** to mean the accomplishment of a speech, regardless of its internal state and nature. It is either complete or does not take place at all. **Syntax** does not exist where there is no **comprehension**, nor can we sensibly analyse an utterance that does not make sense to us, that which we (including the speaker himself) cannot comprehend. The term **apprehension**, to refer to the tentative recognition of a part in anticipation of the ultimate **comprehension**. **Apprehension** is an isolated awareness of almost anything in any manner that comes our way in our general empirical life as well as in the realm of language. However, an **apprehension** that contributes to no end is usually idle and whenever the term is used, it is used in its relationship with the higher order of apprehension that leads to the eventual **comprehension**.

We apprehend in the degree of our spontaniety, almost all the phenomena that takes place in a speech out-going or in-coming, or even in its process of comprehension. Each step of apprehension is accumulated in suspension, until the last word is said and all is comprehended. Comprehension of a speech is instantaneous while the apprehension of a sentence is cumulative, progressional and tentative.

Speech-syllables are the ultimate and highest order of apprehensions in speech. They are anticipatory, suspended open judgements subject to change. What is tentatively named as sentence-patterns are the classification of sentences according to the collocation of such highest possible grouping of words by **apprehension**, namely by the **speech-syllables**.

PART II

1. Nominals

To define what is empirically conceived and practiced is always an imposition of a restricted view. The fact is there beyond definition, and oftener, in spite of definitions. By defining a fact, one only displays his own scheme of thinking, and hence, the more

consistent the thinking, the less conflict in the proposed definition and the less real.

Now that we are to define in our own term what the nominals are, we must bear in mind that we are not creating a new set of mental entities, but are naming a conscious reality which has not been named consistently. The definition will be tentative and of half-way truth as we intend to be practical in our purpose.

It has been our misfortune that grammar, by its atomistic classification of words, told us what the nouns are and their equivalents, and that in the process, grammar has stolen some criteria from syntactical phenomena. While syntax has told us about what the internal relationship among words and word-groups are, more or less indiscriminately, whether it be a speech or a portion of a speech; and in that process of elucidation, syntax depended, by stealth, upon grammatical facts. Or, at least, it is our general impression that whether one calls it grammar or syntax, they mean some convenient melange of both, theoretically getting nowhere if pinned down to the ultimate. Actuality may be an insoluble pragma of illogical things in itself, but it gives us no excuse for confusion in thinking and reasoning. We need, at least a tentative order at every stage, for a higher order.

At any rate, nominals, as one of the four kinds of the speech-syllables, must be first qualified as speech-syllables. They must embody in themselves the two dimensions of qualification, firstly, they have to be syntactically self-asserting units in respective actual speeches, and secondly, they must be grammatically self-distinct units in themselves. Because of these cross-restrictions, the actual designation becomes an affair much restricted and definite. An actual speech is, if unanalysable, is in a single syllable; and if analyzable, it is to be presented in pieces each of which are speech-syllables, not words or phrases or clauses.

Then nominals, as one of the four kinds of speech-syllables we are proposing, distinguish themselves, firstly by their own peculiarities, and secondly by difference from other kinds of syllables.

Nominals are these speech-syllables recognizable in actual speech as expressed in sentences, spoken or written, heard or read, that stand as static representation of co-responding semantic items, subjective, objective or purely speculative and formal. The difficulty is that a nominal is a representation, the verbal symbol, for the correlative

so referred to, and at the same time it is the name given to the kind of linguistic item so employed. These two aspects coincide as often as they do not.

At any rate nominals are nouns and noun-equivalents, to borrow the established terminology, when viewed only from its grammatical aspect; yet nouns and their equivalents are syntactically nouns or their equivalents, that is to say, unless they are immediate division of the speech (they can be the full speech by themselves, or they can fill either of the three capacities, i.e., subject, complement, or object in the predicate,) they do not hold syllable-hood.

The introduction of the capacity in the preceeding paragraph is arbitrary and undefined. Now that it is a morphological affair only of pronouns, the traditional concept of 'case' is avoided for the subject and object (or nominative, vocative and all the train of terms) while complement is here considered a comparable capacity to subject and object, that can be fulfilled by any nominal, without morphological changes (except in the case of pronouns) or influences. For the mere sake of consistency and completeness, perhaps we may say that nominals can be (in either of four kinds) in a speech, (a) a nominal, or nominals are themselves the full speech, i.e., in the capacity of a sentence, (b) in the capacity of subject, (c) in the capacity of an object and (d) in the capacity of complement. The only conflict in this, is that the complementary capacity may be filled by adjectives and their equivalents. It is to be remembered, however, that this is a scheme proposed, not an assertion.

In order to present the samples in actuality, in the remaining part of the present section, the portion considered to be bona fide nominals are all marked off by square brackets, thus, [two things] must be considered here, though they are not the affairs restricted only to nominals.

Firstly, [the nominals] absorb [all the attributive elements] regardless of their inner structure for its furthest possible expanse, whether pre-posed or post-posed. Secondly, [the relation usually called apposition between nominals] should be considered as a psychological repetition rather than a syntactical relation.

[We] must keep in mind also [that the nominals when in one word do not show inflectional changes for the kind of capacity in which they are enacted except in pronouns and this only for subject (nominative, vocative) and for object (dative, accusative etc.)

but not for complement, which is not usually considered as case.] Logically speaking, [I like she] should be no less ambiguous than I like the girl, or perhaps [Me like she] can be distinguished only from Me likes she, but not from I like her. For the complementary case, [the situation] is worse. Since there is no inflection of a pronoun first person singular for complement, [English-speaking mentality] will keep fumbling between It's me and It's I for a while yet.

Thus [the power that designates a nominal whether as the subject, or object or complement] is always latent in the syntax and not in the nominals themselves. [The order in which they appear in a sentence] has here [a drastic influence]. [The order] may be shifted if emphasis is shifted around, thus, [the order] is also [a relative affair,] yet as the norm, [the general order] is more and more established as if in compensation to the loss of inflectional indications. [The general order] seems to be schematically;

[Subject		
Subject	Object	
Subject	Complement	
Subject	Object	Complement
Subject	Object	Object]

[It] may sound radical [to discuss the word order thus only among the nominals.] However, upon reflection, [we] may find [this paradigm] [the basic structure of English, which natives acquire before they are four years of age and go unconscious for the rest of their lives.] [The verbal elements] are introduced as the connecting symbol between these nominal items, so to speak, thus being more closely connected with the object and complement forming the predicate. Whereas, psychologically [the verbs] are under heavier influence of the subject rather than the complement or the verb that follows, (c.f. accident between the subject and the predicate verb).

[The distinction of the post-verbal nominals as to whether they are in the capacity of object (either direct or indirect) or complement] is not to be decided unless the total speech is comprehended, and to our consternation, [the distinction] is not always possible. [Some verbs] are so much of enigma in its insinuation that its post-verbal nominals are so nebulous in their character, though so clear in meaning. [Some] hold [that the transitivity or intransitivity of a verb in a sentence is only determined by

whether it takes an object or not], and [that what determines a verb transitive or not in dictionaries is the statistical frequency in which they appear....a thorough-going back-formation (which is a legitimate linguistic vitality but nevertheless a plausible polemic process)]. Is [the that-clause above] adverbial, or nominal in object relation to the verb **hold** ? [It] seems less sure [to say that unless we can define very well what is the capacity complement and what is the capacity object (direct and indirect at that), the distinction itself seems hazy and perhaps useless,] than to say that the full meaning is distributed conveniently between the syntactical devices and vocabulary contents of the verb, the classification for mere sake of classification.

[What is alluded here] is [the fact that the nominals as speech syllables are actuality, but their role in speeches i.e., the capacity, is a circumstantial designation, never a quality inherent.] Hence [it] is [no wonder] [that unless in a single pronoun, a nominal never contains in itself the indication as to the capacity it fills,] and if such capacity actually carries the notional and semantic content of a speech, [the order] is [the final recourse,] and worse still, perhaps [such categorical distinction] is lost to English mentality for eternity.

In Japanese, unless a noun is suffixed by postposition, [it] will never become [a part of enacted speech.] [It] remains to be [a word, static material out of use.] Once a postposition is added, however, [it] performs, and [the postpositions] are ever so many in variety that the noun can denote not only such an abstract capacity but far wider a scope of actual meaning and shades of meaning. Let [it] suffice, for the English speakers, [to recall themselves to the fact that some scholars proposed to establish “case” for each available preposition, and still others declared that the cases, as logical relation, should number seven powers to seventeen !]

[It] is not [the kind of the verb alone, nor the order of the nominals alone, but the total meaning, the syntax,] [that determines such unnecessary classification.] Perhaps [such] is [the fate of any language,] but [English] appears to be far-gone in this respect to the constant amazement and bewilderment of wordy foreigners. [No one] can tell [what these three nominals play in the formula **A mells B, C**, where A, B, and C are nominals and **mells** a verb whose meaning—and therefore the transitiveness or intransitiveness, or if transitive, whether it takes two objects or just one — is not to be

known.] [We] can imagine [almost N-th degrees of combinations of syntactical contexts imaginable.] [The fact to be acknowledged here] is [that unless one knows what is meant, nothing can be known for certain except the vast, though not a chaos, hierarchy of possibilities.] [It] is [the comprehended whole] [that verifies the analysis,] not [the analysis,] [the total meaning.] In this experimental case of **A mells C B**, unless we know all, [our analysis] is always [an indefinite system of syntactical possibilities.] [We] may know from the inherent form of B and C [that they are nominals,] yet [we] cannot tell [what capacity they perform (often we may not be able to tell even if we know what is being said !)] Is [it] [a change in the meaning of the verb,] or [a change in the function ?] And is [the meaning and function] overlapping somewhere or utterly of different orders of affairs ?

Perhaps [we] have digressed too far astray, yet [the point] must be made of the fact that, strictly speaking, there is no grammar unless one knows what is meant. [The discussion as to the differentiation of case and complement, or the differentiation of object and complement etc.,] will be valid only when what is meant as speech is concretely comprehended.

When a speech is committed, [it] is almost [an accidental fragment whose interrelation is so much unsaid (or perhaps over-said),] and [the hearer] is to fill in the gaps, or, out of the infinitely possible combinations of syntactical meanings, [he] must select [the one that seems to be the one intended.] [English] is more often in the sin of omission, while in Japanese the [sin] is committed in overdoing where there is little. When a foreigner is exposed to such a speech as English "He bought me ...", [the mental image he has so far fabricated] is [that of one being bought as if in a human traffic.] But upon hearing the final section "... a book", [he] has to erase [the half-built image,] and re-paint [a new picture that is true to the meaning.]

If he has a normal mentality, [he] will be accustomed to this kind of thing and will become able to half-predict what is to come and to suspend his imaginations until the last bit of information is given.

To ask a blunt question to the native speakers of English, is [me] in this particular speech above different from that in "Hit me !" If different, in what sense; in function (accusative or dative) or in meaning ? Is [it] [the content we pour into the same vessel] [that varies,] or are [they] the [different vessels with identical appearance ?]

[I] am alluding to another radical question, namely, is “Mr. A,” for an instance, as subject, as object, or as complement, different in meaning, or simply in capacity? Or are [the meaning and capacity] so much [a part of one thing] that we should not divide?

[The discussion] has been unreasonably desultory and prolonged only to provide enough samples for our prosody for nominals in actual cases. Leaving the discussion as to the categorial definition of capacities for later sections, and with some minor points below, [we] shall conclude [the present section which has been an effort to define, though tentatively and in some way, what are the real units of sentences which we should recognize and operate as nominals from their syntactical function and from grammatical features.]

[We] have mentioned that [the attributive adjectives are absorbed into nominals,] and [that the appositive nominals are considered to be the psychological repetition of the same.] [The pronouns] are, in a way, always appositive to the things or linguistic items they stand for with the referants unmentioned. “[He] [my brother] comes ...” or “[Mr. A] [he] tells me ...” has been on the lips until late. [Noun adjuncts] could be considered as one unit as in this very case “noun adjuncts”, regardless of the inner relationship between the constituent nouns. [We] consider [ice-cream] as one noun which could be a nominal in a proper context, regardless of the fact that ice is modifying the cream or cream is modifying the ice or that it is just the admixture of ice and cream in such palatable way. [Gender] is almost [a sub-grammatical phenomenon the English language inherits.] Grammatically, [pronouns in third person singular] only retain [it] as if it is a linguistic coccyx, and for the rest, [it] is [a matter of rhetorical habit.] [Gender] has been [the imaginary sex or a duality we impose upon the words themselves] and not [the natural or imagined sex of the things they refer to.] [The parallel] is often inducing and natural but [we] should not be confused. When English **she** and **he** were introduced to Japan some seventy years ago, [a pair of new vernacular words] were coined to match the sexed personal pronouns third person, the effect of which was so much full of sex that these words have been established in Japan ever since as almost exclusively for the lover and the beloved. [Japanese youngsters in junior high English classes] feel embarrassed to think of their

parents and friends in terms of these pronouns. In Japanese, there are [thousands of personal pronouns or round-about nouns to indicate persons] where the selection of pronouns exclusively by sex seems almost too blunt and rude. [We foreigners] want to know [if there is a semantic difference between **she** and **he** or **him** and **her** etc.] Is [it] a [difference in function] or in meaning] ? [A certain Chinese linguist,] I recall, recommends [the use of 'hse'] in a case where no such distinction is necessary or possible, or even appropriate.

Finally, perhaps having come this far with the marking of actual nominals in the passages, [the reader] might have felt disappointed to find that for so little to be done, so much has been said and wasted. [He] is justified in feeling so; [nominals] is [such a matter-of-fact affair]. Perhaps [some readers] must have found [that many apparent nominals are not marked off as such], but unless by mistake or in marginal cases, [all the nominals] are marked and that, [only the nominals.]

If you have found some nominals left unmarked, [your attention] is directed towards the fact that the apparent nominals are in some way or other subordinate to other speech-syllables. And [it] is [the sad consequence we must take of our logical consistency to the original theorem with which we started the analysis, i.e., the syllables must be only subordinate to the maximum context, the speech.] Psychologically, [it] is true [that **I** as well as **school** is perhaps a noun of almost comparable value in a sentence **I go to school**, or [**I** and **you** in **I look at you**.] There is [an odd unreality] in calling only [**I** of both cases] [nominals] and not [**you**]. [This] cannot be avoided in our scheme of analysis. In the present theory, [**to school** and **at you**] constitute [another unit,] [another kind of syllable.] [Many of the cases where apparent nominals are un-designated] are of this type if kindly readers will go over such as you might have marked off yourself. [Another such case] would have been [the nominals of the subordinate phrases and clauses.] [Such a unit,] may it be a clause or a phrase, with no cause of difficulty for comprehension, may prove [a dilemma for analysis and designation.] Often [it] is [a precarious matter] [to decide if a unit is subordinate to the other unit or not] thus instituting itself as an adverbial element to the predication, or [it] may happen to be [the complexity of the structure in which more than two sentences or lower units are collocated in parallel or in appositional parallel, [the last of which]

is [accidentally the case of this sentence.] Whenever one of such clauses is considered, according to the context, subordinate to the other clause according to the whole sense of the speech, [it] is relegated and is considered as an adverbial element, and hence [their nominal-hood] is relinquished to the adverbial-ness. Psychologically, [this treatment] is not [a smoothly-accepted process.]

[To insist upon this] may be nearly [an offence.] [**He** of **If he comes today**] should register as prominent as **I** in the principal clause **I should be happy**; and why should [**he**] fail to be recognized as a nominal while **I** enjoys it? [**The claim**] is legitimate. If it is the actuality, [we] cannot prevail otherwise upon anybody. But if it is for the sake of formal consistency in our polemic process, [we] must admit [that there is a difference of order between these two corresponding phenomena], and of such discrimination [we] are formally concerned. Grammatically observed, [a sentence] is [a kind of clause beyond which no superior clause is found,] while analytically, [a subordinate clause is a segment of a sentence that happens to be a replica of a sentence, within which perhaps another microcosm of a clause may be found] About these points [we] shall have [more to discuss] in the latter sections.

2. Predicatives

There is a considerable confusion about the predication of human speeches. The confusion is caused by the psychological identification of three orders of affair concerning the predication. Suppose a speech as “He goes.”, in which, the subject is already pinned down, ‘goes’ remains as the predicate. Now this ‘goes’ is a verbal equivalent for the actual act of the subject; it also carries the speaker’s mental assertion about the subject, i.e., “I assert that the person is in the act of ‘going’ at this moment.”, and lastly, it is vaguely felt as the portion of the expression in which the animistic energy of the sentence is invested. If we cling too much to the first, we shall have a nominalistic world of imagination where every word is self-existing actor and object, and if to the second, we shall have an abstract, almost formula-like, concept of speech, and finally, if to the last, we shall have a mechanical type of linguistic dynamics.

But as we have early discussed in this essay, we will anchor our observation upon the objectified phenomena, the expression, as the product as well as the cause of the subjective phenomena of speeches.

Thus, when one says 'He goes.', what he can expect to cause in the recipient is whatever the sentence in its whole, can possibly produce or induce in the latter. It is an illusion that something is being conveyed to the other. He only creates and presents an expression, though he may expect somewhat predictable reaction in the recipients. If anything is conveyed, it is an empty vessel which the recipient must fill, on his own resources. It is the symbolic purchasing power that is exchanged but not the bank-notes as such when we transact monetary-wise.

The predicate, as contrasted to the subject of a speech, may be a mental reality to some conscious speakers, but is usually an abstract category that never asserts itself as a whole unit. Perhaps this is because the predicate is syntactically an assembly rather than an organism. This is to be contrasted against the homogeneity of the subject. If compared at the same level of analysis, perhaps the subject, as nominal, is felt as a solid unit to the mentality because of its being in one syllable, whereas the heterogeneity of its inner elements is pulling the predicate into kinds and orders of segments.

Thus when a sentence, in sound or in letters, registers 'He goes.', we are to form an abstract frame, and fill it out of our own imagination within the possible and likely actualities imaginable under the situation. We know what it can mean (and perhaps what it cannot mean). We may, as the receiver, assume that somebody is expressing his observation to be acknowledged, and by presenting these two words in this collocation he at the least expects that we will be forming our reaction as prescribed. The sentence provides us with some clues that there is a male person in the situation, whom we may personally know, or may not know (we have to take a chance), and that the person is in the act of 'going'; as for its direction, speed, purpose, manner, etc., we are not concerned, and that the observation is made at the moment when the speaker spoke thus.

Now, if the given speech is "He goes to school.", 'goes to school' is supposed to strike us as a single unit — the predication to the subject. Thus we may go on for N-th degree, with the single fact remaining, that if we take out the subject from a sentence, we have the predicate remaining. If we take out of a sentence, what is considered to be the subject, and find nothing remaining, we say a speech is there but

there is no predicate. If we can not find the subject in a body of expression, the fragment is predicate regardless of the kind and structure, and it is in itself a speech. But in all cases, it remains a sentence and a speech.

And if we are not compelled to analyze or if we do not feel any discontinuity within the predicate, the matter is settled there and then. But if we must analyse because it is analysable, there must be some order and priority in the analysis. And as the shortest and most symbolic way to the reality of mental function, we may consider an extreme case of predication. What is the single unit of language that can stand alone as predicate, either by itself or with subject? Perhaps it is a statistical fact, but we are most likely to obtain a number of words which are grammatically distinguished as verbs. If we start testing each word in the vocabulary and see if a word is capable of being employed by itself into a speech, namely if it can demand a response, we are half ascertained that it belongs to a particular species of language items. This may appear to be a rather radical way to determine verbs; it can tell the verbs by indisputable quality ascribable to verbs, and such is the way verbs are acquired to a person, (if it may be only in English.) Notice that we are trying to define verbs according to the syntax, which pre-supposes the communicable speech, i.e., the understood situation and the comprehended whole, and not from the objectified linguistic features. Such is the reason for this round-about definition... which we presume is the natural way we acquire the awareness and distinction of certain types of words differentiated from other kinds of words or other items of language.

It is perhaps too much of a conjecture to assume that the incipient speeches of human beings would have been very likely in the simplest forms of command when some action was to be called for; and the names of the things and persons when recognition of objects were the purpose, and much oftener these two aspects could have been accomplished in an indiscriminate utterance. We may safely consider that the speech motivation simplest and most immediate with minimum of situation and context involved is the imperative motivation and its expression.

As names of things and of persons were identified in animistic mentality, so perhaps was the effect of naked verbs in imperative contexts. Such verbs could have been registered as if they were the commanding will of the speaker incarnate, not

only demanding, but also self-accomplishing by their own force. It could be said that the effects of verbs in imperative use are the live experience not only to the primitives, but also to the subconscious mentality of us moderners. (Consider how we avoid them!)

At any rate, the verbs in their symbolism, are dynamic and in the expression, are themselves the site of vitality, and do almost geometrically govern the whole structure into an organized unit that 'makes sense', first, within the predicate and then perhaps with the subject. And perhaps such is the reason why the predicate verb shines out in the predicate and even the subject seems as if it is an additional references or a mere index. If there is a predicate verb in the predicate, usually it is impossible to conceive the predicate without first recognizing the verb.

But if we are to be more pragmatic, we might consider that the entire expanse of predicate is an extension of such verbs, the syntactical verbs which are subordinate only to the speech, not to the subject or to any other conceivable segment of the speech.

In order to avoid the traditional connotation stuck to the term Verb and verbal-phrase, we shall use the term 'predicative', symbolically meaning that it is a speech syllable that carries the predication of a speech and acts as predicate of the sentence. The syllable-hood is ascribable to predicatives because of its independence in a speech. In a sentence 'He goes.', 'goes' does not belong to 'He', but is as much a part of the sentence as 'He'. This is to say that it is a syntactical unit and we handle them as practical entity in our speech with clear distinction of a single conceivable unit. It is, on the other hand, supported by the grammatical features, the morphological characteristics. And when predicatives are recognized as a speech-syllable, it expels some of the subordinate elements within the predicate that can claim independent syllable-hood, for an instance, the nominals in capacity of object and complement, and perhaps some other kind of syllables we are going to define subsequently.

In the remaining section, we shall further discuss the various aspects and problems of predicatives as a new name looking for a more precise application. The bold faced portions in the lines are what the author considers to be predicatives of the respective sentences. As it was the case with nominals, the term 'predicative' is only appli-

cable to the predicate verb and its phrase of the principle clause of each sentence. And as for the extent to which the trailing end of the predicative encompasses, our technical rules **are** consistently applied, and to this, our discussion **will** reach in time. As for the convention of marking the presence and extent of predicatives, two or three points **have** to be laid out at the onset. Namely, predicatives **are** not always single words, nor always unintercepted series of words; and whenever such foreign elements are placed within the span of a predicative, it **is** either ignored or parenthesized according to the case. In fact, such **will** almost always **be** the case as this sentence happens to be. The span of awareness must, however, pass over these foreign matters on its way.

Again, as was the case with the nominals, the predicate of the subordinate clauses **are** not marked off as predicatives, though they may psychologically demand our recognition as predicatives. The reasons for such unnatural treatment **will be** explained later as we consider them to be other kind of speech syllables, either adverbial or adjectival, according to the maximum context.

Whatever may be the syntactical criteria for the speech-syllable in question, we **will find** it far easier if we go by grammatical standard because grammar has defined them so well though somewhat going out of its scope. Predicatives in our analysis **are** those predicate verbs and their subordinate phrases, and those of the principal clause only; and if there are plural sentences in a speech, those verbs of the parallel sentences.

Grammatical observation and interpretation of the verbs and the related affairs **have been** thoroughly established and shall not need much revalidation. From the syntactical point of view, however, some features **may be** given more stress and some features **will** be rearranged to fit our analytical purpose.

Among the four kinds of speech-syllables, predicatives **are** closest to the phenomena of grammar, and regardless of the syntactical qualification, the designation of predicatives **is** far easier than the recognition of other syllables, or, at least, than finding nominals. Theoretically, if a speech is comprehended, there **can be** no confusing of nominals and predicatives even if there is an accidental ambiguity in the expression, as when we say "Like likes like." If one does not know what is meant by a statement,

he **cannot**, and he **should** not try to analyse.

We **might venture** some survey over the phenomena of predicatives in much the same way as grammar, except that it is done here for the possible analysis of the sentence.

Firstly, there **are** two types of expositions for expression which constitute a basic layout for the predication. One **is** the direct predication the other **is** the prephrastic. In the first, what are called finite verbs either **stand** alone or **lead** the verbal phrase, whereas in the second, the so called auxiliary verbs either **stand** alone or lead the verbal phrase that is headed by an infinitive, usually bare. (for the cases of 'have' as auxiliary see, p.106). No two verbs **are** annexed with equal status unless in parallel; the order of the priority given always to the preceding unit. That is to say, the preceding unit **can represent** the following suit when it has to be curtailed in expression. Thus the first verbal unit, which usually is either a finite verb or an auxiliary verb, **bears** the link with the subject and hence it **incurs** inflections towards the subject. We **may find** such finite verbs, either auxiliary or ordinary, as head-words of the predicative. It **is** usually the head-word of the predicative that is pushed forward beyond the subject in order to stress the effect of the speech, thus effecting the sense of imperative, interrogative, subjunctive or emphasis. **Note** that the usual inversion does not affect the order of nominals! It **is** also the head-word that has the inherent tense system.

Tense is another factor of speech expressed by the predicate, and specifically by the head-word. From our point of view, English **has** only two tenses; it **is** either present or past. Some of the extremely complicated tense classifications in usual grammar **are**, to the author's opinion, a confused view indeterminate either to be practical or theoretical, psychological or formal. We **do not** subscribe to a classification which will have us classify such a hypothetical verbal phrase as "would have had been having had to come" as Future-subjunctive-past-perfect-continuative-infinitive-perfect, and the like. Neither **would we like** to meddle in the mud to decide when is one really coming when he says "I would come.", nor to classify every possible insinuation an average English-speaking man in the street makes by a statement at a certain period of history in a certain area of England or America, and so on. Thus **is** the designation of any

predicative in the head to tail direction.


Another direction to determine the extent of the verbal phrase is to find its liaison with the post-verbal nominals or perhaps with the adjectivals. The relationship between the predicative and the following nominal is not latent in either of the elements, but is a product, or a projection between them. That is to say, whether such nominals are object, or complement (or adverbials) **can be** determined when the combination institutes a comprehensible context and such comprehension is imparted to each element more or less in a way of back-formation. Thus the tail of a predicative **has** much to do with another important factor of the syntax, which is contrasted to the formal function played by the head-word. When head and tail are fortunately in one word, the problem is simplified. It **must be**, however, remembered that it is the tail of the predicative that determines the pattern of the sentence. **Suppose** we have a sentence "I am reading this."; **should we consider** that the person is in such a state, namely "to be reading the essay", or **should we consider** that he is in the act of 'reading' more or less continuously, thus supposing that 'am reading' is an equivalent of 'read' taking the object 'this' ? When we say "One is charming", we **know** what it means, and never **doubt** ourselves as to the adjectiveness of 'charming.' In the previous case, grammatically, both **are** valid. One **may demand** that either is the really intended, or really to be comprehended, yet he **cannot assert** or **argue** upon the internal evidences alone. It is the analysis that verifies the meaning and the use, but it is the comprehended meaning that verifies or rejects an analysis. As for the technical compromise of these troublesome verbal-phrases, we **shall discuss** it after we have cleared the minor points in our scheme of thinking.

Perhaps the reader **might have felt** odd in noticing 'not's' being in bold type. It is **not** a theoretical necessity, but is a practical device. Since 'not's' connect themselves closely to any verb, rather than to nominals, and since such is evinced in the elipsis of various kind and the orthographical 'cannot' in our practice of analysis, merely for the convenience's sake, they **are** considered as if the mathematical indication of minus to the value presented.

As for the verboids, namely participles, gerunds, and infinitives and their subordinate elements, we **need not** deal with them here because they are never predicatives; they **have been** converted under each context to either adjectives or nouns or adverbs, though they

retain some analogical verbal functions.

The following schematic diagram shows the general structure of predicatives:



In an explanation to the table, a few remarks **are** to be made. The entire scope of predicative **is** horizontally divided into two sections; toward the head, we **have** the “finite” portion, and towards the tail we **have** the “verboid” portion. The scope is also vertically divided into three levels: the first level for the direct predication, the third for periphrastic predication, and in-between for semi-direct-predication. The institution of the semi-direct predication **may need** an explanation. It **is** separated from the regular periphrastic predication because of its peculiar liaison with the following verboids (either to-infinitive or past participle) and also because of the complete absence of the notional meaning in the auxiliary ‘have’ as compared to the ordinary auxiliary verbs. It **has** also **lost** its voice implication.

Attention **is** then directed to the lower margin marked for four qualities of a predicate, i.e., tense, number, voice and aspect. **Notice** accordingly that tense (either present or past) **concerns** all the three types of predication in the finite portion, while the number concerns only the direct, and semi-direct predication in their finite portions, and notice that the voice is only borne by the finite in direct predication. The voice for the semi-direct and periphrastic predication **is** borne by the verboid portion. The so-called aspect **is** strictly an affair of verboids in the English language, to our relief and delight. As for the voice, we **have provided** a tentative class in parenthesis, “reflective”, which English shares with other cognate languages, but its grammatical values have been lost in varied degrees. Some reflective cases **are** such that the object happens to be the doer himself, whereas in some cases, without the reflective pronoun, the meaning renders itself uncertain.

For the benefit of the reader, [the lines from this sentence down] **will be** marked both for predicatives and for nominals, while the topic **will cover** various aspects of predicate verb formations in English.

[The author] **wishes** [to limit the use of ‘complete’ and ‘incomplete’] only to the intransitive verbs, either in the finite portion of any verb or in any form of verboids. [The incomplete-intransitive verbs] (the so called copula being one of such,) **deserve** [distinction]. [It] **anticipates** [an indispensable complement, either in nouns or in adjectives.] [The problem which faces us here] **is** [whether the verboids in the predicative are adjectival complements, or a part of the predicate verb.]

[We] consider [that both views are correct,] the only problem being in how to deal with them in our analysis.

[It] is [a tentative proposition, though with practical purposes,] yet [we] **may agree** [that the portion from the head down to the first voice indication towards the tail, is the predicative,] and whatever the verboids in any of the three aspects in how long a series, [they] may be considered [adjectivals leading all the rest of the suit.] Thus ["I would have had told him."] is [a transitive expression], whereas, ["I would have been telling him."] is [an intransitive expression]. [This] is because (the first voice indication is made in the verb 'be' (which happens to be in the past participle) which is an incomplete-intransitive, thus, ['would have been'] is [the predicative proper], while the remaining 'telling him', is an adjectival unit altogether. In this context, ['telling him'] is [a kind of attribute to the subject 'I', namely a complement in adjective.]

According to this tentative agreement, [we] **shall consider** [that the so-called passive form, ('be' plus p.p.) and the progressive form ('be' plus present participle), dissolve into the incomplete-intransitive verb and aspect-carrying verboids, all of them being complementary adjective plus their subordinates.] In the proceeding part of this section, [the bold-faced portions] **have been** mostly of this type. In a sentence "We will have come to be known to every one.", ['will have come'] **should be** bold faced while ['to be known to every one'] is to be considered, en masse, [a unit of adjective] regardless of its inner structure. *

[We] **must also consider** [some verbs that have absorbed particular adverbial particles.] When established, [such a union] **makes** [itself] [more than the sum of the two elements,] not only in vocabulary meaning, but also in their grammatical function. [It] is [the usage], however, [that gives the licence to such compound verbs.] In some cases, as in this sentence, [the verb] **takes** in [the postposed adverb, say, for instance this 'in'] as readily as if the latter is a suffix and no less readier than if it were an attributive. Obviously, [a phrasing 'in the adverb'] is impossible in the context. [The marking] **will depend** upon the degree of independence the analyzer feels

*'to every one' here is a prepositional phrase in adverbial use, modifying either the adjectival 'known' or 'to be known' or the predicative, or even the whole sentence, however.

about the suffixed adverbs.

As for the particulars of tense, voice, number and mood, we **shall have to discuss** under a separate heading in more detail. To conclude the section, [some notes on practices of analysis for predicatives] **are** presented with some reminders as to the syntax.

[Our strict conformation to the present system of analysis for predicative] **will**, often, as it has, **result** in odd and unnatural paraphrasing of sentences. But if analysis is in anyway an unnatural prosody, [a consistent analysis] **is** perhaps better than a concessional make-shift analysis. We **console** [ourselves], therefore, by asserting that, syntactically, "I am sleeping." is closer to "I am sleepy.", and that "she is charming." is closer to "She is lovely." than they are respectively to "I sleep." or "She charms.". [We] **are** at least more consistent in our own way in saying that 'him' of "I am teaching him." is not the object of the transitive verb in the progressive form 'am teaching', but is the grammatical object of the transitive verb 'teach', which happens to be in its participial form, thus instituting an adjective-equivalent 'teaching-him'.*¹ [Such] **are** [some] representative cases revealing the general policy of our analysis for predicative.]

[The readers] **are** also reminded of the fact that, in the light of syntax, predicative is under the cross influence between the preceding nominal and the following nominal. [The head of the complex predicative] **bears** [its relationship to the subject,] while the tail bears its relationship to the following nominals. When the inner structure of the predicatives gets more complex, [a noun or its equivalent in the predicative phrase] **pushes** [itself] up to the syntactical surface and **behaves** as if it were an independent post-verbal nominal of the syntax; or more probably in the out-going phase of a speech, [a more or less dispensable post-verbal nominal] **may lose** [its independence as a syntactical syllable] and **submerge** into the sub-syntactical level within the predicate that absorbed it. ['Him' in the sentence 'I see him.'] **is** [a syntactical object,] while 'him' in 'I look at him.' is a grammatical, i.e., sub-syntactical, object.*² Likewise, ['him' in 'I saw him.' and 'I have seen him.' or 'I have to see him.'] **is** [a syntactical

*¹ as to the relationship between 'teaching' and 'him', see p.p. 195, **Subordination**.

*² thus, is relegated to one affair of subordination.

object], while 'him' in 'I am seeing him.' or 'I am to see him.' is the grammatical object of verbs in various forms, though syntactically no longer verbs. If we recall, [a sentence] is in either direct or indirect predication, and at the same time [it] is either present or past in tense, and [it] is either active or passive in voice. From these three coordinates, [no English speech] is, if it is formally conceived, exempt or free.

[We] **think** [we may find some more support for the preceeding somewhat begotted practices if we preceed into the disucussion of adjectivals in which most of the verboids are to be included.]

[One thing essential about the predicatives in their relationship to the syntax and to the sentence pattern] is [that the distinction of post-verbal nominals either object or complement, is not inherent in either the predicates or the nominals.] [The distinction] is [a kind of approximation], and often [a nominal] **falls** between the two capacities in spite of the fact that we know the whole meaning as clear as the words. [We] **must know** [the whole meaning, the organic whole,] before we can sensibly analyse for some ulterior purpose. [Such]* is also [the ambiguous distinction between the complement object and adverb.] Similarly [the verbs] **have not been** divided into two categories at the beginning. When one says "Sleep !" [it] **can mean** [that one is commanded to go to sleep,] and at the same time, [that he is ordered to put a baby to sleep, though the baby is not named.] When one says "I slept all day", [the "all day"] **can be** [the object that is slept away,] or [the period that he slept through.] And by "I over-slept myself" [one] is only confused as to whether 'myself' is an adverb of emphasis or the object which happens to be the doer of the action. And apparently [the ancient speaker of English] **left** [much more] in the imagination of the receiver, unless they had some other devices ... such as inflections, post-positions, aspects etc., [which], however, [they] **seem** to have had.

Perhaps [we] **may recall** [our earlier discussion on 'A mells B, C'.] [The type of capacity fulfilled by each of A,B and C, especially B or C,] is unknowable unless the character or the meaning of the verb 'to mell' is known and perhaps vice versa. And perhaps, even worse still, [we] **may not be** able to force upon the nominals such back-formed classifications, in spite of the fact that we know clearly what is being said

* Is this 'such' adjective, adverb or pronoun ?

and perhaps, still worse, and more often, simply because we know them too well.

3. Adjectivals

Logically, we may consider the preceding two kinds of speech-syllables, namely nominals and predicatives, to be cardinal in the syntax of speeches as well as in sentences. We have two other classes of distinguishable speech-syllables to offer, whose functions are more or less auxiliary, or less prominent in the syntactical collocation of syllables. It may also be said that they are psychologically located more remote from the center of the speech. The first of which, perhaps less remote from the core of the expression than the other, are adjectivals. Psychologically, perhaps, the recognition of the attribute alone as abstracted from the object, should follow, not precede, the recognition of the things in themselves. In the expressed language, though diverse and complex in its internal possibilities, the adjectivals are of limited capacity. Semantically, they are the words or groups of words standing for the attributes, either defining or describing, restricting or qualifying something or a state of affairs referred to as nominals. Grammatically, the adjectivals may be embodied by the so-called adjectives, adjective-equivalents (noun-adjuncts, phrase, clause etc.) **in so-called predicative uses**. The last four words of the preceding sentence are in themselves an adjective equivalent prepositional phrase, but the unit is not an adjectival because it is attributively merged into the preceding noun. Thus, unless an adjective or an adjective equivalent is the sole expression of a sentence, the adjectivals must fill the capacity of complement in a sentence.*

Being remote from the core of the expository strain, the relation an adjectival bears towards the total syntax is rather lax and leaves much to be conjectured by the receiving mentality. The logical and syntactical relationship of an adjectival to the rest of the speech is often much implicit and ambiguous, and often too far-fetched.

The relationship between the predicative and the involved complements is even farther apart and there seems to be almost no mutual bonds. The adjectivals betray very little of their liaison with the noun or nominal to which they stand complementary. To add to that ambiguity, there exists a worse obfuscation due to the economy of

* what is usually called predicative use as contrasted to the attributive use of adjectives.

language, namely that the adjective unit fails to reveal whether it stands in modification to the noun or whether it stands as complementary to the same noun or nominal. It is often collocated among the other speech-syllables so absolutely and abruptly that it only exerts some vague influence and association over the general purport of the speech. Some adjectivals are hardly even complementary, yet too static to be considered adverbial. Adjectivals as complements are syntactical units as isolated as the nominals as complements. They do not belong to other speech units except to the entire speech, nor do they show any inherent indication as to their complement-hood. One clue to its detection is the fact that it is post-verbally collocated. Hence one could distinguish the element that fills the orbit for the complement, and if it is not a nominal, it is almost sure to be an adjectival.

We consider it somewhat illogical to classify verbs, as complete or incomplete, retrogressively by the explicit existence of a complement, any more than to classify verbs according to the presence of an object or objects. As we have been doing in the foregoing sections, we shall mark off all the adjectivals we find in the following paragraphs by a pair of wedges.

Adjectivals present far less marginal problems because it is definable by a pair of criteria close to each other. Syntactically, an adjectival must be <in complementary capacity> and grammatically, it must be <in some form of adjective, which includes prepositional phrases, participles and infinitives.> As usual we might lay out some of the restricting or describing, may <be considered adjuncts.> All the subordinate elements can be absorbed into the adjectivals. All the adverbs that attributively modify, either restricting or describing, may <be considered adjuncts.> All the subordinate elements of adjectives and their equivalents will be <considered as their internal elements,> thus bearing no independent syllable-hood. If in complementary capacity, all the verboidal word groups, (nexus, or whatever the names they may be called by), are as a whole, <encompassed within the adjectivals.> The participial portion of the passive form or progressive form and some of the complex tenses are <treated under this heading.> There will be some difficulty about the inclusion or exclusion of adverb elements in the subordinate portion of an adjectival, unless one knows exactly what is said. More often, adjectivals being so far away from the syntactical core, the choice does not,

however, drastically affect the general meaning. Thus, in our practices, unless the independence of the adverbial element is so prominent and essential in the syntax that it can stand alone and be moved to some other syntactical position, usually the adverb elements in subordinate elements are <enveloped within the heading of adjectivals.> However, some mis-analysis will be <drastic in its damage upon the total meaning> For an instance, in the very preceding sentence we have marked as adjectival from the adjective 'drastic' to the full stop. However it includes two adverb-phrases led by the prepositions, respectively 'in' and 'upon'. Hence we have the following alternatives,

- a. [mis-analysis] **will be** <drastic> (in its damage) (upon the total meaning)
- b. [mis-analysis] **will be** <drastic (in its damage) (upon the total meaning)>
- c. [mis-analysis] **will be** <drastic> (in its damage <upon the total meaning>)
- d. [mis-analysis] **will be** <drastic (in its damage) (upon the total meaning)>
- e. [mis-analysis] **will be** <drastic (in its damage <upon the total meaning>)>

where each pair of arc parenthesis encloses a unit adverb-element. Unless attributively in modification to other units, (as indicated by an arrow), the adverbial units can be moved to any gap between the syntactical elements; which fact is, accidentally, a sensitive test for the independence of adverbial elements. Such adverbial elements, however, cannot move beyond the bound of a superior parenthesis. And in some cases these alternatives will prove <really tricky,> but as revealed in this particular example, the alternatives do not usually cause much damage simply because they are affairs far away from the center. We must recognize, however, the fact that the beginning of the adjectivals is ever fixed in its relation to the sentence pattern. It sticks to the orbit, the complementary position, of the sentence pattern, and the rest is <much optional, and as often indiscriminate to the speaker as it is to the receiver.> In spoken language, the articulation will show, through some verbal clues, the structural design of the speech, i.e., the sentence pattern, but alas, in the written language, such is usually reduced to the minimum and confusions occur. It is interesting to observe. But can we give a definite analysis of the simple sentence we have just read i.e., "It is interesting to observe"?* Should the

*"It" could be either preparatory appositive to the nominal 'to observe' or 'it' could be something we acknowledge externally and 'to observe', an adverbial element.

infinitive 'to observe' be (included within the adjectival governed by interesting ?) Or should it be (expelled from the adjectivals ?) Unless we know definitely, by external evidences or by internal evidences, if any, what the subject 'it' refers to, it will not be (possible to decide), or to be decided we are again in trouble here. For a foreign learner, if somebody should mark off these confusing groupings by some analytical index, it will help him (comprehend the sentence).

The objective complement of the very last sentence, i.e., 'comprehend the sentence', according to our theory, is an adjectival. We cannot conceive 'comprehend' as a syntactical verb in predication acting between 'him' and 'the sentence'. Perhaps, etymologically, 'comprehend' or 'to comprehend' may be a verb, but it is an infinitive in this context ... that is to say, it is no longer a verb, but is either an adjective or an adverb, (though not noun in this particular case), and we choose it to be an adjective which spans over to the 'the sentence'. As for the particular local relationship between the infinitive and its object, we may have another chance later to discuss, under the heading of 'subordination'.

Similar independent verboids in complementary capacity will be (handled under this heading.) The word group headed by the past participle 'handled' in the preceeding sentence is the kind of thing we are trying to analyse. After the predicative 'will be', we can expect syntactically, a complement of any type, either nominal or adjectival, and we have a past participle of a transitive verb (which connotes passive status), 'handle'. The participle 'handled' is, syntactically, closer to other adjectives, say 'feasible' or 'appropriate', than to the verb 'handle'. And then the fragment headed by 'under this heading', could be either (subordinate to the adjectival) or an independent adverb to the statement indicating the place of occurrence. And we know the distinction does not matter nor is intended, because I, the author, have written it without distinction while I wrote it. There could not be any better proof to it.

It is significant, however, that we know that the phrase 'under this heading' is not, in any way, a predicative or nominal, and that 'handled' is an adjectival either by itself or including the phrase in question. This is to say, the instinctive indeterminism is only at the lowest order of the affair where the speaker as well as the reader can be far more indifferent and nebulous.

According to our routine, from this sentence down, [we] **shall apply** [three mark-

ings,] [one for each nominal,] [another for each predicative] and [still another for the adjectivals.] And since I am the author who is writing the samples, [the analysis explicitly expressed here] **is**, logically, [the ultimate authority,] whenever you find them disputable. And in many cases [the very author himself] **may be** (nebulous as to the precise differentiation of such loose elements far remote from the center of the expression.) [The general rule in such cases] **is** [that I would rather stick to the larger expanse,] and of course [the inner structure] **is not** (to be analysed within already specified syllables.)

[One of the pities in our analytical system in regard to adjectivals] **is** [that we cannot designate the relative clauses and participial clauses (that are in attributive modification to the antecedent; for an instance, this very that-clause.) [The sentences in which these adjective-equivalents take place] **are** (so frequent) and [the adjective itself] **shows** [so much coherent existence and prominence,] besides the physical weight it occupies in a speech. But simply because of its subordination to a mere nominal, [its syllable-hood] **is** (denied.) [The fate] **deals** [another blow] to the independence of such relative clauses by the fact that they are never to fill the complementary orbit as adjectivals. [Infinitives] **are** (to occupy the complementary orbit with its own subordinate elements,) as in this particular sentence, while prepositional phrases **are** (of no exception to the law), as in this. [The Participial structure] **finds** [itself] (repeated and even dominating, not only as complement to the subject across intransitive verbs but also as complement to the object by immediately following it,) as it was the case in the early section of this sentence. However, because of the laxity due to the distance of its orbit from the center, [the adjectival complement] often **goes** (adrift in the linguistic space) with its logical sequence somewhat uncertain and indeterminate.

Is [the adjectival phrase above] actually (adjectival?) How **can** [we] **know** if [‘adrift’] in the context **is** [an adjective] or [an adverb?] And **does** [it] **matter**? Perhaps [it] **was** never (divided) in its use; the dictionary entry as an adjective and an adverb being a back-formation.... [Such] **is** [the cause of the transition of adjectivals into adverbials.] [Ambiguity] **is** also (caused) as the distinction becomes vague as to between the modification and complementary relation an adjectival holds

to the nominal.

[The adjectivals consisting of verboids and their subordinate portions] **are** [the chief source of difficulty] as we have seen, and perhaps [a separate discussion] **is** needed. [It] **will be** more or less <like a grammar rearranged for syntactical analysis.>

Just as we convert nouns into adjectives by the addition of -y or -ly, or the addition of an article, [verbs] **are** <transformed into nouns, adjectives, or adverbs> in various ways. In the process of conversion, [the subordinate elements] **can be** <brought into a new heading as they are.> [An adjective,] for instance, ['kind'], **may have been** <modified by an adverb 'very',> thus 'very kind' is a unit. With the shift in the head-word of the phrase, i.e., 'kind' into 'kindly', [the subordinate element 'very',] **is** <carried over with the former relation intact.> <So> **will be** [the case] with the converted verbs. [The shift the verb has undergone] **is not** <caused by the subordinate,> hence [the subordinate elements] **are** <free from the influence of the change,> and as a whole, with the unchanged relation, **goes over** to the new heading.

Thus, when it is a unit in a sentence, [an infinitive phrase 'to be always considered as superfluous to every one's eyes'] **is** [an infinitive phrase,] and [its inner structure, in respect to the verb] **is** [a mere analogy to that of a hypothetical full context where the verb is the predicative.] Likewise, ['taught by the teacher every Sunday afternoon' of a sentence 'I am taught by'], **may be** <considered as one unit of an adjectival standing complementary to the subject, 'I',> or [we] **may have** [two adverbial phrases] <separated from 'I am taught'.> [Both analysis] **will do** as long as either is true to the speaker's psychology.

As it has been briefly pointed out in the discussion of predicatives, [these verboidal adjectivals] **not only carry** [the voice] but also [the aspect,] [which] **was** originally [the property of the full-verbs.] [The dilemma] **is** [that what has to be expressed by verbs is now expressed in verb-adjective combinations, or by something in-between.]

[The syntactical essentials in the handling of these verboids] **are** [that they are of equal status in syntax and sentence pattern], and [that they are contrasted against each other with equal terms of syntax.] Thus, [all of them] **can be** [the subjective complement and the objective complement], mutatis mutandis. ([They] **share** [some other function, such as becoming attributive modifications to nouns.])

[The infinitive as a grammatical adjective] **carries** [so-called potential aspect, or abstract pure aspect.] [It] **can** either attributively **modify** [nouns (post-positioned),] or syntactically **stand** in complementary capacity. With the 'have' of semi-direct predication, [the combination] **becomes** [a predicative,] in our system. Thus ["He has to come"] is <analysed into subject 'he' and predicate 'has to come'>, [the latter of which] is [a sole predicative] [that] is [to say], ['to come' has no independent meaning, neither does 'has' unless they are combined.] Of course dia-chronically, [we] **can imagine** [an object] between the two, thus giving the infinitive an independent syllable-hood. But since we do not have one, [we] **must do** without it.

[Present participle as a grammatical adjective] **carries** [so-called continuative or repetative aspects] and attributively **modifies** (post-positioned) [nouns on the grammar-level,] whereas, syntactically, [it] **can stand** <complementary to subject or to object.> [The so-called progressive form] is [a case of adjectival in present participle introduced by predicative in intransitive-incomplete so-called 'be'-copula.]

[The past participle as a grammatical adjective] **carries**, in the case of a transitive verb, [the perfect aspect] only, and in the case of a transitive verb, more often in passive aspect. Grammatically, [it] attributively **modifies** [nouns], either preposed or post-posed. Syntactically, [it] **stands** in complementary position to subject or to object. When complementary to subject, [the predicative] is usually [the 'be'-copula,] and if it is a transitive verb, [it] is <in the passive voice,> and if intransitive, [it] is <in the perfect aspect.> However, if the predicative is the semi-auxiliary 'have', [the combination] **becomes** [the predicative] and [the adjectival-ness of the adjectival] is <relinquished.> In "He has come.", ['has'] is no longer <voice-indicating.> [It] **has** also lost [its original meaning of 'have'.] [The past participle 'come'] as an adjective **can**, in any way, **be** [the object of 'have'] grammatically, unless there is a nominal object; thus [we] **have** "He has it come.", [which,] however, is thoroughly [another speech.]

[The following table] **shows** [this] in a schematic way though it may be too much of grammar for syntactical purposes.

Infinitive complete, potential, abstract aspect.

(Attributive)* book <to read> things <to come at any moment>

Predicative finite : either 'have' or 'be'

a. subjective complement

I am <to come.> I have <to come here now.>

b. objective complement I make him <come.>

He felt her <shiver violently.>

Present participle continuative, observed, repetative aspect.

(Attributive)

<rocking> chair girls <studying in the room now>

Predicative finite : 'be'

a. subjective complement

I am <coming.> They are <talking the matter over.>

b. objective complement

I kept him <running.> They left her <weeping flood.>

Past participle perfect, passive, psuedo-passive.

(Attributive)

<grown-up> man <boiled> egg <blue-eyed> girl

men <killed in the last battle>

Predicative finite : 'be' or 'have'

a. subjective complement

He is <gone.> I have <come.> I am <interested.>

b. objective complement

I had it <boiled.> I found him <shot in the head.>

Prepositional Phrases: The next important element of the sentence that works as adjectives are the prepositional phrases, which may function as adverbials or adjectivals. The adjectival uses may be:

* Attributive uses are not syntactical, but subordinate or grammatical affairs. However, any adjectival is, in form, identical with the adjectives in attributive uses. Cases for attributive uses are presented only for comparison.

(Attributive)

books ⟨in the box⟩

men 〈in difficulty at this time〉

Predicative

a. Subjunctive complement

He is \langle in difficulty. \rangle

She is <at home with her mother-in-law.>

He stands <in awe.>

b. Objective complement

I kept him in disgrace. It made him at odds with everything
around him.

The adjectives: The original adjectives have usually degree-inflections, the older adjectives are indistinct from corresponding adverbs.

(Attributive) Either post-positioned or pre-positioned, if with subordinate, or if emphasised, the position is after the noun.

〈 tall 〉 man

〈 taller 〉 man

man < tallest of all >

Predicative

a. Subjective complement

He is <kind of heart.>

b. Objective complement

He likes her < poor. >

I hope him <well and healthy.>

[Another important element that constitutes adjectives but not adjectivals] is [relative clauses and fragments.] [This] is \langle presented \rangle for comparison.

(Attributive)

book < which I bought yesterday. >

book ⟨I bought there yesterday.⟩

Predicative

a. Subjective complement

impossible

b. Objective complement

impossible

Because of the remoteness of orbit the adjectivals hold, [its logical relationship

and other functions] **become** <much indeterminate> and often [it] **is** <very difficult and problematic> [to decide whether an element is an adjectival in attributive modification or predicative modification (complement) or perhaps an adverbial absolute.] [The confusion] **is not** [a modern symptom.] Perhaps [such comprehensive, indiscriminate use of words] **was** [the original synthetic vitality of the ancient English languages.] [Some of these indiscriminate words such as 'slow', 'home', 'like', 'open', etc.,] **can never be** <divided into the precision-like-scheme of modernity.> [It] **seems** <true> [that at least in English, if the same thing is intended, the less words, the more effect, and if the effect is equal, the less said is better said.]

4. Adverbials

Another of the auxiliary speech-syllables, and the last of the four kinds of speech-syllables, is named 'adverbials' after the usual term 'adverb.' Syntactically, an adverbial can be a full-speech if no other elements are collocated with it in an utterance. It will, however, never stand in the capacity of subject, object or complement as nominals do, nor will it incarnate the predication as predicatives do in sentences. Adverbials are distinguished from adjectivals in the fact that they do not fill the complementary position. The definition is furtherly negative: the adverbials do not constitute a member of the basic sentence structure, or sentence patterns. They do not hold a fixed position as other syllables do. The law of collocation for the adverbials is not of 'case-factor' but of 'influence' or of psychological association rather than of syntactical insinuation.

Thus, adverbials will take place between the cardinal speech-syllables of sentences according to the context and situation, free from the syntactical gravity that sustains the speech. When considering a sentence in terms only of its syntactical comprehension, namely, the conceiving and comprehending of the sentence-patterns, in a sentence, the adverbials are more or less foreign matters obscuring the basic design of the sentence. Due to historical and practical reasons, many cases of adverbials are over-lapping with adjectivals and other capacities of speech-syllables, but as a definition, we must establish a definite criteria for adverbials, which will be, naturally more formal than practical.

At any rate, adverbials syntactically, stand alone from the other syllables and are remotest from the organic core of the speech-impetus. They are free-lancing and are

additively super-imposed upon the speech, and in actual speeches, are inserted between the syntactical speech-syllables. (This, of course, excludes the attributive use of adverbs in direct modification of other elements as specified by usual grammar. To compare with the other three types of speech-syllables which are usually interdependent among themselves, that is, they constitute a context by their collocation), adverbials are more independent (not much from the speech as a whole, but from the other component syllables thereof).

Adverbials are, in a way, the so-called sentence-modifying adverbs, or the adverbs and their equivalents in predicative uses, if after the usual terminology of grammar. However, because of the ambiguity and vagueness inherent in the relation so defined by 'modification' to cover the whole aspect of adverbials, we would rather introduce a new term with somewhat restricted connotation. So much for the syntactical definition and description of our adverbials.

Now, semantically, adverbials are the distinguishable speech-syllables standing for the conditions, restrictive or descriptive, that attend the predication as a whole, either directly to the entire speech or indirectly through the predicative of the speech. They may include all the heterogeneous considerations and circumstantial attendants of the predication, either intra-contextual or extra-contextual. It feels almost irrelevant that grammar, not the lexicography, would enumerate and classify all the adverbial elements according to their semantic, or logical criteria; thus, adverbs of degree, of manner, place, time, direction, purpose, result, genitive, etc. or adverbial phrases and clauses of condition and attendant circumstances, or the absolute use of adverbs, etc. And we feel that somewhere, we must draw a line between the meaning in syntactical principle and the meaning in notional content.

Morphologically, although all the adverbs in speeches may not always be adverbials, an adverbial can be either of the following kinds. (Logically, this is to put the cart before the horse, however, as, for an instance, the grammatical 'adverbs' defined as the words are most frequently used in adverbial function when mobilized in sentences)

Adverbials may be any of the so-called adverbs, original or derivative, which one can find in the dictionary. 'Yes' is entered under a heading 'adverb', and can be

an adverbial in a speech, and if the speech contains nothing but 'yes' itself, it is at the same time in the capacity of a full speech. We do not consider that the word 'yes' (which happens to be ear-marked as adverb) is an equivalent to a sentence in such cases, unless the word is first activated into a syntactical syllable. Do we find such cases rather often? Yes, often. We consider that the last sentence is a full speech consisting of two adverbials.

Adverbials in actuality will be also words or word-groups, other than adverbs, which are compelled to perform the duty of adverbials. 'This afternoon' is in itself a noun, a name for a period of time of a day, yet is an adverbial in the speech "I will go this afternoon.", and likewise, 'a day' can be an adverb in the phrase, 'once a day'. We cannot know if such an adverb is short of something fully adverbial or complete in itself. A historical explanation may tell something, yet the psychology of the moment invokes nothing of such references.

Infinitives and infinitive-phrases with all their subordinate elements are often adverbial when their logical affiliation to the predication is vague, that is, if an infinitive-phrase is not a noun equivalent, nor exactly an adjective equivalent in the sense, or perhaps of them at a time indeterminately, it can well be adverbial not only in the inherent or imposed sense but also in the classification. More often an infinitive cannot be distinguished as to whether it is complementary adjective or a bona fide adverbial. We are to see some such examples in due time. Is the infinitive phrase of the last sentence, adjectival or adverbial? Was the sense of the statement clear?

Prepositional phrases, one of the most frequented linguistic units of English with their train of subordinates, are usually taken either as adjective-equivalents or adverb-equivalents according to the context and collocation, though often the distinction is an unnatural imposition. The prepositional phrase in this sentence is felt more adjectival than adverbial, but place a paramount stress upon the phrase 'in this sentence' or place it at the beginning of the sentence, and we have an adverbial instead. Marginal cases of prepositional phrases belonging to the order of adjectival complement or adverbial abound, and we are often at a loss. Is the phrase 'at a loss', an adverbial or an adjectival in this case, for an instance?

Conjunctive clauses are so-called subordinate clauses led by some kind (expressed or imagined) of subordinate conjunction (as contrasted to coordinate conjunction, though

the distinction itself is to be negotiated .. From a formalist's point of view, the conjunctions are distinguished from prepositions as they lead a clause no matter how thread-bare it may be, but never a phrase. Whatever remains of an adverbial unit either phrase or clause, it is an adverbial, often we may not know the original phrase or clause, but we know what we have is an adverbial. Few know what is really meant by 'please' in the original collocation, but he is no worse off for the ignorance.

Participial construction, a happy in-between of the clause and the phrase and the bug-bear to the foreigners, is an adjective unit which went off the adjectival orbit and joined somehow the adverbial orbit. Participial units may behave toward the predication as if it were an adverb clause with explicit logical affiliation, yet it lacks the logical-relation-indicator, i.e., a preposition or a conjunction. It may lack even the participle itself or may be capped with a subject-like indicator. (Mentally it is the subject, yet, linguistically, it cannot be the subject.)

As the result of such appalling elipsis incurred in the adverbials, what we often have is what remains of the original adverbial units of fuller inner-structure. We may class them as 'adverbial fragments' which are nevertheless full adverbials; 'fragments' they are because they are so much emaciated that it cannot be known whether they are phrases or clauses.

(For the remaining part of this section), the adverbials are marked (off) (by pairs of arc parenthesis, whose application may be often conciliatory and a compromise) (as the outline of adverbials is often so nebulous because of its remoteness from the central speech-prescience.) (As it has been the usual practice hitherto,) the adverbs in attributive status to other elements, are (theoretically) denied (of their syllablehood,) (as in the case of other syllables.) (However,) (in the case of adverbials,) the status of attributive modification is (often) a matter of choice and of opinion (such indeterminateness itself being one of the striking characteristics of the adverbials which occupy the outermost orbit in speeches.) Should we mark off 'off' (as separate adverbial) or it is an attributive adverb or a suffix of the verb 'mark' to institute a distinct verb contrasted to 'mark' or is it contrasted to other combinations of 'mark' with other prepositions, such as 'mark away', 'mark out' etc. ? (With these discussions,) we now enter another phase of the linguistic

realm, where laws of 'uncertainty' govern, and where the adverbials are the main subject.

Adverbials are classified (also into three classes) (according to the closeness of their relationship to the predication.) The closest are the short, ancient adverbs so closely affiliated to verbs that the resultant combination comprises something more than the sum of the components. (In the case of 'mark off',) the independence of 'off' as an adverbial, not as an adverb, may be recognizable. Yet, mental propensity may (well) take it (as if it were a suffix of the verb 'mark'.) (When we say 'Mark it off.', or "Mark that word off."), 'off' seems to be a separate mental unit, (though perhaps one may be delighted in finding a parallel in German, "Ich stand früh **auf**." and "Ich früh **aufstehe**.")

However, the 'get' is modified (by an adverbial, which happens to be an adverb, 'up',) (in the sentence "We get up.") (which means something more than to get ourselves in an upward motion.) This type of adverbial, (as well as ordinary adverbs in whatever the context), may be distinguished (from the adverbial phrase, 'at six',) (if collocated thus, "I get up at six",) thus we may analyse the sentence as "I **get** (up) (at six)." or "I **get up** (at six)."

'To look at' may be or may not be separated (from the noun that follows) and becomes a transitive predicative almost equivalent to 'to see' (instituting the post-verbal nominal as the syntactical object of the sentence, rather than as a grammatical object to a preposition.) (When the cohesion of 'look' and 'at') is (mentally and practically) accomplished, we may lose an adverbial (to a predicative.) (No matter how illogical it may appear to the purist) one can feel thoroughly congenial (in being looked at by a charming lady) or (being looked after by her.) (When usage is established,) such a preposition may be considered (as a suffix indicating the converted transitive verb.)

(As we have mentioned in the discussion on predicatives,) the negative adverb 'not' is considered (as negative suffix to the predicative or any verb,) (while) the other negative indications, mostly adverbs, may or may not be handled (in the same way,) (depending upon the usage.)

The second class of adverbials consist (of a variety of independent adverbs modi-

fying predicatives and their derivatives.) (As speech syllables,) they restrict the effect of the predication, (directly modifying the predicatives) or (indirectly modifying the assertion of the speech as a whole.) (To this class) most of the adverb phrases and clauses which grammar enumerates, belong. The adverbials may indicate time, place, manner, purpose, direction, mode, condition, result, attendant circumstances, etc. Such a logical relationship which each adverbial bears towards the speech either as a whole or to its predicative, may or may not be explicit. (Often) the relationship is vague and multiple. (As a basic law,) the prepositions and subordinate-conjunctions carry the indication as to the logical relationship, which, of course, is semantic. Prepositions govern nouns and noun-equivalents that follow, to the maximum expanse, (while a subordinate conjunctions govern clauses or clause equivalents which they lead to the farthest possible expanse they can command.) These prepositions and conjunctions are originally geometrical and physical in their notion, but they are used (metaphorically) (to cover other logical relationships.)

Another of the major adverbials of this type are the participial constructions. Participles with their subordinate elements are, (in themselves,) adjectivals, and (hence,) they can (only) perform the capacity of complements. (Being a complement,) the adjectival (gradually) institutes itself (as superimposed information about the state of affairs, which is inductive to be considered as the cause, result, manner, etc., attending the predication.) (Hence) such a participial structure pushes itself (into the order of adverbials.)

(From the syntactical point of view,) such a logical relationship is (beyond its concern.) The syntactical scrutiny and awareness will be complete (if it can distinguish and acknowledge a portion of speech as adverbial) and thus the logical bond is more or less an extra-syntactical affair (when the comprehension of sentence pattern is the main faculty of syntactical consciousness.)

(To return,) the third group of adverbials are those phrases, clauses and even fragments that are more or less extra to the syntactical exposition of a speech; an instance of such is the first phrase of this very sentence; i.e., 'to return'.

(Now,) the striking nature of this group is their threadbare link of modification and their somewhat appalling internal economy, so to speak. Some will bear a distinct clue

(to show in what way they are to modify, to condition or to restrict the exposition and the attitude of the speaker.) But, (to our constant consternation and delight,) many (utterly) fail, not (only) to show, but also to have the logical connection with the elements that they are supposedly modifying. (Whether paraphrasable or not), (whether decisive or tentative,) (concessional or alternative,) (in many cases) logical implication is withheld or undefined. (Often) it is presented (as an incomplete expression in suspense, intended in a somewhat insinuating way to exert a directed influence over the entire effect of the speech.) (Well,) (at any rate,) (if one likes it or not,) such a general laxity and freedom with which this type of adverbials are used is the striking character that distinguishes this from other types of speech-syllables and (because of the versatility and flexibility and economy,) they cause the most difficulty and misunderstanding (to the learners of English.)

Such absolute adverbs are not limited to English, (of course,) yet the appearance of such free-lancing elements between the foot-holds of the syntactical fixed-positioned syllables, distracts the comprehension of the structure (most efficiently and tragically.) (Brevity is the zest of speeches,) (to be sure,) yet could we, (no matter how much training we may have had,) (ever) expect, (with some exceptions admitted,) to become (eventually) able (to comprehend,) (unless by repetition, or by rote,) such a succinct expression (as "During Movie, no smoking allowed"?) The last sentence, so spattered and mangled by unnecessary adverbial elements is (syntactically) as simple (as to say "Could we?") The parenthesis here are not (only) for the adverbials but also for adverbs, (for the more intended confusion of the reader.) (In many cases,) the adverbial-indicators, i.e., preposition, conjunction, participle etc., are not expressed. Have they been worn out (of existence) or have they ever been (in need of being expressed?) Has the preposition 'to' ever been expressed (in a speech "I go home." Was the preposition 'at' (ever) an addition (in a speech "I am at home"?) (Well,) so much (for the classification of adverbials according to its inherent attributes and structure.)

(In order to complete the experiment,) [we] **shall mark** [the lines following,] (with all the indications for the four speech syllables,) (according to the convention so far applied.)

Suppose [a speech, "Being poor, I like her."] **Are** [we] **told** [that it is he or she who is poor ?] (In another case such as "I slept the day away.") **is** [the day] [object of the verb 'sleep'] or **is** [it] [the duration, the time, that the speaker spent in sleeping ?] **Say** ["Done or undone, it is wicked to do".] and (if we were to fill in the gap between the segments divided by the comma,) [we] **will find** (only) [a vague unnatural word or words.] [Such] **is** [the general ambiguity some efficient adverbial elements are running the risk of.] (As demonstrated in these,) [the internal economy] **is** [another of the difficulties.] [Such outer-planets as these absolute adverbials] **enjoy** [a sort of grammatical extra-territoriality.] (Being under the tenuous strain of the syntax), [the elements] **are** <in their bare essence> and **are** <collocated with each other> (in their radical, pre-grammatical vitality). (Not) (only) **has** [one] [almost complete freedom to select a word or two he deems necessary out of the whole would-be complete clause if desired,] but (also) [he] **may insert** [some grammatically impossible elements, for an instance 'he',] (into the participial construction); (thus "He being there, I could not come.") [The solecism in shedding the subject 'it' of the conditional clause 'If it you please' and the subsequent back formation of 'you' as subject and the converting of the notional content of 'please' from transitive to intransitive] **are** [one of such odd cases,] [which] [no body] **thinks** <to be odd> (at this date.) [It] **seems** [that some kind of restricted grammar should be developed for the behavior of words in these remote satellites, or meteors called adverbials.]

(Whether a clause or phrase), [adverbials] **are** <volatile> and [the manner of evaporation] **is** (often) <unaccountable> yet (there) **seems** <to be> [a set of extra-territorial laws governing the affairs.] [The table below,] (though no explanation is attempted,) **samples** [the manner and degree of such adverbial evaporation.] (For an identical principal clause,) (there) **are** [a class of adverbials] (thus):

- (In spite of the fact that he is such a fine fellow,) [I] **don't** like [him.] (1)
 (Despite that he is such a fine fellow,) [I] **don't** like [him.] (2)
 (Although he is such a fine fellow,) [I] **don't** like [him.] (3)
 (Fine fellow though he be,) [I] **don't** like [him.] (4)

- (Fine fellow that he is, [I] **don't like** [him.] (5)
 (Fine fellow he,) but [I] **don't like** [him.] (6)
 (Though fine,) [I] **don't like** [him] (7)
 (Fine,) but [I] **don't like** [him.] (8)
 (Fine fellow all right,) but [I] **don't like** [him.] (9)
 etc.

(As pointed out earlier in this section,) [another distinctive characteristic of adverbials] is [freedom from the syntactical or collocational gravity, i.e., their status of being a syntactical free-lancer.]

[The freedom with which the adverbials are collocated among the syntactical elements] is <vast and varied> and **stops** (almost) (a little too short of becoming the cause of ambiguity.) (Naturally), [the propinquity] is [the law of influence,] yet (with the shift of emphasis), [the position] **may be** <shifted far more freely than other syntax-bound, fixed-syllables in fixed sentence-pattern positions.> (When pushed forward,) [the emphasis] is <added> (in the case of ordinary second-type adverbials.) (Perhaps), [such] is [a matter of rhetoric and not of syntax or of grammar.] Yet , [the movableness] is [one of the essential natures that distinguishes the adverbials from other syllables], and [we] **think** [it is something more than a mere rhetorical problem.] [We] **should say**, (if a language is only spoken and heard,)[that inflection is an indispensable indication as post-positions are indispensable to agglutinative languages.] But (once the inflection gives way to prepositional structures,) [syllable order, i.e., the sentence pattern,] **becomes** [the back-bone of the speech.] (Now) [the sentence pattern] **should not be** <too complicated or disturbed> (if the speech is only spoken and heard.) (Thus) [the speech patterns] **are** <more and more fixed and reduced> and (there) **are** [less and less chances of shifting around], (unless so required by the force of expression.) (In such a fixed-position language,) (as long as it is spoken and heard,) [the emphasis] is <given> (by articulation stress and verbal ornament,) but (never much)(by shifts in order.) But (as the language becomes written and read,) [such physical stress] is <lost>(in its way into expression.) [The result] is [the unusual flourish of adverbial phrases and clauses that can be shifted around according to the emphasis but without disturbing the basic order of syllables.] (If we recall the case of the dative object from its early development,)

[we] **may feel** [this supposition] < somewhat justified. > [The general trend in English] **seems** < to be that double objects and nominal complements are gradually displaced by preposition-ed adverbial phrases. > [The decline of such secondary post-verbal nominals] **may be** < tested by the so called "change the voice" exercises for such cases. > [We] **may say** ["I bought her a piano".] [We] **may say** ["A piano is bought to her"] or ["A piano is bought for her"] but (never) (simply) ['her'.] [It] **is** almost < impossible > [to say "She is bought a piano"] and (perhaps) [we] **might say** ["She is bought a piano for."] (Whereas) [we] **find** [no such affrontation] (in saying "I am taught some English."), and (perhaps) ["English is taught me"] **is not** [a solecism] (though 'to me' is preferred as inevitable.) [No school teacher] **will forget** [to teach that the subject, i.e., the subject of the original sentence, may be added, if wanted, by making it an adverbial phrase governed by a preposition 'by' or 'with' as the case may find it fit.]

[The mobility of adverbials] **is** (actually) [what is making up for the fixedness and destitution of stylistic variety in English,] (due to the extreme simplicity in its sentence patterns.) (Although it is very English to combine an intransitive verb with a particular preposition to make a new transitive verb, as in the case of "look at",) [the stealing of prepositions, the critical connector that is pre-fixed to the following noun or noun equivalent] **is** [a matter of such grave consequence that we should not, just for the mere sake of convenience, try to legalize transitive verbs of intransitive-plus-preposition adjuncts.] [The look-at fusion] **could never have established** [itself] (unless there had been the usual verb-plus-short-adverb combination in wide prevalence.) [It] **is**, (at least pedagogically,) [a good way] [to insist upon recognizing such an amalgamation as 'to look down upon' as an equivalent of 'to dispise'.] (Grammatically speaking,) (there) **are** [legitimate transitive uses of 'look'] (as in "I look her in the face" or similarly, "I stare her in the face".) (Perhaps) [these facts] **point** (to the fact that originally the voice was not a differentiated faculty to a verb, and that because of the introduction of the prepositions, the distinction is confusedly brought about upon English verbs, thus giving rise to prepositional adverbs.) **Consider** [the preposition 'to' prefixed to infinitive verbs.] [One of the home-truths revealing such development] **will be** (best) < exemplified > (by the virile utility of the word 'home'). [It] **can be** [a noun,] [adjective,] [adverb,] or [verb]. [We] **come** (home,) and **celebrate** [a happy return] home (without a preposition,)

but [we] **are** <away> (from home.) [Some notion] **strikes** (home,) (while) [some clothes] **are** <home-spun.> [Pegions] **take** [bees' way] (in their homing.)

(Perhaps) [we] **have digressed** (too far astray.) **Is** [this last 'astray'] [an adjective in complementary capacity to the nominal 'we'] or is [it] [an adverb modified by far,] or is [it] <modifying the adjective (or the adverb) 'far' retrogressively?> [These vital words which English inherits without much change from its early days] **are** [the constant source of difficulty for foreigners] and **are** [the most taken-for-granted to the natives.]

(Perhaps) [some of the linguistic vestiges English still retains and operated side by side with analytical syntax] **are** <of this type,> (even though many of them are back-formed into a kind of elipsis.) (For an instance) ['side by side' in the preceding sentence] **has** [no preposition] (before the first 'side',) (in which) (if challenged,) [we] **may be** <compelled to acknowledge that another 'by' has been omitted, as evidenced somehow by 'beside' and 'besides', which are unit adverbs or prepositions that are to lead adverb-phrases.> Yet, [we] **do not know** [if there had ever been a 'by' which has been worn out.] [We] **put** [a thing] (upside down) or (inside out) (without ever being conscious of an implicit preposition,) or (ever) **doubt** [ourselves] <as to the classification of the phrase 'upside down' or 'inside out'.> **Are** [they] <adverbial or adjectival in the complementary orbit?> [We] **may think** ('hard') and **find** [it] <'hard'> but [we] **may** ('hardly') **come** (to a plausible solution), (though we might weep 'flood' over the matter.) (By and large,) [we] may say [that modern tendency is to consider these so-called idiomatic expressions as extra-grammatical oddities on which we only waste grammatical debates.] [it] is [quite a fate] [that what has been once the most vital and central in the linguistic form is now a set of irregularities.] [An accomodating modern mentality] **will consider** [these] (rather) [a group of adverbials whose connective elements are implicit.]

[The general tendency], (again), is [that we supply imaginary prepositions or conjunctions whenever we come across such an abrupt auxiliary element in speeches.] [The ultimate destination of such a tendency] **is** [the diminishing of post-verbal nominals in favor of adverbial phrases and clauses with newly acquired freedom to move around.] [We] **may ask** [ourselves,] [are not we going back to the original inflex-

ional language with its inflections in the form of prepositions or conjunctions instead?] (At any rate,) [we] **seem** <to have more and more adverbials with further simplified sentence patterns> (perhaps), [we] **shall have** [only subject and predicate verb, in fixed position with no inversion between them.] (For questions) [we] **may** (only) **prefix** [some question-mark words, such as auxiliary verbs (plus anomalous finite verbs) or indefinite pronouns,] [a process much like the French “Est-ce que,” with no actual change in the order of Nominal in subject and Predicative in verbs or verbal phrases.]

[We] **have been** (again) <desultory,> but [the essence] **is** [that it is the adverbials that undergo the most radical kind of reduction within themselves,] and [that the remote elements of a speech find their way into.] (The simpler the syntax), (the more the adverbials.) [The sentence] **had** (only) [two adverbials] and [nothing else]

(Perhaps) [we] **shall include** [the so-called prepositional adverbs] (in this heading). [The extreme freedom of curtailment or representation of the whole by a fragment] **is** (strictly) [the affair of adverb that enables us to present only ‘to’ at the end of a sentence in the place of an infinitive phrase intended to]. (Similarly,) [the adverbs that should have been prepositions if followed by nouns] **are** (perhaps) <classified into this group together with other odd remainders such as the ‘at’ of “I am looked at” or the ‘upon’ of “He is looked down upon”, etc. > [The irony] **is** [that in order to make an adverbial or a noun, we add a preposition, and no sooner is the adverbialhood established, than we take the preposition off again.]

[One more puzzling phenomenon concerning adverbials of English] **is** <to be pointed out.> [It] **is** (again) (with the old and vital ‘that’, whose uses are so multifoliate and versatile.) [We] **may not need** [to discuss its uses as noun, pronoun, or adjective.] But (as a conjunction,) [we] **have** [much trouble] with it. (Occasionally) [it] **is** [so abstract a conjunction that it only indicates that the clause that follows is a subordinate clause of some kind in the speech, and not the principal sentence.] And (in such cases) [the so-called that-clause] **is** [a noun equivalent.] But (not seldom) [that-clause] **is** [an adjective equivalent] (when that ‘that’ that stands concurrently as the pronoun of any noun within the clause.) (Well,) [it] **is** (often) <con-

fusing > but <tolerated somehow.> [Difficulty] **begins** (when such 'that' stands for the noun of a prepositioned adverbial element within the that-clause.) (Thus) (instead of saying "This is the pen with which I wrote that book",) [we] **have** ["This is the pen that I wrote the book with".] [This inclination of 'that', i.e., refusal to be prepositioned,] **combines** [the force] (with the logical buoyancy of adverbials.) [We] **are** <glad> (that we need not express in words the logical relation between "we are glad" and "that we need not express" in this sentence.) (Or else) [it] **could have been** (somewhat) <like "We are glad because of the fact that" or perhaps "We are glad about the fact that" which seem altogether too redundant.> Similar situation] **exists** (in "I so arranged the things that he may find it easier to handle" or in "I study that I should know more" etc.) [We,] (as foreigners,) **may presume** [that the native may feel wicked that such a natural way of saying things should be so rudely handled,] yet [we] **are** <convinced> [that in such indiscriminate use as these lies the vitality and genius of English language,] and [the outer-adverbials] **seem** <to present most radical yet vital subconscious grammar of English language.>

PART III

1. Syntax

Now that we have defined, more or less in principle, the four types of speech-syllables, perhaps we might discuss the inter-relationship between and among them in a given syntactical field of speeches. The inter-relationship of the speech-syllables in terms of the totality of the speech, and the phenomena related to this relationship may be called syntactical phenomena. The syntactical phenomena are contrasted to the phenomena which are sub-syntactical, namely, the linguistic phenomena within speech-syllables. Our analysis anchors itself at the level of speech-syllables, or the syntactical phenomena, for many theoretical reasons. We consider that the speech-syllables are concrete analytical elements, real to our mentality and feeling, in the use of language. They are something lower and more concrete than the Subject-predicate division of speeches, and yet somewhat higher than the atomistic recognition of words and their inter-relationship. Mentally, we manipulate, syllables, not the words or word-groups as units, constituting speeches.

The differentiation of four kinds of speech-syllables is self-evident or else we cannot recognize speech-syllables or handle them in the practice of language, whether conscious or unconscious. The distinction seems as real as their syllable-hood and vice versa. Syntax, in short, is the dynamics of speech as embodied by the four kinds of elements in various notions and collocations.

Since each syllable in a speech is only subordinate to the speech, there is no subordination among themselves . . . this is to say that each syllable is an isolated unit of apprehension anticipating the ultimate sublimation into the unity in the form of a speech. The relation is somewhat like our concept of water or any chemical compound. A unit of oxygen and two units of hydrogen suggest nothing of the water to be, but when they are combined, suddenly the compound is produced as a new concept, and there is no intermediate state in this process. There is an impassable gap and discontinuity between the component syllables and the speech, a single motivated act.

At the very onset of this essay, we discussed the nature of speech in its definition and acknowledged the fact that the manifest portion of speech depends fully upon the

unexpressed portion, and that the force of that unexpressed portion of speech is symbolically called syntax. As speeches are not thoroughly intuitive human feats, the inner elements are apprehended, part consciously and part sub-consciously, and the analytical awareness in actual speeches cannot be too minute nor too abstract. Speech-syllables are the empirical units at the pragmatic level of mental operation; at least they have been introduced and assumed as such. Thus by the term 'Syntactical phenomena', we are designating a linguistic level and the phenomena at that latitude, namely the syntax of, between and among the speech-syllables in respective speeches.

One can imagine a language which is so thoroughly wordy that every syntactical factor is expressed as a piece of notional meaning; there will be no syntax in the sense we are using the word, but a set of grammar. For an instance, in Japanese a noun is suffixed by a variety of particles indicating not only what should be the case of the word in the sentence but also all the possible derivations into other parts of speeches, and there, the post-positions are so comprehensive that every one of them does not indicate but has a meaning, and reduction to a higher generality is almost an impossibility. The speech structure in Japanese, is more like a string of concrete meanings connected one after another. *

The reference to Japanese is not made without a purpose, if it elucidates some points to the native speakers of English --- the points they take for granted and which are obvious to them, but at the same time, paralyzing to the unfortunate Japanese learners.

* A report by Dr. Y. Fujiwara tells us that in dialects, due to the amalgamation of postpositions, to the nouns, the nouns (and other elements) are revealing an inclination towards something like case inflections !

watashi — ga	(subject)	washia
watashi — o	(object)	washiu
watashi — no	(genitive)	washin
watashi — e	(locative destination)	washii
(Pro) Noun	Post-position	root inflection

Even the original (historically speaking) English with its system of inflections and accident is somewhat more abstract and analytical if compared to Japanese. The case and accident were abstract relational concepts, but never a concrete notional meaning independently recognizable. Metaphorically speaking, these devices do indicate, but do not embody or have meaning, though the distinction is more tentative than definite. To a foreign learner, the most essential meaning-carrying words——the words that should represent the most indispensable and major facts and relations in the body of a speech,——are missing in English. It is as if you are given two names of places without an explicit mention of what had taken place between them, nor which was the starting point and which was the destination. You may smile, “Yes,” if you are an Englishman, and we foreigners manage to understand, though dazzled and puzzled, but it would have been impossible for the latter to invent the expression. Pliable ones may somehow struggle out of the difficulty, but for the majority, the barrier stands high in the way. When you say ‘struggle out of the difficulty’ you are not telling us explicitly the fact that you have transported yourself.

With the shedding of the inflections and the necessary accident indicating the subordinate relationship, English is now most-abrupt and least-explicit, a terribly understated and suppressed language, while the **Lex Nonscripta Anglica** fills in all the unstated parts, namely by way of word-order, or still better, syllable-order. The state is very much like the nucleus of an atom; it is an organized whole whose elements are matter and energy, or, linguistically, concrete meaning and unexpressed though obvious relationship. For the sake of contrast, I shall draw another reference to my own language, Japanese. If I were to say, “Actually, I have no head-ache today”, or “To say the truth, my head is not painful, to-day” (Awkwardness due to the affected closeness to the original Japanese collocation), we shall have the predicate “is not” which will be the only syntactical element, while other elements are all reduced to vague adverbial elements bearing an identical post-position, ‘wa’: thus, “I-wa truth-wa today-wa head-wa painful-wa is not”, where the order and the collocation of the units hyphenated together do not seriously matter. This may appall you, but the degree of the shock you get from this is no more than the one we get from the most hometruth expression you utter at ease. (Some of you may remember that your ancestors used

to speak a somewhat similar kind of un-English centuries ago.)

The digression was to present the English syntax as so much the part of the language that the concept 'syntax' itself seems valid and significant only when we discuss the particular language called English. Perhaps I am sublimating the concept 'syntax' beyond what is usually accredited for, but the word should be exclusively applied to this characteristically English fact, and I think it deserves the title. This is not by any means to say that English does not share such phenomena as usually referred to by 'grammar' and 'accidence'.

When we confront a speech "A mells B", where A and B being nominals, we can apprehend a few syntactical possibilities, and perhaps an addition of one more piece of information will decide what kind of syntactical perspective in which the speech is being set. The English native sense will not find this odd or strange, but for foreigners, it seems all together too short of making any sense at all.

Any linguistic item is in some way or other representational and cannot be fully concrete nor thoroughly abstract, and some relational or functional elements are explicit while others are never stated, some are 'full' while others are 'empty' words as the popular terminology goes.

To return to the original discussion of English syntax at the level of speech syllables, the first thing on the agenda should be the relationship 'speech v. s. syllable', on which some account has been already made. A speech can be sub-linguistic if an utterance is indistinct and vague in its notional motivation, the actual cases being such speeches as "Oh!" "eh?" "George!" "My goodness!" etc., usually called 'exclamatory word-sentence' or something the like. There is no problem as to whether to acknowledge a speech to each of these utterances or not. If such indistinct utterance does accomplish the linguistic purpose of the persons present, they are bona fide speeches. Even though practically these speeches pose no difficulty, they pose some theoretical problems to vigorous purist grammarians, especially these elements appearing in otherwise perfect sentences. Syntactically, no analysis is necessary or significant, nor is there a need of affording them any syllable-hood; there is no harm done in giving them one according to the situation. In short, some speeches are beyond analysis; they partake of the context, but have no syntax within themselves.

Some of such speeches may be a little more structural, though not within themselves but in reference to the context. The affirmative “Yes” and a reflexive response “Yes” when called, seem to be different. Likewise, “Mr. Robert” as a response to “Who’s going?” or “Whom you love?” etc. will be distinguished from “Mr. Robert!” in accosting. Some speeches may consist of such a single syntactical unit or units either in series or in parallel. In these cases the expression is only a portion of the whole speech and syntax is partially in the situational context and partially in the manifest expression. In these speeches, what is being expressed is conceived as a part of structure though the rest is unexpressed. This presupposes that the speech, the original content, is analysed or, at least, analysable because of its structural-ness. What is called vocative “Mr. Brown” is not a portion of some analysable speech, while “Mr. Brown” as the response to such questions as “Who’s he?” is clearly a portion of a whole, representing the whole. Thus, often we may find to our analysis only one unit, or units in parallel, and we acknowledge proper syllablehood to such elements according to the syntax and context either manifest or suppressed. We have, accidentally, some doubt as to call such simply ‘elliptical’ or ‘fragmentary’ because the apparent understatement could be more organic and comprehensive, being in the stage before analysis commences in speech process. The incompleteness is not that of a maimed body, but that of an embryo. “Yes.” could be the whole, solid mental reality, before one analyses the state of affair and reconstructs the broken segments into synthetic structure, thus either “It is so” or “I am coming” etc. It is not “It is so” or “I am coming as you say” that comes to the mentality first, then a succinct “yes” replacing it. “Copperfield!” is the concrete speech expressive of the whole emotion and recognition, then Mr. Micawber rearranges the feeling and recognition into further development, “of all persons!” or “Is it possible?” or “glad to have met him!” etc. It is not always a curtailment in economy but more often it is maximum necessity that can be said at the moment. It is quite misleading to consider these as something imperfect doing the office of something that could have been perfect. It is only in the process of artificial analysis that they may be considered as a portion of the structurally conceived mental contents, never a stock of linguistic debris.

The syntactical point with these compressed speeches (or representative speeches) is

the fact that if they have to be analysed for some ulterior purpose, they can be analysed into some speech syllables, or recognized as speech syllables according to the imaginarily reconstructed whole context and the syntax thereof and according to the actual morphological features of the expressed portion. Thus we can say "Mr. Brown" is a nominal in itself, and could be either subject, or complement or object in the understood context.

The tedious discussion so far in this section is to forestall the grammatical qualm from the quarters of 'irregularities' 'exceptions' and the like minorities. Now we shall proceed into the discussion of the syntactical phenomena proper, namely the inter-relationship between and among the speech syllables in reference to the maximum context, i.e., the total speech.

The main aspect of syntactical affairs in English is the unexpressed but nevertheless actual relationship between the collocated syllables the logical outcome of a trend from the replacement of relational particles by inflectional symbols, and then by the mere order of the elements. This is the crucial point of our discussion. It is somewhat like a orthography of a word; each letter has to be spelled one after another according to an order, and the letter and the order together constitute the word, yet the word is a mental unit that is not the sum of the letters. The order of letters in the word is fixed because that is the order in which the indicated (rather haphazardly, however) sounds are to be uttered. Only difference being, and which is a fact rather neglected, that while the order of letters in a word is physically fixed, the pure speech, though it is an analysable and structurally conceivable whole, is essentially a time-free affair, and hence the order of the elements is not chronological, but geometrical so to speak; one is linear while the other is spacial. When we say "I am going to school", the order of words is not the order of the mental items that takes place in us, nor is the order of "I like him" or "Him I like." One-dimensioned-ness of physical world in terms of time, compells us to project what is essentially spacial into a linear order. We may wish to say some state of affairs where are symultaneous phenomena taking place, but we cannot help but say one thing first and the other after, unless we can say or write thus:


I love her.

She loves me.

And read them at a glance, say them at the same time (if one can!) and hear them

“I love her
 who loves me.”

Perhaps the reader might have noticed a small word 'strain' in the preceding episode. The very resistance or strain one feels when he wants to express something in language is partially due to the contortion needed in squeezing the timeless mental content out into the physical existence in a form of a single line.



Now that we have once defined the syntax as the affairs concerning the relationship and collocation of the four types of speech syllables in the field of speech, the factors that concern the syntactical phenomena are, the four kinds of syllables, three capacities for nominals, and a capacity for adjectivals, capacity and kind combined for adverbials and predicatives.

Although we have elusively defined some concepts above in terms of syntactical function, notional meaning or morphological features etc., it remains that the facts, the language and speech, are there beyond and before the definitions and criteria. When we say that 'Mr. Brown' in a particular sentence is subject, i.e. the nominal being in the capacity of subject, we are not engaged in a pure logical classification, but is ascribing a concrete meaning of the word that is differentiated from another 'Mr. Brown' which is in object capacity.

These abstract function etc., are the partakers of concrete meaning though in most general terms. So-called empty words are not empty of meaning, but they mean something so thoroughly general and abstract that the concrete meanings are felt to be converted into a function or a relational indicators.

The differentiation of the syllables into four kinds is not, therefore, a mere formal classification, but is semantic, though much general and vague, a distinction. When we say that the word 'home' in the sentence A is nominal while 'home' in the sentence B is adverbial and another 'home' in the sentence C is adjectival... we are making distinction in actual meaning. Likewise, when we say 'the table' in the sentence D is in subject capacity and 'the table' in the sentence E is in object, while in F is in complementary capacity, we are giving different meaning to each appearance of 'the table'. The native sense may not feel the change to have occurred to the words, but that some change in abstract relationship with the other elements in the sentence has been occasioned. Unless in the case of pronoun, no nominal undergoes inflectional changes, to support the conviction. If such inclination is the another name to the analyticalness of modern English language, we fully subscribe to the appellation.

We shall not repeat the definitions, specially the respective notional and semantic definitions of the four kinds of speech syllables, but will repeat that they are the standard highest common denominators of the meaning to all the actual cases of speech-syllables designated to a particular kind of syllables. Thus, for instance, if we say that 'home' in certain speech is an adverbial, it is almost a lexicographical definition of the word. When we say a verb (predicative) is intransitive, it is almost a dictionary definition regardless of the presence or not of explicit object. When we say a nominal is in subjective complement, we mean something different from the same word in

objective complement, much less from the same in object. But English mentality, whether as the result of the language they use or because of their particular mental propensity, or the mutual influence of the both, seems to feel that when the expression does not change, the meanings neither change (the fact must be the evidence for anything that has taken place !) and what has changed is the implicit mental strain . . . the syntactical relationship.

Thus predicatives, adjectives, adjectivals, and adverbials pose less theoretical difficulties, though in actuality, the ambiguities looms heavy especially along their behaviors in the outer-orbit.

As for nominals, we have a purely syntactical problems as they fill three distinct orbits in the linguistic space. The nominals, without internal changes (except in the case of pronouns for nominative and accusative-dative), fill the capacity of subject, object (direct and indirect) and complement (subjective and objective). The distinction is partially formal and partially circumstantial depending upon the actual context fabricated by the entire speech (especially by the predicative, of course). Because of the psychological insinuation, the order in which nominals appear determines the capacity in which they occur. If in a series, a syntactical span will encompass only three seats for nominals, first reserved for subject, second either for complement or object, third either for complement or object and no more. (The seats for complement, however, can be also filled by adjectivals.)

The position for predicative is at the psychological lee just behind the subject, the first nominal. When emphasis, either due to the exclamatory motivation or interrogative motivation, is to be expressed formally (not in stress or pitch variation), the head of the predicative is placed before the first nominal, but the inclination is that only a formal, (preparatory, in a sense) element, auxiliary head, is prefixed, to the regular order of the 'Subject-verb' construction . . . the obstinate insistence upon 'Subject+verb' pattern. It is partially because of this fact that we do not place much importance upon the Subject-predicate division of speeches . . . our mental vision being two or three nominals connected by predicative placed between the first two nominals, the very first in subjective capacity, and the second either complementary or objective.

Adjectivals share the post-verbal seats complementarily either to the subject or

to the object according to the context (chiefly determined, however, by the tail of predicative). The difficulty with the adjectival complement being the fact that the capacity so called 'complement' is so abrupt and isolated a syntactical element in the speech, that when its bond of complementarity to the preceding nominals gets too tenuous, it rolls off the complementary orbit and becomes adverbial. Naturally, as they share the complementary function with nominals, the affiliation to nominals is closely felt in adjectivals——a fact much analogous to the close relationship between nouns and adjectives.

As for the syntactical function and ideosyncrasy of adverbials, the previous section has fully covered it. Perhaps we might recall the laxity with which adverbials are related to the predication, the free-lancing prelogative, the laws of propinquity and association and the law of uncertainty . . . that distinguish the adverbials from other speech syllables and the fact that the English seems to relegate the outer-orbited elements into adverbials. In short, the syntactical characteristic of adverbials is that it is not fixed, in regard to its position, thus in the process of grasping the sentence-pattern, we must be able to put aside the adverbials whenever they are inserted between other fixed-positioned structural syllables. 'The comprehension of a speech by syntax' means, practically speaking, the grasping of sentence patterns according to the speech syllables, disregarding the adverbials. To put it in a fuller terms, we may say that syntactical comprehension is, in the phase of reception, to anticipate a probable speech pattern the speech is to fit into and finding the particular pieces of information supplied one after another do fit into the pattern, and to combine the syntactical meaning and the notional meaning, the first being structural and general while the latter is notional particular, while whatever the irrelevant matter that comes in between, being suspended and temporarily put aside. A corresponding process takes place in the phase of conception as a matter of fact.

Another feature of the adverbials is that they find it hard to come between the transitive verb (either in predicative or otherwise) and its grammatical or syntactical object. This gives rise to such periphrastic negation as 'do not hate' instead of 'hate not' by which means two rules are satisfied: firstly, the adverbs of close subordination should immediately follow the verb, and that the verb and object should not be intercepted

by an adverb or any other element. (See, *Syntax* p.p 133)

The evasion of adverbial units between the grammatical and syntactical transitive verb and its object reveals some very English features. Transitive verbs and prepositions seem to be vested with a potential reach, as some unstable elements ready to capture free electrons and other atoms, and they readily catch at whatever that follows. It feels a considerable mental detour to contain the charge over the foreign matters (adverbials) until it finds its receptacle in the proper object a few words later. What usually happens is that the energy is spent over the adverbial element, and when it reaches, after skimming over several words thus obnoxiously inserted, the object, the bond is already cut, and the noun or the nominal stands dazed and lost to the grasping master-mind of the syntax. ('the object' above is the object of 'reaches')

The notorious shunning of so-called split infinitive is partially due to this psychological fact if we consider that the initial 'to' of an infinitive is apprehended as preposition (which in fact was and is) anticipating a noun; which anticipation is to be defeated eventually by annexation of a root verb... which is a rather unusual outcome and few wants to be held in suspense or in mis-orientation too long. To frankly admit this is occasionally necessary even though basically either to condemn bitterly or to reluctantly admit is a matter of taste.

The similar situation exists in such adverbs as 'off' 'on' etc. suffixed to verbs, thus instead of "Take off the hat", one may prefer "Take the hat off". The process will distinguish the expression from intransitive "He fell off the tree." Here English mentality is indeterminate and is attracted to the formal parallel whatever the syntactical difference; thus "Take off the hat" will persist in spite of its own syntactical unstability as long as there is a pattern "He fell off the tree". In the latter case, 'off' is an preposition engaging the object 'tree'... but, and this 'but' is significant... but as the combination gets fixed, the back-formation sets in, and the psychological reality gradually forms itself after the pattern of other structures. Thus 'the tree' comes to be felt as the syntactical object across a newly formed predicative 'fall-off', though we may not feel that the change had been so complete as to institute the verbal-phrase as transitive equivalent in meaning at least. It is syntactically made transitive, exactly after the pattern of "Take off the hat!". The 'look-at' fusion may be one of such

cases which has undergone voice change due to its frequency and psychological pull.

At any rate, heavy adverbial element, either grammatical or syntactical, is avoided between preposition or transitive verb and their objects, and when the adverb is very fragmentally, it is either absorbed into the tail of the predicative or attracted towards the following nominal which historically should be in some kind of oblique cases. The compound prepositions being the result of the first case, as are the adverb-suffixed verbs, whereas the institution of prepositional adverbials, which otherwise have been bare nouns in capacity of complement or object, being the result of the second case.

Another, home-truth to the natives of English and a striking feature of English is its head-tightness. Syntactically observed, the more essential are the elements, the forward position they take. The earlier said is an element, the more discriminate and definite in its function and meaning, the elements that are placed posterially, the less distinctive and indeterminate are their function and meaning. The most essential structural indication is given at first more or less preparatorily then additively the static information and substance are supplied according to their syntactical and notional importance. This is not only true in the syntactical phenomena but also is true generally in English. Again for a contrast, in Japanese language, the predicative element is usually placed towards the last stretch of a sentence which usually goes on and on for a whole paragraph. If you recall "I-wa, truth-wa, today-wa, head-wa, isn't painful", the situation will be clearly understood. In actual Japanese, the last predicate is yet in this order "painful-wa being not is". And if one wants to make the whole sentence into a question, he has only to add a syllable 'ka' a verbal question mark, to the end of the sentence, thus "Watakushi-wa, honto-wa, kyoo-wa, atama-wa, itaku-wa, nai-no-desu ka?". I will reserve my judgement as to which language is more logical...logical in what sense?

The head-tightness of English is further convincing when we discover its tail-looseness. Syntactically English is trochaic, rather than iambic. Each syllable of a speech carries the syntactical indication towards its head and gradually it tapers away towards the tail where it is abruptly to meet, perhaps with a pause in-between, the head of the following syllable or the full stop. And worse still, a tail often fuses into other element that

follows, thus rendering the syllabication quite nebulous towards the end. This of course takes place in the outer-orbits. Was the prepositional phrase 'in the outer-orbits' of the last sentence attributively adjectival to what is originally a noun, 'place', or does it stand alone as an adverbial? The sample in the case is rather obvious, while 'in the case' of this sentence is a little more subtle.

For apprehension of a syllable, we must know the beginning and the end, but usually beginning is the index, not the tail. The feature, again, seems to be ignored by the native speakers, but for a Japanese student, it is a flagrant anti-psychology. As you might have had some insight into the language with a meager quotation in the earlier part of this section, every syntactical indication in Japanese is at the end of each syllable, and syntactical conclusion is also at the end of the statement. Which is more logical... I shall again withhold the judgement... logical in what sense? let me ask again.

Are not the articles, pronominal adjectives, prepositions, conjunctions, relative pronouns etc., all devices to indicate the syntactical function under which the following unit is to be mobilized in the speech, but we have no end-indicating devices, which in some way German seems to have. The assertion thus presented here may not be of significance to the general advancement of English, but I feel it should be stated. In the preceding sentence did the reader find any difficulty in finding a discontinuity between 'here' and 'may'? Were you conscious of the mental cessation between 'significance' and 'to' as well as that between 'advancement' and 'of'? Was it clear that the preposition 'of' should govern down to 'English' or somewhere in-between, say perhaps before 'to' or 'of'? Our comma presents itself only when ends of several units fall at a same point; our period, where inevitably every units must come to an end. And in spoken language, we never say commas or periods aloud nor can we ever expect to hear them.

Syntax in syllable order, and grammar in word order in English seem to be a parallel phenomena to each, yet the first is strikingly English while the second, rather universal.

'The comprehension of speech by sentence pattern (i.e., the syllable collocation) especially those constituted by the nominal, adjectival, and predicative' is the constitution of English. It is so simple in structure and so few in kind that no further simpli-

fication or reduction is possible. What we have is the minimum imposition even a child can acquire while the adherence to the minimum is the imperative no one can violate without incurring upon himself the curse.

2. Sentence patterns (1):

The reduction of the whole discussion into the already well-established sentence-patterns may appear to be an anti-climax to the readers. Certainly almost every beginner's grammar will contain such tables as:

$$\begin{array}{lll} S + V_i & S + V_i + C & \\ S + V_t + O & S + V_t + O + C & S + V_t + O + O. \end{array}$$

We are, however, re-introducing the concept of sentence-patterns as a most fundamental working principle of English, either conscious or unconscious, either for practice or for analysis of actual speech. Hitherto, the sentence-patterns have been quoted as a set of classification and taught as the formulae to compose sentence after, but were seldom presented as a system of working knowledge.

The formulae have been too much of an abstract that no concrete and comprehensive designation of the structural member of the pattern was made, while the free-lancing nature of adverbial elements was scarcely mentioned in reference to the sentence-patterns.

The diversity of the kind and of the internal structure of each element together with the untractable rampacity of adverbial elements obscuring the basic structure, have rendered the concept of the sentence-patterns mere knowledge devoid of practical value.

The concept of sentence-patterns become practically useful and analytically significant if the concept of speech-syllables is incorporated. Then we have a set of speech-patterns in terms of syllables and their collocation, which is something between grammar of 'word-order' and the abstract 'sentence-patterns'. Hence the 'sentence patterns' are made far more basic and actual medium to the mastery and understanding of English than we had known them as something in which syntax and grammar were handled more or less indiscriminately.

The grammar books are compiled to draw attention to the minor points where natives fail, and do seldom put emphasis upon the syllable-order upon which they never

tumble. Unfortunate is a foreigner who has to fumble over the both, of the two evils, let him be spared of the cardinal failures. The sentence pattern never presents itself as such to the consciousness of a native speaker because it is acquired before he becomes self-conscious of his speech. The patterns are reduced to such a minimum that the speaker is seldom aware of its imperatives as an imposed convention. He is so thoroughly broke to it that he almost thinks in the way he talks, and believes that such is the only way to have it said and thought.

Those unfortunates who have to learn, by any reason, the language, must acquire this fundamental orientation in linguistic habit until it becomes a resistance-less feat for him before he may aspire after the full vocabulary, complex stylistic structure or mere superficial fluency.

In a word, the syntax is here made almost synonymous to say 'the grammar among the speech-syllables of a speech' and that at this level of abstraction, there are only four 'parts of speech' namely the four speech-syllables. If we apply another analogy, we might say that this is a set of linguistic algebra, in which each exponent can be handled as an entity no matter how complex is the actuality it is standing for. In this representative grammar we have three cases for nominals, namely subject, object (direct and indirect) and complement. There is only one kind of modifier, which is more or less what is called sentence-modifiers, namely adverbials whose position is not fixed by the pattern but by the contextual influence. As for the case of the post-verbal nominals, the whole context, especially the tail of the predicative has the final say.

Thus more from formal speculation than from actual statistics of all the possible speeches, we may reduce a reasonable variety of sentence patterns. The kinds should not be too many or too few, the degree of reduction at the least of complexity and yet of practicable level. Thus we have:

Chronological order of syllables

	<u>First Nominal</u>	<u>Predicative</u> (tails)	<u>Second Nominal</u> (Adjectival)	<u>Third Nominal</u> (Adjectival)
I	Subject	transitive	---	---
II	Subject	transitive	Object	---

	<u>First Nominal</u>	<u>Predicative (tails)</u>	<u>Second Nominal (Adjectival)</u>	<u>Third Nominal (Adjectival)</u>
III	Subject	transitive	Object	Object
IV a	Subject	transitive	Object	N-Complement
b	Subject	transitive	Object	(A-Complement)

V a	Subject	intransitive	N-Complement	---
b	Subject	intransitive	(A-Complement)	---
VI	Subject	intransitive	---	---

The head-tightness of English syntax is indorced by the constant initial position given to subject for all the basic patterns from I to VI. Unless something is given an unusual emphasis, the first nominal one encounters in any English speech is most assuredly the subject. Subject is syntactically paramount thus, firstly because of its initial position and secondly from its constant apperance in that position. However the syntactical prominence is often confused, duly and unduly, with the prominence of the actuality it stands for. The identification is as natural as the identification of gender and sex, or tense and time, one in grammar and the other in actuality referred to. The paramount feature and position of subject in a speech naturally reflects the paramount object of attention in the situation around which the whole context crystalizes.

The nominal in the capacity of subject has two dimensions, firstly it works as the entry index or heading for the whole speech, introducing the item which is to be the center of the attention under the actual context proposed. It can be, thus, replaced by an adverbial, say for an instance, 'As for me' in a sentence "I prefer coffee hot." thus, "As for me, (I) prefer coffee hot". Accidentally such is the way subject idea is introduced in Japanese. The second dimension of the subject is the purely formal requirement for the sake of syntax, a routine in a convention in anticipation of the subsequent series of words to be incorporated. Thus the sentence given above may be paraphrased, psychologically, somewhat like this: "As for me, the speaker himself, observes and thus states that he, meaning myself, prefers his coffee hot." When one says "He comes", by the subject 'he' we are told what is the central item of reference

of the speech and at the same we know that 'he' is also the doer of the act 'come'.

The separation of the two dimensions of a Subject may be felt in many cases. We have been told that pronouns are somehow substitutes to the real names, but they are not always interchangeable. I will give a sample. Can I put my personal name instead of the 'I's' in these two sentences? Certainly not, but why? If the reader's personal name is Mr. Brown, I shall not say "Mr. Brown may have objections to present." instead of "you may have". This paradox seems to be felt only with the immediate conversants, first person and the second. If I were to use 'the reader' instead of 'you', the situation is in half-ways and I shall be tickled as to the use of the verb, should it be in third person singular or second person? Usual evasion finds its way in the use of auxiliary or in plural, thus "Readers are asked to be tolerant" or "You will allow me to digress." etc. "Mistah Kurtz- he dead" is not so thoroughly a foreigner's solecism if we reflect the English usages of few centuries back. The real name is entered as the main topic of the statement, while the pronoun acts the subject of the sentence. Thus it is possible to say "Mr. Brown, whom I love" instead of "It is Mr. Brown I love." Now that we have only a meager set of inflection, in the verb remaining, the indication as to the agent of the verb is a formal necessity; or else why should we need 'I' when we have 'am' in a sentence like "I am here" etc. We might recall another paradox between the a-grammatical presence or absence of quasi-subject in participial constructions and the bold omission of subject in conditional clauses.

These two dimensions imposed upon the first nominal of the speeches in English are so seldom separately felt that no one suspects the duality, but we ought to re-define it somewhat like this: Subject of a sentence is the nominal that introduces the subject of the context, actual and imaginary, and that formally engages the predicate headed by the predicative. This may sound redundant but this dualism is the inevitability of the expressed speech throughout, and we must acknowledge it once, though we may not repeat it every time we come around it. Without the realization of this fact, we cannot sensibly account for such valid and vivid expressions we find in newspaper heading, as "Success foreseen", "President to visit U.K." "Strike called" etc., as if they are a-grammatical irregularities we must simply connive at. The first noun clearly performs one function of the first nominal though not the other. Whereas,

in such sentence as "It rains", the first nominal performs only the other function of the subject. It is well for us to reflect why in these speeches "Beg your pardon!" "Thank you!" etc. subjects are omitted and why yet they make sense and do not become imperative. Consider experimentarily the difference between the subjectness of 'English' and 'I' respectively of the sentences "English is taught by him." Do we not rather wish to have them "English is taught by He" and "Me am taught by He"?

There seems to be a latent psychological reason for the fact that in the pronouns, we have the identical forms for subject and complement (Nominatives) because psychologically the subject and the nominal in complement, unless in the case of objective complement and which never occurs with pronoun, is (or are) a same thing in different orders. As for instance to a question "Are you Mr. Brown?" we say "Yes, I am he" and in which 'I' and 'he' refer to a same person irrespective of the order; Thus we have "It is me (whom you teach)" and "It is I (who teach you)", then in the case of "It is you" or "That is it" there is no formal distinction, then why not the other pronouns and other nouns in general? And we have the indiscriminate "It's me". Often the formal subjects are not the actual agent of the verb employed, yet, because of the formal compliance, we accomodate our own mental image into it. One feels the texture of a surface with his finger tips, and declares "It feels rough." You say, never doubting or suspecting a difficulties of a foreigner, "She looks happy and is agreeable". Who is here looking, and is inclined to agree? You say "The book sells well" and say that 'sell' is here used as intransitive. But what has actually happened is that there is a difference in subject-predicate relationship between such a pair as "They sell it well" and "The book sells well". The two subjects are different in their state of being the subject of the speech and especially in their relationship to the remaining part. Is the situation much differently expressed if we say "It is the book that one sells well" into which the two are combined. Actually in this case there are three agents concerning the verbal action 'sell'; is this much far from the Japanese sentence I have introduced earlier?

The influence the first nominal exerts over the following predicate is in two ways again. Firstly it is conceptual; the actuality referred to not only determines the number-inflection of the predicate (in present tense only, however) but also often the voice,

as was the case with 'sell' above. It may require the reflexive pronoun as semi-object. It is fortunate that in most of cases, the state of actuality referred to and the linguistic representation do agree, but whenever some discrepancies are apparent, the usage by majority is the law.

As for the predicatives, we have exhaustively discussed in defining them. In the way of a review, we might enumerate several points about the predicatives. Predicativeness has three functions combined. It represents the observation and assertion of the speaker (not the subject always); it represents the dynamic aspect ascribed to the subject, and lastly it is the formal element of the expressed speech. These three may or may not coincide. 'Goes' in a sentence "He goes there" expresses that the speaker is observing and asserting that it is the act of 'going' that the man is performing; it also enacts verbally what the man is doing, lastly it supplies a formal essential. Why is "He going" incomplete as sentence in spite of the fact that it has *ing* more than "he goes" though short by *es*? We simply need a verb, finite verb to satisfy the formal requirements for a sentence, which is ever a mere arbitrary convention. In Japanese, all the adjectives have the predicative ability with tense ending and other comparable features that verbs have. Thus in Japanese, at least, "I gone" "He coming", "You kind" etc. as "Mistah Kurtz —he dead" are all legitimate. We feel that the English adjectives have imperative mood, thus instead of "Be quiet!" we may say "Quiet!" "Careful!" "Louder!" etc.

This may be still better witnessed by comparing what we consider a clause or a sentence with a participial construction with quasi-subject, or with a nexus structure in some causal or other verbal formations. The want the latter makes us feel in contrast to the former is the implicitness of the predication, not the Subject-predicate awareness or syntax conceived in the state of affairs so expressed. Once the comparison is done, we may come to realize that "the comparison is done" is no more exhaustive than "this done" in its sense and relationship to the principal predication. Since the both clauses are prefixed by relation-indicating "once", perhaps we might say the shorter "this done" has more to say than the apparently complete "this is done", as the former has some insinuation that it is going to be a conditional information and not the predication proper. The addition of 'is' into the clause will deprive the phrase

"once this done" of its relative sense and the reserve to the principal clause. We may, further add 'being' only to find the situation not much improved . . . simply because it still lacks the finite verb, a formal requisit.

The next feature of predicative is its internal structure, especially the fact that the head being pulled close to the first nominal, the tail to the immediate post verbal elements. That the head usually carries the tense, number and the tail the voice, and the verboid portion, either within or without the predicative, the aspect. However, among these factors of predicatives, what concerns the syntactical phenomena is the voice: A predicative must be either intransitive or transitive, (or perhaps some in-betweens as take reflexive objects) the determination of which is to be done from the whole context, but more directly by the type of the tail of the predicative.

One, vital feature of the syntax we must recognize is the mutual complementarity of the elements; when two words or two syllables are the only patent members of the expression of a speech, they divide between them the entire meaning, syntactical and notional. When there is single unanalyzable (into syllables) unit standing alone for a speech, it representatively carries the entire implication. When a context is understood and some factor in the expression is not thoroughly distributed (according to the terminology of logics) or explicit, the defect is covered up by the remaining part of the speech. In such speech as "I went three miles.", unless we know the concrete meaning of the word 'miles' as the degree of distance, 'three miles' is a nominal, and unless we know the dictionary meaning of the verb 'went' we cannot know if this nominal 'three miles' is an object or a complement or even an adverb. The designation of 'three miles' to be an adverbial element comes only when we know the total meaning, the concrete vocabulary meaning, and use of the individual words in the sentence. Thus the 'adverbialness' is imposed upon what is essentially a nominal element, or the nominal element took upon itself the adverbialness . . . which could well have been done by a use of a preposition. "I made him a toy." and "I made him a beggar." have exactly identical verbal structure, and unless we know the vocabulary meaning of the two words, 'toy' and 'beggar' not only the ultimate meaning but also the tentative comprehension of syntax, i.e., if the final nominal is in complement or in object capacity, becomes vague. Unless we have the adverbial that follows, the sentence

“I think much” is not settled as to the transitivity of the verb ‘think’ and as to the object-ness or the adverb-ness of ‘much’. In a sentence “I look at him at the window” has much in ambiguity. The first ‘at him’ tells us the destination and the point of contact for the act of ‘look’, while the second phrase led by ‘at’, namely ‘at the door’ tells us either it is such a person as observed at the window (attributive) or perhaps it is the place where the speaker himself is engaged in the act of looking, or perhaps the point where such an action is taking place (adverbial). Further, if we replace the so-called equivalent ‘to see’ with ‘look at’, thus, “I see him at the window”, the prepositional phrase comes to be felt as an adjective not in modification of ‘him’ but a complementary state of affair, though a little short of so-called adverb of attendant circumstances, meaning thus “I saw the man, who, happened to be, at the window as I saw.”

Upon the reception of the speech, we inwardly negotiate within ourselves and find some way to accommodate the fragmentary elements, both in syntactical and in notional ways probable to the suggested situation. Voice is again the criterion of the verbal affair, not necessarily that of the state of affairs that constitutes the context. Attempt to classify all the verbs into two categories, transitive and intransitive, will turn out to be a matter of probability and of degree. The determination is relative and depends much upon the mutual complementarity. One gets on a bus, but we do not think the bus is got(ten) on, yet we may conceive the situation as he is getting himself the state of being on the bus, in which ‘getting’ is synonymous with ‘acquiring’, ‘bringing’, etc. One may sleep a child or perhaps himself, and a little too long thus he over-sleeps himself, which is a little short of saying that one sleeps. If we recall the ‘look-at’ fusion, we may expand the application as long as it has a post-verbal nominal even to such a degree that all intransitive exposition can be put into passive; thus: “I go to school and the school is being gone to.” Are not such expressions as “I am looked down upon”, “He is being read to” etc. in some way or other in the similar loop-hole between transitive-intransitive dilemma. We Japanese feel somewhat awkward in expressing one’s entrance into the life as a passive inadvertent incident (which, however is far more realistic). A new father is told that a boy has arrived, and if what we can say is only that “a boy is born,” is not the mother too unjustly ignored? It is also

a queer experience for us Japanese to find that all the internal changes, emotional and otherwise, are conceived as the resultant state caused by others ... thus one is "surprised," "interested," "amused," "delighted" etc. Can not these mental happening be expressed as active affairs of minds? Why should I say "I am possessed of a begotting grammatical notion," when I can say simply "I possess one, and I shall be glad to be rid(den) of it?"

Because of the prominence and stability of nominals, whenever there is a post-verbal nominal, the native sense seems to work the syntax into Subject + Predicate (transitive) + Object pattern. The predicative should be in some way transitive to have enough grip over the following nominal. "I am looking at him" seems to impress the natives as 'I' the subject, **am looking at** the verb and 'him' the object, which happens to be in object declension. Thus we have the passive exposition for that sentence in "He is being looked at."

Whatever the psychological reality may be, from the syntactical point of view, if it has any merit, voice is not an affair of sentence-pattern. Transitivity and intransitivity of a verb (in its tail) may be significant in determination of the syntactical meaning of the following nominals, but to institute some particular type of sentence as in 'passive voice' or 'passive' sentence is a confusion of form and reality. It seems, however, that the general tendency of practical grammar is to establish a system of predicative somewhat closely representing the psychological realities of the native speaker. Thus almost all the sentences with more than two nouns are to be conceived as Subject predicate Object frame, thus:

Type A	Subject	Predicate verb	Object	
		head tail		
1.	He	(does) see(s)	me.	*
2.	He	can see	me.	*
3.	He	has seen	me.	* (Perfect)
4.	He	has to see	me.	*
5.	He	is seeing	me.	(Progressive)
6.	He	is to see	me.	
7.	He	would have had . . . seen	me.	* (Subjunctive)
8.	He	ought to have been to see	me.	(Subjunctive)

Type A	Subject	Predicate verb	Object	
9.	He	has got to see	me. *	
	He	(’s) gotta see	me. *	(vulgar)
10.	He	wants to see	me.	
	He	wanna see	me. *	(vulgar)
11.	He	is going to see	me.	
	He	(is) gonna see	me. *	(vulgar)
Type B	Subject	Predicate verb	Object	
		verb --- prepositional adv. Prep.		
12.	He	looks at	her.	
13.	She	is looked at by	him.	(Passive)
14.	She	is seen by	him.	(Passive)
15.	They	live in	a house.	
16.	A house	is lived . . . in by	them.	
17.	She	is spoken . . . of by	him.	
18.	He	goes to	her.	
19.	She	is gone . . . to by	him.	(impossible)
20.	He	is gone to	her.	(Perfect)
21.	He	looks down upon	her.	
22.	She	is looked down upon by	him.	
23.	She	is passed . . . by by	him.	
24.	He	buys a piano . . . for	her.	
25.	She is bought	a piano . . . for by	him.	(possible ?)
26.	He	lived with	her.	
27.	She	is lived . . . with by	him.	(impossible)
28.	She	is out-lived . . . by	him.	
29.	She	is done-away . . with by	him.	(possible)
30.	She	is lived-away . . from by	him.	(possible ?)
31.	She	ought to have had been looked-down-upon by	him.	

This is to demonstrate even to some absurdity that not only the voice, but also other so-called varieties of phrasal verbs are very tentative classification falling between psychological reality and the reality of language. We cannot fight very long against the actual mental reality with which we use our language, but as long as there is a distinction felt, the distinction has to be, though not for practical purpose perhaps but for analytical purpose alone, recognized.

In spite of the apparent formal parallel with not only "The house is lived in by a family" or "I am looked at by him", but also with "S is attended by O", "S is gone to by O" is impossible not because of its syntactical frame-work, but because of its context. Of the thirty-one samples in the table, supposing them all possible and making some sense, only those marked by * are to be considered in our principle as legitimate Subject+Predicate+Object construction, while all others are diversely analysed according to the structure of each sentence.

So-called complex tense and mood are also the affairs that concern the predication and the predicatives. Practical minds, as is the practical grammar, are inclined to take the short-circuited conception and operational pattern irrespective of the formal consistency, and since they are consistent in their purpose in use of language as the pragmatic tool of communication, we must pay due respect to the autonomous evolution of the language on its own laws. And some day we may grant a dignity now 'will' and other auxiliary verbs enjoy to the uncouth 'gonna' and 'wanna' stock if they supply the demand both in taste and in efficiency.

The second nominal (or the first post-verbal nominal) is either the complement to the subject across the predicative whose tail is an intransitive verb, or it is a so-called object. The determination of the second nominal as to its complement-ship or to its object-ship depends upon the totality, namely the context, syntax and the vocabulary meaning according to the usage. The syntactical capacity given to the second nominal is either called object or complement according to the notional meaning of the rest of the speech, especially that of the predicative, and vice versa. The mutual complementarity is again the law, the distinction may often be artificial imposition, though often there is not much syntactical ambiguity. (on this more later)

As we have mentioned a few paragraphs ago in the notes to the table, the first

noun after the predicate verb tends to stand up as object. If the noun happens to be the object of preposition with which it has constituted an adverbial element, it loses the preposition to the predicative as best represented by the 'look-at' fusion where the object of the preposition is made the syntactical full object.

Object of transitive verbs may indicate varieties of notional meanings in relation to the predicate verb. The syntactical definition of the capacity Object must be first made by its difference from Complementary capacity. Say, for an instance, "He becomes a president", and are we told whether the person undergoes a change in status and institutes himself as a president, or the person exhibits a quality that matches a dignified position of the president? "One regrets an act", in which the act is an obvious object, while if we mean that we regret to do the act, we are caught and cannot tell if the infinitive phrase is an object or an adverb. One digs a hole, and grammarians tell us that the hole is a cognate object telling the result and product of an action. But couldn't it be a complement, if we take it to mean that one digs a spot of earth so that the area will become a hole. One can wave a good-bye to a parting friend, and the 'good-bye' is an object syntactically rather than actually, or at least it is only in metaphor that one can wave a 'good-bye'. Thus determination of the first post-verbal nominal as 'object' is a precarious matter, and since the distinction is to be done for the sake of syntax, the criteria must be also syntactical.

The formal definition of the capacity 'object', and that of direct object and of indirect object will be again a problematic issue. It is so obvious and taken for granted. Thanks to the natural parallel between the objective world and the representative mental affair within, most of the so-called objects are concurrently the verbal representation of some particular object that receives the transitive event, actual or metaphorical, and, at the same time, in the realm of language, it is the counterweight placed on the other side of the balance across the predicative thus verbally enacting what takes place among the objective-correlatives. Most of the cases are quite natural in the verisimilitude between the actuality and the representation, while occasionally they are quite at odds with each other. One may say "I hear him well" but in the actual physical realm, the speaker is listening while the third party referred to by 'him' is making noises (most-likely vocal voices) that reach the subject of the statement, the speaker.

We Japanese get an ample shake when we are 'shaken' literally, but accidentally, in hands. We are thoroughly lost as our person is 'robbed', but fortunately, only 'of our purse'! They shake us, in hand, and rob us, of some money, but in Japan you get only your hand shaken and your money robbed and your person is left politely intact.

The discrepancy between the two dimensions of verbal objects is an inevitability as long as language remains to be a way of representation and never to be the things and happenings in themselves. Thus within the actuality of language, a clue to the definition of object is in the tail of the predicative, as it has been pointed out. However, we should not forget that the final recourse is to the context, the way in which the state of affair is conceived verbally and expressed, in the manner of which we can get the indication as to the object-ness or complement-ness of a post-verbal nominal. For the second object, only a vaguer definition can be found. We should not look into the physical reality the expression is referring to for the logical object or objects. They must be sought in the way the situation, the context, is conceived and given expression.

According to our theory and practice, noun element in grammatical object to a preposition is never given a nominal-hood and hence never is syntactical object, thus among the samples of Type B, not even one case of the pronouns in objective declension under the heading 'object' is considered to be the syntactical object. The only test stone for the object-ness of the second nominal is to look to the kind of the tail verb of the predicative. If the tail verb is in itself a transitive or intransitive, the determination is more than half made. The determination of a verb as to its transitive-ness and intransitiveness, in its turn, depends not so much as it does on vocabulary meaning and on the fact that it has an object, as it does on the fact that it can be, in a hypothetical context, the past participle intimating the passive aspect among other aspects such as perfect etc. Thus in "I love here", the doubt may rise as to the meaning of 'here', namely is it an adverb or (pro)noun? if first, is 'love' transitive or intransitive?; if second, is 'love' transitive or intransitive? Unless we know from the context what it means, what is meant by the speaker, the analysis is futile, though we may have several possible conjectures. If it is to mean that the person engages in a mental act of love

at the location, the transitivity or intransitivity of the verb is undetermined and unanalysed. But if it is meant to mean 'I love this locality', it is the second case and 'here' must be either complement or object. Of all possibilities, we have another clue to determine the capacity for the 'here' which is told us now as nominal. It is the grammatical test, if 'love' can be used as passive form in its past participle form in a proper syntax, and if found possible, chances are more for transitivity than for intransitivity and the word 'here' has what an object-ness can mean. This is again an exaggerated description through which we come to the general comprehension of syntactical pattern as for the second nominals (first in the post-verbal nominals). But such is the latent psychological procedures one usually undergoes in comprehending sentence.

To conclude, the voice of the tail of the predicative has much to do with the determination of the meaning (inherent and relative) of the first post-verbal nominals; the meaning in two major divisions, one is grouped as object, the other as complement. However, the voice of the predicate verb is often ambiguous while the vocabulary meaning of the nominal seems to have some influence in deciding its object-ness or complement-ness. The over-all law that governs the situation seems to be the law of mutual-complementarity among the members of a speech. And the general tendency, apparently, seems to direct itself toward the indiscriminate Nominal + Predicative + Nominal construction leaving the internal variations wholly to the law of mutual-complementarity.

Unless a speech is conceived and comprehended, analysis thereof is an idle play in possibilities. All the grammatical and syntactical classifications are the ways the elements of speech share and shoulder the concrete meaning in spite of the fact that the expression is representation, not the substitution.

3. Sentence pattern (2):

The distinction of the first post-verbal nominals as object or complement (or even perhaps as adverbial) is almost impossible from formal point of view alone (unless in the cases of pronouns), and it seems more of a conceptual than of syntactical distinction. However, if we feel some difference in gestalt quality between these two capacities, perhaps we may define, for the sake of consistency, the distinction to a degree even

though it tends to be an abstract.

We accept both "We grow old" and "We grow apples" and almost instinctively attribute the cause of difference in the verb 'grow' and say it has two uses, one intransitive, while the other transitive and some dictionary distinctions added to each. Are they different words happening to be in an identical form, or two different uses of a word? Suppose we say "We grow old folks", we must accommodate ourselves into the possible context and decide which way should we take the verb 'grow'. Now, comparing "We grow apples" and "We grow old folks", we realize a difference in the function played by the two nominals. Those who feel not at home in the phrasing "we grow old folks" may reflect that in their mind the verb 'grow' persists to be transitive and 'old folk' cannot but be the object. Is the difference in the vocabularistic meaning of the words concerned, or in some relational meaning of the context? The distinction as object or complement (in the case of both being nominals) is a distinction of meaning in the most general terms so abstract a relation that we cannot give notional disparity but only abstract distinction in capacity of function. The complements are instituted as a syntactical function or distinction beyond the grammatical level, because of their fixed position and their entry without connective elements. Thus the division of capacity between object and complement of a nominal is possible only when there is a clear distinction in its vocabulary meaning. "One gets cold" is a simple case where the distinction is up to the reader's choice, while "He gets it cold" presents a difficulty because we cannot decide if 'it' alone is the object and 'cold' the complement, or 'it cold' is an object of 'get' as a whole, meaning the state of the thing referred to being cold. A comparison with "He makes it cold" will puzzle us further as to whether it is a difference in meaning or in the abstract relation within the speech. And we have "He gets it done." where these two above are combined.

What really sets us off in the complementary ditch is the complement that comes thus after the first post-verbal nominals, or so-called objective complements. If we recall the dual aspects of subject of a sentence and speech, our imposition of subject-foothold upon the object becomes understandable. I might wish the situation expressed clearer, and would add some more words thus: "I wish that the situation may be expressed more clearly", from which the complementary relation is banished.

The confused discussion above was intended to intimate that the complements stand in such a variety of logical relationship to the predication that we cannot afford to establish classifications for the conceivable relationship they may stand in actual speeches. The only possible and practical thing we can do is to acknowledge them as a whole according to the position and differentiating them from objects (in the case of nominals), and no further classification seems syntactically significant. The logical relationship (the meaning) of such complements is not expressed and the recipient of the speech negotiates within himself until he finds the complement accommodated within the context... to put it in the other way, the logical relationship that complements carry in the context is worked out by the 'mutual-complementarity', the 'closure' of human mentality, and the complementarity, i.e., the state of being a complement, is made duly a syntactical affair at the equal level with subject, object predicative, and adverbials.

Syntactically complements are those nominals or adjectivals that stand in complementary capacity, and in return, the ability to stand in that capacity is made a criterion for distinguishing nominals and adjectivals, (especially in the latter, the complementation is the only capacity that they perform). And unless we define what is complementarity, either definition above becomes anchorless. For nouns and nominals, the complementarity may be a case-like affair as often hinted at, but for adjectives and adjectivals, the 'case' is a foreign affair. The concept of complementation has to be defined in some other terms.

As it has been the case with other capacities of syllables in speeches, complementation is also two-dimensional; firstly, it is the way the state of affair is conceived in the context and accordingly finds its way into language, while, secondly, it is a formal item in a given sentence with distinct behaviors and position as contrasted to nominals in object and to adverbials or to predicatives.

Conceptually, complements in speech represent the state and status of the item represented by nominals, with the act of ascription withheld.

By 'state and status' in the preceding paragraph is meant the somewhat corresponding two realms of affairs empirically divided between two classes represented respectively by adjectivals and nominals. If to qualify the subject is the motivation of a speech,

the predication will carry the function of the ascription, and the items ascribed will be either the attributive quality or the corresponding member of identification, or perhaps something in-between.

We recognize and assert a state of affair in which, for instance, a person is observed, and among all the possible and probable ways we find him, perhaps we may ascribe some quality to the person. The identification and the ascription may or may not be the central motivation of the speech, depending upon the speaker's intention.

As a matter of fact, the identification and ascription have no clear-cut distinction and are usually interchangeable hence adjectives and nouns, or adjectivals and nominals commonly share the complementary position, and the interchangeableness may, to a degree, be one of the tests for a complementship.

Now so much for the complementarity itself and we will turn to the same in the expressed speech patterns.

Obviously the orbits for complements in the sentence-patterns are definitely set: syntactical complements occur at the first post-verbal nominal position when the predicate is intransitive (subjective complements or planetary complements), and at the second-post-verbal position when the predicative is transitive (objective complements or satellite complements). In the latter case, the insinuated ascription is shifted to between the object and the complement. The occurrence of complements at these sites under the respective type of predicatives, is not something indispensable, but something additional, accidental or even unanticipated to the formal completeness of sentences.

We must furtherly recognize the fact that complementarity is an affair essentially independent of the voice of the predication. Complements are never anticipated as objects are, regardless of the voice of the predicative. It is not the incompleteness of the verb that necessitates a complement. Complements are complements (not objects or adverbials) because of their somewhat unanticipated entry into the syntax.

If compared to the other capacities ascribed to elements of sentences, i.e., objects and adverbials, not to say the subjects, the entry of complementary elements is not a filling of a vacancy but an addition of an extra matter to the sentence.

The objects as the syntactical units are less abrupt than complements, because of the fact that the tail of the predicative (usually the verbs) has an inherent expectancy

of no object, reflective object, one object, or two objects, according to their vocabulary (notional) meaning and to their formal usage.

Neither are the adverbials as abrupt as complements in spite of their free-lancing character. Since the logical continuity to the predication proper is so essential to the adverbials, their entrance in sentences is, unless obvious, always preceded by such indicators as prepositions, conjunctions or some form of inversion etc.

The entry of a complementary element is neither predicted by the predicative nor by the prefixed prepositions or conjunction; the abrupt existence is the essence of complements in the syntactical sphere. The abruptness, however, is least felt when the ascription or identification is the sole and main motivation of the speech, whereas it is felt most abrupt and casual where the descriptive nature of the motivation prevails. For the former, we have the almost mathematical equation connecting two members of identification on a balance of so-called copula verbs. For the second, we have the structure of Subject-Transitive Predicative-Complement. Beyond this, there will be a cluster of complements as rhetoric requires, and the merger with the participial construction sets in, and the adverbial-ness thickens.

The table below is to show the kinds of complements in speeches according to the kind of the predicate, to the kind of the complements themselves, and according to the type of contexts more or less mechanically with unavoidable occasional awkwardness. For each kind of predicate, 1 ~ 15 below, we have 6 choices:

<u>Tail of predicative</u>	<u>head of complement</u>
1st line	Noun (Nominal)
2nd line	Adjective (Adjectival)
3rd line	Present participle(")
4th line	Past participle (")
5th line	Infinitive (")
6th line	Prepositional phrase(")

1. Intransitive
incomplete

be	a man
seem	kind
become	pleasing
appear	confused
seem	to come
appear	at a loss

2. Intransitive
complete

live	a king
die	poor
stand	towering
fall	defeated
go	at large

3. Indeterminate
incomplete

taste	honey
weigh	heavy
smell	offending
feel	pointed
measure	to exceed
sound	off harmony

4. Indeterminate
incomplete

act	a hero
sell	cheep
read	interesting
sound	obsessed
prove	to exist
fit	at odds

5. Reflective
incomplete

amuse	onself	a clown
enjoy	onself	bland
present	onself	willing

(slightly transitive)

6. Reflective
incomplete

talk	oneself a monarch
cry	oneself hoarse
repeat	oneself stammering
weep	oneself exhausted
oversleep	oneself to snore
behave	oneself at ease

(slightly intransitive)

7. Transitive
without object

take (it)	easy
hit	sung
make	easy
strike	home
drive	home
etc.	

8. Transitive
causal

select	him	president
made	him	happy
kept	him	wondering
render	him	satisfied
get	him	to do it
held	him	in suspense

9. Indeterminate
conceptual

think	him	a genius
guess	him	happy
imagine	him	struggling
believe	him	converted
suspect	him	to have done it
	picture him at rest	

10. Transitive
perceptual

know	him	a man
saw	him	happy
hear	him	running
feel	him	provoked
know	him	to have done
found	him	in difficulty

11. Transitive
complete

defeated	him	a coward
struck	him	flat
sent	him	flying
worked	him	confused
stirred	him	to wake
pushed	him	off balance

12. Transitive
complete

bury	him	a hero
caught	him	naked
found	him	sleeping
captured	him	wounded
exposed	him	to suffer
discovered	him	by himself

13. Transitive
complete

ordain	him	a priest
hold	him	dear
deem	him	deserving
consider	him	lost
maintain	him	to deserve
believe	him	in danger

14. Transitive
complete

like	it	him
like	it	hot
take	it	steaming
prefer	it	cooked
hate	it	to fade
drind	it	in pure

15. Subjective
complement after object

He	married	her	a widower
She	married	him	young
I	greet	him	laughing
I	left	him	puzzled
I	dislike	him	to know
I	met	him	in confusion

(approach towards participial construction)

The terms 'transitive' and 'intransitive' as well as 'complete' and 'incomplete' are in the traditional definitions. 'Indeterminate' is the term used to indicate those verbs that can be either transitive or intransitive according to the context and where the complementarity or objectness of the nominal is established accordingly. The completeness of verbs can be tested by the indispensability of the complement in the syntactical (not the notional) context. Except for the case 7 and 15, the arrangement is adequately self-explanatory, and we leave the interpretation wholly to the discretion of the readers.

Also notice that with the more completeness of the verb, the more adverbial become the complements, and the infinitive complements and prepositional are often more adverbial than adjectival complement.

Perhaps this is too much of simplification of the affair encompassing so diverse the manner of expression in English, but if we reflect that sentence patterns are the basic mental frame for speech, whether to speak or to analyse, it should not be too complex but be vital and simple enough that even a mere child of four can master them. I think the analysis is necessary to this level but no further if the practicality is the purpose, either to practice or to analyse.

The tail-looseness of English is again felt obscuring the outer-orbit of these complex-syntax. Perhaps, in this way, I may convince the reader to feel the point: Is the phrase 'to feel the point' complement, object, or adverbial? You might answer that it is a bad English or perhaps no English at all. We say "we train a dog to sit and beg" is a good English and perhaps are "we can command him to sit and beg" and "we need him to guard a house". Are the differences syntactical or contextual? How far

should we be discriminatory within the practicality of it all? We can command our intelligence and knowledge assist us, and convince others see the point! The infinitives seem to shed the 'to' in order to avoid being taken as loose adverbial that would go astray and might affiliate itself, by propinquity, with the predicative or the statement as a whole. On the other hand precarious complements are dragged into adverbials: once quoted "We grow old folks" may be better said by "We grow to be old folks" in which the phrase 'to be old folks' is more adverbial than adjectival, thus avoiding the verb 'grow' to be taken as transitive. By saying "We grow into old folks" the prepositional phrase has far less chance to be taken for adjectival and no chance for nominal.

The complementation is something between the modification and adverbials. Forgoing of the syllablehood distinguishes the act of modification, while the adverbials are syntactically free-lancing.

As early stated, complements are not only syntactically but also notionally a superimposed items independent and isolated. Yet they are entered as something duly ascribable to a nominal element of the sentence according to the collocation. However, it is only when the ascription is the sole motivation of the speech that the ascriptive force is made manifest, namely such equation like speech as "A is B" or "A is good". For the rest of the cases, a complement is there as an item that is in itself incomplete and unstable, ready and apt to associate itself with any nominal item that may come by. It is therefore no wonder that variety of verboidal structures that follow the first object should insinuate a "subject -- predicate" formula.

However, since complements are complements because of their inference, i.e., the affected unintendedness of the inevitable ascription, the confusion sets in when the unexpressed ascription is given too much emphasis. 'Him washed' of "I get him washed" is not a clause no matter how strongly we feel the inferred context "he is washed" behind it. (We will return to this later.)

As secondary objects were apt to fall into adverbial orbit, the satellite complements (objective complement) do also veer away into adverbial orbits and thus "One would rather think highly of a person" than "think high of him", or "think him high", "We grow to be old" rather than "grow old."

Moreover, when the complementary elements are structural kind of any sort, the whole train gives an impression of a clause and its anterior units (mostly adverbial units) get so loose as to appear as independent adverbials to the speech. Did the reader distinguish the clause led by 'as' in the last sentence as an independent adverbial or an adverbial element subordinate to the adjective 'loose' thus as a whole constituting the planetary complement (subjective complement) ?

Another basic fact about complementation is that a complements may be serially clustered on until an adjective or noun is entered as complement. This is to say that a verboidal complement may have another complement joined, thus "It was returned washed clean", "I heard him speak inspired high" etc. while "I found her wonderful happy" is being replaced by "wonderously happy".

In the cases where complementary series is made a chain-like formation, we shall recognize the maximum context for the complement, thus in a schematic series "A made B cause C hold N", we are to consider the entire train after 'cause' plus whatever the subordinate flares involved as a complement.

Diverse types of sentences with complex syntax may be analysed according to this rule regardless of the inner structure of the complement unit so analysed.

Thus the apparent complex syntax as causal exposition may be considered as a type of complementary development. The sole excuse for the inclusion is the adjectiveness of the verboids employed in such construction. The adjectiveness can be well supported by the fact that the adjectival verboids in such position can be held by the bona fide adjectives in most of the cases. Thus:

I made him <come>

I kept him <waiting>

I left him <starved>

I had him <mentioned>

I made him <happy>

I kept him <hungry>

I left him <miserable>

I had it <red>

I made him <come here by bus>

I kept him <waiting by the gate>

I left him <starved almost to death>

I had him <mentioned in the class>

I made him <happier than ever>

I kept him <unbearably hungry>

I left him <as miserable as I was.>

I had it <red enough to startle.>

In spite of the strong insinuation of the Subject-predicateness between the object and the complement (adjectival or nominal), it is considered more reasonable and consistent to include the verboidal appendix as a whole into the complement — i.e., unit adjectivals. The situation resembles with the cases of perceptual verbs such as “see,” “hear,” etc. Thus:

I hear him	<come through the gate.>	(infinitive)
I see him	<coming through the gate.>	(present p.)
I found him	<gone already with her . . . >	(past intrans.)
I found him	<talked of very highly.>	(past p. trans.)

(Notice the tail-looseness of the final prepositional adverbials.)

Regardless of the kind of the predicate-tail, the satellite complements, especially those in adjectivals, seem to establish themselves congenial, perhaps as we are used to the postpositioned attributive adjectives of various makes. However, unless we are possessed of the habit of partial subject, i.e., the quasi-subject of participial construction or that in imperative speeches, the illusion of the Subject + predicate relation between the object and its complement would hardly assert itself. The apparent complexity of syntax involved in such forms as “I saw him come”, “I found him sleeping” “I want him come” etc., ought not to be analysed into three units but into four syllables independent from each. We cannot conceive the adjectives (verboids) as predicate or as modification to the preceding nominal. There is no subordination of the complement to the subject or complement. If we are to connect them in any way, we must go back to the whole speech whose syntax they partake of. If one thinks the relation between the object and the satellite complement do insinuate so much of predication, I think he is free to read so much into the expression but he must admit that the predication asserted is one dimension off the actual level of predication of the sentence.

We consider a sentence “I get him washed” to be analysed as (1) and not as the following (2) (6):

I get	[him]	<washed.>	(1)
I get	[him	washed.]	(2)
I get	[he	get washed.]	(3)
I get	[he	be washed.]	(4)
I get	[he	get himself washed.]	(5)

I get [he be washed.] (6)

This is to say that we do not consider the suppressed subject-predicate collocation apparent between 'he' or 'him' and the symbolic fragment of predicate (not predicative, they are either adjectival infinitive or participial adjectives), the object of the verb 'get'. To be sure, 'he' will never take place in actuality. We do not think that what should have been 'he...washed' has been, by sheer mechanical force of the verb 'get', transformed into 'him washed'. 'He' it could never have been: the formulae (3) down to (6) are not possible.*

The following table presents a back-ground out of which the above sentence "I get him washed" is to distinguish itself in its complementary structure.

I wash.		He washes.
I wash [myself.]		I wash him. He washes me. He washes himself.
I am <washed.>		He is washed.
I get <washed.>		He gets washed.
I get [myself] <washed.>		He gets himself washed.
I get [myself] <(to be) washed.>		He gets himself (to be) washed.
I get [myself] <(to get) washed.>		He gets himself (to get) washed.
I get [myself] <get washed.>		He gets himself get washed.
I get [him] <get washed.>		He gets me get washed.
I get [him] <(to be) washed.>		He gets me (to be) washed.
I get [him] <washed.>		He gets me washed.
I have [him] <washed.>		
<hr/>		
(I have washed [him.])		
I saw [him] <washed.>	I made [him] <washed.>	
I saw [him] <being washed.>	I kept [him] <being washed.>	
I found [him] <(being) washed.>	I ordered [him] <(to be) washed.>	
I found [the man] <washes.>	I ordered (that he be washed.) or nominal.	
I found [the man who was washed.]	I ordered [that he should be washed.] or adv.	
I found [the washed man.]	I ordered [his getting washed.]	

*A distinction must be made of this faulty 'he get washed' of (3) to (6) from those of "I hope he get washed" or "I wish he get washed". The clauses of these latter two stand adverbial to the sentence and they are clauses and 'he' is in either case the subject to the verb 'get' which should be 'gets' if not in conditional clause.

I get him	<ready.>	(adjective)	I made	[him]	<washed.>
I get him	<speak out.>	(infinitive)	I found	[him]	<washed.>
I get him	<going.>	(present part.)	I want	[him]	<washed.>
I get him	<at work.>	(prepositional adj.)	I had	[him]	<washed.>
I get him	<washed.>	(past. part.)	I get	[him]	<worked.>

In the discussion of the so-called causal exposition and other complex-syntax, we have come close to the orbit of the second object which also hold the second post-verbal position.

The simplest test for the complementarity is, ironically, to see if the context allows to imagine an ascriptive relationship between the first and second nominals. If it does, it is a complement, if not, an object. The fact may be further confirmed in the fact that if the second nominal can be replaced by some related harmless adjective, thus:

I made him president of the club him influential
 I kept him bachelor him unmarried
 I left him enemy bitter and firece . . . him hostile
 I had him prisoner for life him imprisoned
 (Observe again the loose anterior adverbial elements.)

More often, however, a distinction is made according to the kind and meaning of the verb at the tail of the predicative. A fine classification is made distinguishing the verbs out of context, according to the ability to take dual object or not. The statistical data seems to comply with the vocabularistic meaning of the verbs, which is very fortunate. I envy the English language such consistency (or for such consistency), and perhaps it is only on-looking foreigners who make English worse a subject of study . . . Now what is this 'worse a subject of study'? Logically, it is a complement no doubt, but cannot it be an object? Does our above mentioned test apply to this

case? If we call 'a hole' of "I dig a hole" a cognate object, certainly the phrase is an object. A teacher of English composition would certainly have corrected me this phrasing as to read 'worse as a subject of study.' Thus we slip into the adverbial parabola orbit from the first orbit occupied either by second object or satellite complement. The second post-verbal nominals are in many ways ambiguous. It depends more and more upon the law of mutual-complementarity which is not much distant from the law of propinquity and of association that govern the adverbial-hood. One can wish a friend to be the president, and may say "I wish him a president", which is somehow distinguished syntactically from "I wish him a good-night" and further still from "I waved him good-night" or from "I made him a president." If we go further deep in discrimination, we shall come out with the result that each word, whether nouns or verbs or whatever the kind, has its own grammatical inclination in each collocation it finds itself employed . . . this is certainly not a grammar nor syntax but a rehtorique.

What is the indirect object? What is the direct object? We have sufficient historical definitions for the two types of objects and perhaps we can very deftly change them into passive form taking each nominals as subject, but, for what purpose?

Since English has lost its dative inflection, the compensation has been sought in prepositions thus rendering the second object into adverbials unless there is a stylistic demand. In the place of "I teach him English" we have "I teach English to him" and perhaps "I teach him of English" or "I teach him in English", after the manner of 'an instructor in English'. Of the three variations, the second seems not yet to be congenial to an English tongue. The abruptness, the immediacy the hard-hitting effect, of the fixed orbit exposition is lost and we are to have a regular, well mannered language. Unless we talk or write about something elemental, our language tends to be periphrastic and lax, while expositional bluntness or energy is to be supplied by the new-ness of the conceptual, not the formal aspect of the language; the excess of neology or inventive phrases, some are ephemeral while others are to live a longer day, seem to feature the future of English. Very logical pieces called adverbials are the main genius of the language, in its free-lancing-ness as well as its free-contraction.

"Would you like to be taught Latin?" says David Copperfield to Uriah Heep, "I will teach it you . . .". The dual objects may have caused no uneasiness, whether

to be converted into passive, or in sequence of two consecutive pronouns. Is it a matter of frequency that decides the precedence of 'it' before 'you'? And why should we revert the order when 'it' comes in its full, i.e., 'English'? Thus 'teach you English?' Are we to assume that Englishmen in the street still hear the "As I you devyse" of Chaucer ringing in their ears? An American modernist poet writes "i can entirely her only love" and I can entirely it him understand. If the inversion is a rehtorical device, we are going back to the Old English days beyond Chaucer. I do not know how long will this French-like word-order consistency in the second and third nominals hold out, or if they might regain the currency in the linguistic tomorrow, but at least a foreigner finds it an invincible barrier to overcome, or should I have said 'finds in it an invincible barrier to overcome'? Or better perhaps 'finds it so invincible a barrier to overcome'? And I 'find it to be invincible as a barrier to be overcome'. The apparent logical precision of the last sentence sample, however, runs a risk of considerable chance of misunderstanding because of its wordiness. We have four grammatically coherent segments and by way of stress and pause, or comma and other indications we can make all the possible collocations of the four segments make sense. Suppose we name them thus: 'I found it'...(Principal Clause), 'to be invincible'...a, 'as a barrier'b, 'to be overcome'c. The mechanical arrangement will be:

Pabc	aPbc	bPac	cPab
Pacb	aPcb	bPca	cPba
Pbac	abPc	baPc	caPb
Pbca	abcP	bacP	cabP
Pcab	acPb	bcPa	cbPa
Pcba	acbP	bcaP	cbaP.

And if we give room for adverbial unit to wedge in between 'I' and 'find', the result will be 18 more cases added to the above 24. While, if we look for the similar possible collocations for "I find it an invincible barrier to overcome", we shall have a strikingly few possibilities, the only loose element being the infinitive 'to overcome'. Thus:

To overcome, I find it an invincible barrier.
I, to overcome, find it an invincible barrier.

I find it, to overcome, an invincible barrier.

The awkward experiment above was to show that the law of propinquity is such a loose law if compared to the complementarity that there will be no generalization can be made, and such constant danger of ambiguity is the inevitable cost for the adverbial independence and freedom.

The centripetal force with which English sentences cling to its fixed-order syntax seems to be counter-balanced by the centrifugal inertia of adverbial freedom. One depends upon the syllable order, a gestalt quality, for its vitality, while the latter depends upon the self-explanatory explicitness for its freedom. Either at the first or second post-nominal orbit, complements and subjects have the decisive directness, the curtness, and abruptness, whereas wordy explicitness of adverb levels the originally rugged Germanic language into smooth and logical English.

The polarizing phenomena are observable in the fact that more field the adverbials gain, the more conspicuous becomes the fixed-orbit exposition, and more powerful. There is a functional relationship between the two as between the pressure and the space of base if the mass remains the same. Same thing being said, the less said, the more force. This, of course, presupposes the one-ness of the speech, the grip of syntax, the mutual-complementarity of elements within the context.

Although somewhat out of the way, the table below shows a set of expressions for a single conceptual content with graded degree of explicitness. In a case of nominal:

Shakespeare plays
 Shakespearian plays
 Plays of Shakespeare
 Plays of Shakespeare's
 Plays by Shakespeare
 Plays written by Shakespeare
 Plays having been written by Shakespeare
 Plays which were written by Shakespeare
 Plays that which had been written by Shakespeare

In a case of adjectival complement in the second post-verbal position:

I elect him president.

I elect him as the president.
 I elect him to be the president.
 I so elect him that he be president.
 I so elect him that he may be president.

In a case of adverbial:

I will tell him to see you.
 I will tell him to have him see you.
 I will tell him that he sees you.
 I will tell him that he should see you.
 I will tell him so that he should see you.
 I will tell him in order that he should see you.

In parallel sentence:

She is pretty, I like the girl.
 She is pretty; I like her.
 She is pretty and I like her.
 She is pretty so I like her.
 She is so pretty that I like her.
 She is pretty, therefore I like her.

Perhaps a silly observation, but it seems that another center of gravity in English is being formed in the extra-territoriality of each free-lancing adverbials which are more and more encroaching upon the other defunct elements drifting uncertain in the looseness of the remote orbits. Unless very vital, the remote fixed-orbit elements will pass away and join adverbials and be reinvigorated there.

It is ironical but some overlapping is taking place at the extremity of economy and of corrosion. The lopping away of particles within the adverbials approaches to the succinctness of the complements. One may say "I saw the man in the moon." Does he mean that it was in the moon where he met the man, or somewhere he met the man whose residence is in the moon, or does he mean that he himself being on earth, saw a man (with whom we are commonly acquainted somehow) who was at the time in the moon? If it were in Japanese, we have three different postpositions that will clearly states which is which, and we cannot express the content without distinguishing the difference, but in English only recourse we seem to have is the common sense,

the mental flexibility to accomodate, the respect for the precedence and respectability. It is a wonderful harmony that such conservative trends should be balanced with the vigorous spirit of economy and expressiveness.

We shall summarily review the whole discussion on the speech-patterns or sentence-patterns (the section 1 and 2) before we may proceed into the affairs of the lower order of syntax within syllables.

Firstly we recognized empirically and speculatively the six sentence patterns. According to our theory and practice, the classification of the sentences into the six is done in terms of the speech-syllables and their collocations. And with so much of abstract formulation, we can discuss the diverse mode of speech expressions in an algebraic abstraction and that such abstraction is not a pure abstract, but is an empirical actuality as are the speech syllables.

Then our discussion covered the dualism or three-foldness of the function the verbal representations are performing in the speeches. Each member of sentence pattern is definable in two or three terms, and the identification is as often enlightening as it is confusing. Some inconsistencies in grammatical definitions of these terms are due to the false identification between the state of actuality referred to and the status of the verbal representation within the realm of language, the speech.

The paramount position given to the first nominal is commonly acknowledged as subject of the sentence which often is the center of the situation, but not always.

As for the predicatives, the similar distinction is attempted, and the explicit predicative and implicit predication are compared to each other in order to pin down the quintessence of predicative capacity of predicatives in speeches. Then, the law of mutual-complementarity is introduced as an important law of language, a gestalt-forming tropism of the human mentality so to speak. It presents the linguistic situation as if it is an organic whole whose content is shared by the available members. If there is only one member, then it stands in representation of the whole speech . . . And similarly the division of labour is performed in bearing the syntactical capacities. Thus the apparent formal classification of each member is not an affair inherent in such element, but is imposed upon the comprehended whole.

Then we have done some speculations over the tendency to grasp every context

in Nominal-Predicate-Nominal frame relegating the further divisions to the realm of rhetoric. But we agreed, perhaps, that our platform of analysis should not be too abstract nor too minute. Then we had a short discussion on the fact to be an object in a speech. The capacity Object (two kinds) is again defined in two terms and we found that in actual practice of language, the ultimate criteria could be sought only in the context of the language, not in the objective correlatives. Now in the formal features of the language, we also excluded the grammatical idea of 'object of preposition' from the syntactical objects. The formal criteria for the distinguishing of an object from planetary complement is the fact that the predicative (in its tail) can be transitivei.e., if it, by itself, can denote 'passive-ness' in its past participle form.

Then in the section 3, the discussion covers the complementarity both adjectival and nominal. While the capacity of being a complement is ascribed to nominals as if it is a case of a noun or noun equivalent, for the adjectivals, it is the only capacity in which it works syntactically. The complementarity is again defined from dual aspects, firstly by the inherent formal criteria and secondly by its contextual status. Naturally the law of mutual-complementarity is the force that makes the complements possible and powerful in spite of its abrupt relationship to the syntactical core, and of its remoteness of the orbit. The partial replaceability between the corresponding adjectival complements and nominal complements are pointed out, and then such a complex syntax, namely predication-like insinuation between the object and the satellite complement is discussed away from the acknowledgement of practical validity. We should rather consider the adjectival to trammel up the entire train of the subordinates for the maximum context, thus instituting the entire series as a unit adjectival. Because of the remoteness of the orbit, the outer orbit elements are apt to role into the adverbial parabola orbit. The remoter objects are no better mannered than the complements, and in sheer mockery of the grammarians, these excentric free-lancing elements behave super-logically and the distinction more and more to depend upon the total context by virtue of the mutual-complementarity. The uncertainty of the frontier is introduced without much elucidation except that it is ever a helpless barrier for any foreigner to learn and overcome.

The tail-looseness is again quoted to give more light on this situation and our attention

is directed towards the future of the English in its possibilities, firstly the flourishing adverbials which include the corruption and curtailment as they become so much of convention and tends to be succinct broken fragments in speeches. This tendency is reciprocated by two facts. Firstly the decrease in the variety of complement leaving the effects of complementation more and more pointed and effective, and secondly the outer object veering into adverbial orbit, and in fact these extremities do often find themselves identical.

To return to the original point of the summary, shall we say that sentence patterns are facts on the pragmatic level, from which we must begin and to which we must come back. The sentence patterns are not the classification of the sentences according to their type of exposition nor the attitude of the speaker in the speech; it is solely the classification of speeches (in sentences) according to the internal necessity and actuality if we were to analyse sensibly and if we were to acquire the native way of language with a practical purposes. The curt complementation, the succinct and rampant adverbials, these constitute the major difficulty for a foreigner, and yet that is the genius of the language. These apparent incompatible directions are in fact complementary to each other. The English tomorrow may largely depend upon the choice the English people make between these two poles. The loose, irresponsible adverb with monotonous head-indications such as preposition or conjunction or too carelessly curtailed pseudo-economy, will not perhaps compensate the uniformity and predictable monotone of the sentence patterns.

Seats Pattern	<u>First Nominal</u>	<u>Predicative</u> (tails)	<u>Second Nominal</u> (Adjectivals)	<u>Third Nominal</u> (Adjectival)
I	Subject	transitive	---	---
II	Subject	transitive	Object	---
III	Subject	transitive	Object	Object
IV a	Subject	transitive	Object	N-Complement
b	Subject	transitive	Object	(A-Complement)

V a	Subject	intransitive	N-Complement	---
b	Subject	intransitive	(A-Complement)	---
VI	Subject	intransitive	---	---

4. Extra-syntactical affairs :

The preceding two sections covered the phenomena concerning the sentence patterns according to the inner structure of speeches by syllables. The discussions have been carried out much in abstract and to the readers they might have appeared as if a set of fixed view, a new private system of interpretation with optional degree of practical validity and use.

In this section, some of the extra-syntactical affairs, that is to say, some of the phenomena which we have ignored in our proceedings in the past for the sake of clarity of the discussion, will be discussed. The extra-syntactical affairs are to be distinguished, however, from the sub-syntactical affairs, of which we shall devote another section.

Perhaps we might begin with the independent elements in speeches other than the four kinds of the speech syllables. Interjections are perhaps the most distinct of them. Yes. Certainly these elements called by that name stand alone in sentences free from the frame-work of sentence-patterns. They may be independent as the 'Yes' a few lines above, or perhaps, say for an instance, as this 'say', while some may be lodged within a sentence. It is an irony, I think, that what is so lucid in practice is so much a trouble for formalist's formula. Is the inserted clause 'I think' of the last sentence, the formal principal clause of the whole sentence while the remaining clause being the dependent nominal clause object to the transitive verb 'think' or an adverbial clause intimating the manner of thinking? Or even perhaps is not the latter the principal clause with a slip of tongue 'I think' as something to dull the edge of assertion with? I think these considerations are beyond what syntax can handle. The very last sentence presents the difficulty. The author himself is not sure which is the main assertion; whether 'I think' or the clause led by 'these'. What should we do with them when asked to analyse the sentence like these? Well, the answer should not be a fixed formula dictating the reality already incarnate. Was the 'well' of the last sentence an adverb to influence the assertion of the following statement, or a mere slip of tongue somewhat sub-linguistically expressing my attitude over the assertion? You, the kind reader, cannot dictate it to be either, for it has been already said and cannot be retracted, and once it is given independence, it is subject to all the possible manner of reception, over which I have no power.

Thus, some linguistic units are always indeterminate and do mock the formal designations despite the clearness of the meaning. For such cases, we have only to show the possible ways of interpretations according to the principle we hold.

Many units of speeches may turn out to be such, and especially some coordinate conjunctions and interjections are of this type, and we ignore them when ignoring seems more practically true, whereas on another occasion we shall be giving them status of subordinate conjunction rendering the following full clause an dependent element, a syllable equivalent, in a sentence pattern. (c.f. the clause in this sentence after 'whereas'.) A sentence or a series of sentences

I work.

He rests.

may or may not be a single speech. According to the structural pattern, they are two sets of sentences, but if the logical assertion of the utterance as a whole was implicit but clearly felt between the two clauses, the problem arises . . . which is subordinate? Suppose we have this statement a little more explicit, thus:

I work while he rests.

the situation is a little improved, yet we are not confident if this conjunction should be considered as subordinate conjunction reducing the second clause a conditional element (adverbial). One thing is clear that we cannot have a definite result. We may not be able to divide an given angle into three equal angles by valid geometrical process yet we must acknowledge the fact that the angle can be so divided.

We have such expressions as "Like mother, like daughter" or "The more money, the more trouble" etc., where no logical elements are explicit, yet no other way of expressing the content will be more efficient and clearer. As for our analysis, it remains true that we cannot analyse what is not physically there, and that what we impose between the words, or the full context we see behind the expression, is a guess with indefinite possibilities. Thus in many cases our analysis may only point to the fact that the totality of complete expression is a speech regardless of its internal formation. And if any recognizable segmentation is practically felt, we may be satisfied with the probable designation of type to speech syllables for a maximum context for each of such unit. Thus "The more money, the more trouble" will be analysed as a complete speech consisting of two recognizable syllables each being nominals. And perhapes likewise, the

independent 'yes' might be analysed as an independent speech, and recognizable to be in itself an adverbial. The analysis cannot indicate the distinction whether "Yes." as a speech is in affirmative, or a mere sign of acknowledgment or even an expression of ironical disapproval, even though in actual speeches, the intonation may somehow reveal the tone, and in typography, the '?' or '!' may partially indicate.

We may say "God save the king!" but we cannot analyse it properly unless we know if 'God' is in vocative or nominative . . . these phenomena do defy the scheme of analysis if the latter wants to be the ultimate exclusive law, but if the analysis is adopted as a technique to exploit the probability, we can show several conceivable ways of analysis one of which may be the probable one depending upon the context and usage.

At any rate, it is not only such grammatical odds as coordinate conjunction and interjections that are to be classified as extra-syntactical affairs, but also some more English facts which we consciously feel 'grammatical'.

The discussion may have duly brought the reader to the question of mood, the topic the grammar can never do without, . . . Fine thing we inherited. Were I the reader, I should have instituted another mood, i.e., 'ironical mood' in which such an expression as "Fine thing we inherited!" may be included. It obviously intimates that the real purport of the statement is exactly the opposite, which is a fact more drastic than assuming something subjunctive.

Perhaps readers may protest and would say there must be a formal evidence to substantiate such mood as an agrammatical norm. Yet, is not the absence of negative indication a formal feature? The clause "were I the reader" a few lines above is a typical of so-called subjunctive conditional clause, whose subjunctiveness is explicit in the irregularity in the inflexion of the verb and the inversion. But is the sense of unreal supposition insinuated or stated? Unless we are clear about this point, the discussion upon the mood will be rather futile from the formal point of view. If such is for the practical purpose, the statistical probability is the final authority, and language being much subjective, there is no way to test the objectivity of the statistics taken for that information either, thus leaving us not far from the starting point. May the day come when such expression as this may be classified simply along with "The

day may come” with a note saying “the inversion for emphasis effecting inquiry, command, hope, supposition etc.” Such has been the way we have come not to distinguish the uses of ‘God’ in “God save the king!”. The day would come. But we will never be sure what the verb ‘would come.’ definitely mean. And the laying out of all the possible insinuation including the ‘ironical mood’, the paradigm obtained is a chart of psychology for the mergin of conditioned reflex. Consider the so-called imperative mood. Is this ‘consider’ in any of a formal declension indicative of imperative? Or is it parallel to adjectives used imperatively as “Quiet!” or “Louder!”? Or perhaps we may say that we have imperative zero-declension for nouns in “Exit”, “No smoking”, etc.

In short, we need not consider mood in our analysis unless the expression of mood becomes syntactically distinguishable from the indicative speeches. Mood, however, is the over-all property of each speech in terms of its original speech motivation, if we remember our initial discussion and how have we exclusively selected the speeches in indicative mood in our subsequent discussion of sentence patterns. All the inversions are felt as such because of their diversion from the norm, and such diversions are considered as the results of some additional force upon the expression, namely some extra-syntactical influence that has nothing to do with the state of affairs in reference to which expression has given occasion.

This may perhaps be an arbitrary distinction, but it seems nevertheless necessary for us first to differentiate two orders in classifying the sentences: One by the kind of motivation, the other by the structural patterns. Is a speech in its motivation emotive or notional? Is it intended to demand some state of affairs to be effected, or is it an ejaculation or an acknowledgement of something that has caused an emothinal impetus? Is it stating some mental image and statement, or is it an inquiry about facts? These are basic points regarding to the intention rather than the import of a speech.

Four of the so-called moods are the classification of this order while the classification according to the sentence patterns is thoroughly a different order of the affairs and it seems to be rather a futile effort to define one with the other. They are like tone and note to a song. They are related but not directly. Whenever a comprehensible

utterance is made, it can be grasped in some way or other in our scheme of analysis, regardless of the mood in which they may have been uttered, but we should not anticipate that the results of the analysis will prove necessarily the mood in which the speech is brought to existence. Perhaps some frequented inversions and other indications may be recognized to form certain speech types for certain moods in contrast to the indicative speeches. Inversions or the affixation of interrogative pronoun in the case of interrogative mood as well as in exclamatory mood, and the absence (needlessness) of subject in the imperative mood, the fragmentary utterances in exclamatory speeches, may be considered as distinct types of speeches, yet we do not consider them to constitute different sets of sentence-patterns.

After all, the mood and analysis have no definite bond. The often discussed subjunctive mood does not pose problems in the process of analysis.... It is almost purely grammatical in its formal aspect and belongs to the affairs notional and even rhetorical. In short, semantically speaking, the mood-expression is a kind of side-effect or over-tone, whereas syntactically, it is usually off our consideration unless it exerts an influence over the patterns of sentences.

Thus, according to our theory and practice, the so-called inversion and other shifts that take place in the collocation of syllables are regarded somewhat as affairs within each sentence pattern. We consider "Is he coming?" a version of "He is coming" both belonging to a sentence pattern, and the collocational shift is considered as an irregularity or divergence from the regular norm, and the kind of the psychological motivation for the inversion is dissociated from the syntactical scope.

No doubt, every linguistic expression is a representative expression, yet we feel that there is a distinction to be made between what is being insinuated and what is stated. We cannot usually distinguish "You go" as to whether it is a speech in imperative or demonstrative, nor are we sure if "You must have it" is in imperative mood or in demonstrative. We are further perplexed as to the distinction of subjunctive quality in "You might come", "Could you come" etc. from imperative.

One can take statistical notes about the mutual relationship between the psychological mood and the certain linguistic formula, and present them as a guide for modal expressions in English; but, at least for the purpose of some sensible analysis, the pre-

linguistic, extra-syntactical affair so psychological seems to be out of the scope. And unless one comprehends what is stated with what intention, the analysis is pointless . . . Unless we know what is meant, we cannot know if 'you' of "You come" is the subject or vocative though both in nominal.

The mood is something more fundamental than notion, the meaning carried by words and by their structure. It is something felt and experienced rather than things comprehended through apprehension.

"Stop!" must be self-explanatory and self-evident, and the comprehension does not come through analysis nor grammatical knowledge. It has to be experienced and comprehended first by some other ways than analysis or explanations. "The man!" may be comprehended if one is in the proper situation of the objective correlative without a help from synthesis, and what are we told by sub-linguistic utterances such as "Oh!", "Hec!", etc.? And what mood are they in? We are not in the mood of going further into this maze.

Perhaps another way of classification of speeches may be done according to the homogeneity or heterogeneity of the motivation. Something that goes between these two classification may be those so-called anacolutha. The classification is somewhat a closer discrimination of the sentences usually done in such terms as 'complex sentence' 'compound sentence' or 'sentence equivalent', etc. The simplest case of heterogenous speech may be, I propose, such sentence as this in which another independent speech is inserted. It is not exactly a complex sentence, nor yet a compound sentence, and most likely the heterogeneity of such foreign element varies relatively according to its weight against the principal clause. Often the inserted element is almost so important as to become a coordinate sentence of a compound sentence. Whereas in some instances, the inserted heterogenous element will be so casual that it may be considered almost an absolute use of adverbial element. The classification is, thus, again a relative distinction. In the practice of language, the homogeneity of a speech is not felt to be the law, so it seems. The additional clause 'so it seems' is an independent speech uttered immediately at the conclusion of the previous speech and in reference to the latter. Yet the subordination of the main speech to this after-thought was never considered until the additional speech is invoked. I might well have selected 'I believe'

instead of 'so it seems'. This is an anacoluthon ending not in a solecism, but in heterogeneity.

These extra-syntactical elements in speeches pose technical problems for a thoroughgoing analyst, but if the comprehension is already attained, these foreign matters are easily relegated as such, and the theoretical controversies will only prove the subjective judgement each conversant impose upon the heterogeneous element in question as to its heterogeneity, I think. The clause 'I think' may be considered as a thoroughly insignificant addition to show the concessional attitude of the author, whereas it could be the suppressed main clause whose object is invertedly preposed with its conjunction omitted. We may now come back to the parallel sentence: "I work and he rests". We may have several possibilities of analysis depending upon the insinuated, and imagined context.

The utterance is actually two independent speeches connected by an syntax-free conjunction 'and'. It is a complex sentence with the first clause dependent on the second intimating that the first is the condition and the cause to the second, and the conjunction 'and' is here assuming a faculty of subordinate conjunction or vice versa. It may also be asserted that the essence of the speech is the relationship between the two facts thus stated and there is no subordination between the two facts and by separating the two facts, the essence, the content of the speech is lost ... Could we ever expect that the verdict is forth-coming from the result of analysis? Certainly no. Since the beginning, our principle has been to derive the direction and manner of analysis from the comprehended whole, and where there is no comprehension, no sensible analysis. When the expression itself is inherently so ambiguous that it allows variety of receptions, the analysis is a relative affair left much to the discretion of the receiver of the speech, only requirement being that the analyser must stay consistent to his principle of analysis. To repeat, the analysis is not an absolute designation, but a relative interpretation in terms of the constitutional comprehension of organic human speeches. Actual speeches may more often defy the analysis, than agreeably do conform. But unless we have criteria, such distinction itself becomes impossible, and such distinction is not an abstract formal phenomena but a mental reality. If we feel the difference between and among "I think this wrong", "I think that this is wrong" and "This is wrong, I think", the difference is actuality and must be pointed out. And the

discussion will not be settled in terms of the objective-correlative, e.i., the actual state of affairs so expressed, but in terms of the logical relationship among the structural units of the language employed.

Apposition is another kind of extra-syntactical affairs in a way, in spite of the fact that it is within the syntactical realm. When we say 'Queen Victoria' we have no difficulty but when we say 'Victoria, the queen' the merger of modification and apposition begins. And if we say 'Victoria, namely the Queen' or 'Victoria, that is to say, the Queen' the situation is better stated but with more analytical confusions. When appositive elements are placed side by side in speeches, they may be considered as one unit repeated. It becomes difficult to handle in syntactical analysis when the appositive elements are placed apart, as in this case where the preparatory 'it' is appositive to the infinitive phrase. (Yet, being a pronoun, 'it' represents the latter as an 'I' may represent, in this context, the another.) And we must clearly distinguish such a nominal in speeches from the syntactical post-verbal nominals. It must be difficult to distinguish . . . Do I mean that the act of distinguishing is difficult, or do I mean that such a nominal is found difficult when to be distinguished? In this case, the infinitive is the source of ambiguity, the infinitive being an indeterminate verbal state fluctuating between nominal, adjectival and adverbial.

We can also recall that some syntactical elements are appositive only in the formal aspect of expression. The apparent conjunction 'that' of the last sentence could well have been a pronoun representing the fact expressed by the clause whose subject is 'some syntactical elements', and there is potential appositive relationship between that 'that' and the clause. The preparatory 'it' can be, likewise, said to be a pronoun standing not for the external reference but for the internal elements of the same sentence or speech. Is not every pronoun in apposition either to the items of external actuality or of linguistic actuality? Well, was not language, ever since, a convention of communication in linguistic representation? When we consider the affairs so-called apposition, we cannot help but feel the psychological source from where the syntactical apposition draws its force. Syntactical apposition would not have taken place unless we have the faculty of identification and representation together.

However, for the sake of practicality, we shall not expand the term 'apposition'

to say that every verb is appositive to the act it means, and every noun, appositive to the thing itself etc. We shall limit the use of word within the appositive relationship between and among the members of the expressed speeches, and especially of syllables. We have earlier tentatively said that appositive elements will be treated in our analysis as if a psychological repetition, rather than syntactical unit and we shall be more inclined to consider 'Victoria' and 'the Queen' appositive when arranged 'Victoria, the Queen' than to consider that 'the Queen' is restrictively designating a particular Victoria among Victorias, thus as a post-posed adjective. And when we have 'Victoria, i.e., the Queen' or 'Victoria, that is, the queen', we would rather consider 'i.e.' and 'that is' as a heterogeneous element, and if we have 'namely' instead of these, we shall consider the 'namely' as an adverbial of that heterogeneous speech. But from the practical point of view, the whole series of words standing for the Queen, can be considered as a unit of noun or nominal as a whole.

Another ironical apposition takes place when something is directly quoted. 'This', for instance, is the subject of the present sentence. Likewise we say 'we' is a pronoun in spite of its plurality in meaning. We are less likely confused in such obvious case, but when direct quotations of speeches are involved, the situation gets more confused: Yesterday, he said "I will come day-after-tomorrow". Should we consider the quotation to be represented by a pronoun 'it' or an adverb 'so' thus conceiving the verb 'said' either as transitive or intransitive respectively? Although it is only in written form, we have a way of presenting apposition by means of colons, thus: "Thus spake he: Go thou in peace!" "They went: the mother and the sons." etc.

The syntactical problem with the appositive phenomena is that how can we distinguish the element and recognize the appositive relationship between the two members of the apposition. And the second post-verbal position is further obscured by the appositive nominals. A sentence "We appointed Mr. A the chairman to the committee." can be severally construed as:

<u>We</u>	<u>appointed</u>	<u>Mr. A</u>	<u>the chairman to the committee.</u>
S	Vt.	Obj.	Objective Complement
<u>We</u>	<u>appointed</u>	<u>Mr. A</u>	<u>the chairman to the committee.</u>
S	Vt.	Obj.	(appositive)

<u>We</u>	<u>appointed</u>	<u>Mr. A</u>	<u>the chairman</u>	<u>to the committee.</u>
S	Vt.	Obj.	(appositive)	Adv.

Likewise the ambiguity of an appositive nominal and the secondary object may be inevitable: "They called the body ban hous, bone house." in which there is a confusion as to the apposition between the three consecutive nominals. Confusion of this type is not met with very often and remains to be exceptionally unfortunate coincidence

We must remember, however, that the apposition is, or at least was, one of the basic syntactical pattern of English until of late and some of such remain in the expressions like "the earlier, the better", or 'The devil of that fellow' 'Jesus Christ, Our Lord', etc. The antecedent of the relative pronoun and the relative clause, as well as the preparatory 'it' and the following clause or phrase are modern vehicle for English still much in use and ever gaining in use. It may perhaps be not too much a surmise that without such appositive inclination, the auxiliary 'do' may not have come into such a prevalence as it enjoys in present English, although the apposition in this case is between 'do' and the 'verb' in root. (the relation originally was, however, syntactical.)

So-called continuative uses of relative pronouns as well as the similar use of participles (present) may have caused, in spite of the clear comprehension, some trouble in the formal analysis we have been proposing. Continuative use of relative pronouns, which is contrasted to the restricted use, is often indeterminate as to its continuativeness, as is the case in this sentence. The relative clause above headed by 'which' between the commas can, and may not, be considered as restrictive nor yet thoroughly continuative. When we feel the clause heterogeneous to the main speech, it is in continuative use, and if we feel it an attributive adjunct to the noun, the antecedent, it is in restrictive use. The decision comes not from the mechanical symptoms of the expression but from the context, the mutual compensation and complementarity, the ability to select the most probable interpretation out of the whole set of possible combinations. As for the continuative use of the present participle, it takes us back to the Old English days, leaving us much in un-analyzing synthetic state of mental process. The last portion of the last sentence after the participle 'leaving' is one of such cases. We may classify the phrase (if it is considered a phrase) or the fragmentary clause, as adjective in adverbial use intimating the result, consequence, purpose, manner, etc. Or perhaps we should establish

another independent speech that shares the subject with the preceding sentence thus treating the verb in ing-form as a finite verb with the potential relative sense superimposed. The apparent present participle 'treating' above, in this understanding, is not a derivative adjective but a finite verb equivalent to 'treat' standing as predicate verb to the subject 'we' several lines above. What is indicated by the ing-ending is the omission of the subject which had to be repeated. In the school grammar, we are taught to remember, wherever we come across a continuative use of relative pronoun, to replace it with 'and' plus the ordinary pronoun that fits. The situation is much like it in the case of 'continuative use' or present participle. What we have as the result is in either case a heterogeneous sentence.

Language being a most intractable natural growth and not a prefabricated scheme, there are thousands of cases fully in force and use yet whose origin and mode of existence defy generalization. We must invent new explanation for each unaccountable phenomenon. There is no exception to the affairs of language, because every exception institutes its own law.

In our past process of analysis of speeches in sentences into four kinds of syllables with some irregular extra-syntactical elements left out, we shall still have some elements that confront us by failing to comply with the principle so far acknowledged. If we recall, in many occasions with adverbials, the inner structure of the adverbials are often maimed to something a little short of solecism as in the case of 'If you please' and the like. Often the actual usage, with or without linguistic basis, establishes itself and the content is back-formed into the cast, then come grammarians who first frown, then acknowledge, give name, find proper position in the grammatical cosmos, and at last draw a law from it, or at least make it a precedence to judge other occurrences by.

We must realize the fact that whenever a scheme of interpretation confronts something unaccountable, the progress has come to a new stage and we are one step closer, perhaps, to the fact. Radio-active elements were exceptional odds fifty years ago, but they proved the keys to our modern physics and chemistry.

We often, half-mockingly, used the term 'look-at' fusion as if to make fun of illogical, practicality of English mentality . . . but would it not be opening the way to the reconciliation of transitive and intransitive distinction of the English verbs? Is not it

perhaps leading the current to the universal sentence pattern Nominal — Predicative — Nominal regardless of the kind of verb? Some of the incorrigible American slang expressions we now frown upon may be giving us an inkling as to the English spoken tomorrow, or perhaps yesterday. The system and consistency we have reduced from what we have and what we have had may fail in explaining them neatly, but there will be another set of schemes and systems that will logically and consistently explain the affairs now we think indescriptive and intractable. This reads 'kind of' boasting maybe, as an American would say. We may not be able to predict if this 'kind of' or 'kindda' as an adverb will survive or thrive or cease to be used. Neither can we tell if this 'idiom' is deeply rooted in English tongue or a freak growth by mere accident. Historically we seem to have had been very tolerant of such until the things became so well established that any alteration was taken for the lack of knowledge and respect to the established institution. The old adverb 'maybe', preposition 'during', conjunction 'nevertheless' 'notwithstanding', 'instead', 'inspite', etc. do evidence 'annual rings' of such evolution.

Our principle when we face facts that defy our logical elucidation, should be, firstly, that we must establish the fact, then acknowledge, and then interpret. Laws of language are not natural laws: they are of practical covenant. We are of opinion that any description of language at a synchronical cross-section is inevitably self-contradictory and inconsistent. We find our consolation in the fact that such a discovery of inconsistency is the evidence that we are thinking consistently.

As a practical policy for our analysis, we might strive to present two aspects to irregularities whenever encountered: Firstly we are to assess the closest meaning for the maximum context involved, secondly we must select the fittest among the possible ways of analysis under the context and situation. We have once mentioned the illogicality of such expression as "Here you are." when attention is requested to an article. Here we are saying what we are not meaning and there seems to be an eternal parallel between meaning and expression. A Japanese gentleman on a bus in London, accidentally steps on a foot of a lady, he, in sincere apology wishing for forgiveness, says "Excuse me, madam." The lady is enraged and slaps him in the face. The gentleman, mortified, cannot comprehend the situation where he should have said "Sorry" or some-

thing of the kind but never an "Excuse me." which was only correct if he should have had said it before he had stepped on her, but had he been able to do so he would not have stepped on

We have asserted that our syntactical analysis was to draw its principles from the maximum context of the speech, and therefore we expect to confront such discrepancy as this in varied degrees between the expression and the expressed.

If we are to be wholly given over to the actual meaning, 'the expressed' of the sentence, we shall soon find ourselves analysing the state of affair we are talking about and classifying them not according to the language but according to the facts in themselves, for instance, not of tense but of physical time, not in gender but in sex, etc . . . And if we are given wholly over to the linguistic actuality, we shall be ultimately confronted with impenetrable wall of meaningless sounds.

Our analytical syntax as a practical interpretation and practice of English will find its horizon somewhere between these two poles of language analysis, and when confronted with the phenomena whose analysis is something beyond the actual benefit, we will relegate them as 'extra-syntactical phenomena' and if asked to do something more, we might perhaps describe what is really meant extra-syntactically on one hand, and on the other, we might try how it can be best analysed within among other ways of analysis to fit the context.

"Good morning!" could have been in two words in hearing, one attributively modifying the other, thus together constituting a nominal, that could be either vocative, nominative, dative, accusative, ablative, or complement, or perhaps an object of a preposition in a sentence. And perhaps we might be told that it is uttered bitterly to a door-to-door vender of brushes by an angry housewife slamming shut the door on his face.

We must realize the fact that by distinguishing 'the extra-syntactical affairs' we relegate a vast area of linguistic actuality and limiting ourselves within the observation of the physical language and analysis thereof according to the maximum context, the total speech, which is extra-syntactical in its own right and nature. Maybe this here discussion been kind of too far gone round about way of saying something real simple . . . if I imitate some vulgar speech. If I cannot comprehend what is said, I have no authority to analyse, and if the total meaning is clear to me, perhaps I can be allowed to analyze

with some imagination and analogy I may invoke from the general knowledge I have for the analytical norms and criteria. Today, what I do about this sentence will be an accommodated interpretation, but who can tell it will be the tomorrow's grammar, or who cannot? "He go." "He went or goed" "He gone" "He going" seem to present an orderly paradigm for a verb 'go' for tenses and we must concede to the fact that to a new learner of the language, the aesthetic resistance against these forms as well as the cultural bias is non-existent while the anti-grammaticism and anti-logical impression of these forms may only provoke educated English speakers. It is, again, the majority rule, and if one cannot beat'em, he better join'em! sooner the better!

The final discussion in this section headed as 'extra-syntactical affairs' will cover the indeterminate syntactical items on remote orbits for whose determination, when the determination is in demand, we must depend upon the extra-syntactical affairs we have so far discussed.

However, before we go into the clarification of such marginal cases, we must reflect ourselves about the criteria by which we cast the actual affairs into categories. When we say 'in the room' is adverbial in the sentence "The girls in the room are pretty" and not an adjective phrase, (in spite of the actual feeling) we must not forget that the actuality is the 'in the room' and not the categories 'adverbial' or 'adjective phrase' and if we decide which it is, we are talking in majority representation. In the psychological actuality of the speaker, it could be 40 per cent adjective and 60 percent adverb, and we call it adverb. Whenever an ambiguity is felt, we are inclined to be decisive, yet we must not force a reality into the prescribed categories according to our taste. This is not at all concessive. Should we consider the adverb 'not' attributively modifying 'at all' or 'concessive' or 'at all concessive', or is it predicatively restricting the predicate verb 'is' or the sentence as a whole? The strictest and the minutest analysis will be to assess the possibility to each of the cases conceivable by the isolated context and according to the statistical data, instead of the round-number decision in either of the probable cases indicated. In some cases the weight is indisputably upon one designation according to the obvious context, while in some cases, the determination makes no difference in actual meaning, nor a shift in emphasis or nuance. When the speaker is uniliterary speaking or writing in his own scheme of thinking, he is often blind to


the fact that his context is valid and actual only to him and the reader not only find it intangible until somehow broken to the speaker's pattern of thinking, but more often the reader is misled in the manner which, to the author, was utterly unimaginable. One presents a ring to a group and asks if any one can push a well-sized item, a book perhaps, through the ring, which feat seems utterly impossible to effect. Then he puts the ring on one of his fingers and with that finger he pushes the book, thus accomplishing the feat! A silly trick somewhat taking advantage of such human adaptability.

For the speaker or the writer, the expression is done through the selection of one best suited way out of whole possibilities of expression before him, while for the receiver of the speech, the comprehension is the most probable selection of all the conceivable interpretations of the structure the expression can mechanically mean independent of the context. Hence the informal dialogue in broken sentences between two parties each reading the mind of the other at best he can is the most natural state of language at work. It is only in inhuman unilateral formal language or performed speeches, spoken or written, where the strict formal conformity is a necessity. One can grow a tiny seed into a tree, but one will find it hard to assemble dead material into even a dead replica of a tree, one is living while the other is dead.


Present system of analysis is not intended as a set laws by which to settle the marginal cases, but to point out such marginal cases in an efficient way and then to introduce, according to the syntactical possibilities 'the coordinates' for the determination of the actual status. To return to the original sample 'in the room', we must first point out the possible dualism in the interpretation of the function of the phrase in the context; it is either an adverbial or a grammatical adjective equivalent in modification of the noun 'girls' thus constituting together a nominal. If we are sure of the speaker's meaning under this particular situation and context, we can determine how much it was adjective and how much it was adverbial. If it is indisputably inclined to be either of the two possibilities, we shall say either that the phrase is in 'adverbial' capacity or that perhaps it is an 'adjective'. The determination comes not from within the sentence but from the total speech.

The readers are asked to refrain from the habit of thinking that the designation of some linguistic unit to a class is an exact definition. It is a matter of convenience

and abstraction. The process is much like a locating of a spot on a surface by two perpendicular coordinates.




In the case of an infinitive phrase, the situation is paraphrased into three dimensions. The infinitive phrase 'to see it' for an instance, in a sentence "One regrets to see it." may be plotted in the space definable in three terms, i.e., noun, adjective and adverb, thus schematically:



Whenever we confront similar kind of possible dualisms and other ambiguities, our constant task is to present the correct and exhaustive criteria according to which the comprehension could be analytically stated. I myself will not be certain if this 'myself' is used as an appositive to 'I' to emphasize, or had I used it more or less adverbially wishing to intimate 'on my part' or 'as for me' etc., even though I could have never thought of it as an object of some act of myself. Thus we have three dimensions, firstly the pronoun, secondly, the adverb, thirdly (pro)noun. The distribution of

the content according to the terms is somewhat arbitrary, yet the reader is as free as I myself am for the decision. (Remember, however, that we are not talking about the kind of the word, which is reflective pronoun, but its use in the particular context we are here exposed to.) Perhaps we might plot the word over the territory already divided in three possibilities, thus:



The readers may not find themselves agreeable in these mechanical diagrams, but if they kindly remember some earlier arguments we have gone through, they may be somehow reconciled to this practice, which, after all, is a parable. We have said that an actual, personal, subjective experience cannot be conveyed as is, and only by rendering it in some abstract terms, communication becomes possible. The actual content I entertain and want to express by the use of 'myself' cannot be stated except by these abstract criteria and the proportion.

To conclude the section 'extra-syntactical affairs' we may do well to call to our minds that these affairs are something beyond the syntactical technique of ours can reach, yet from which the technique draw authority and direction. Our analysis can not influence the extra-syntactical affairs, the latter holding the final say in the actual analysis. And it is not the objectives of the analysis to classify the facts, but to present them in an orderly site for a better elucidation of the language and its practices.

5. Subordination

The principle of our 'analytical syntax' has been to analyse a given unit of speech according to the maximum context conceivable under the situation. The analysis procedes, in our process, from the higher and general to the lower and particular as

required. Thus an analysis of a speech is possible only when the ultimate context is already comprehended. The mental speeches are hypostatized in language and to present themselves as individual sentences. The transition (or transmission) of a mental content into a physical events involves not only the suppression, but also a transformation. The organic whole of a speech is being not only represented but replaced by a structure of segments. The speech syllables were introduced as the frontier reality where the largest possible structural members and the highest possible level of analysis for individual speeches meet each other. The concept of syntax was then introduced as an implicit gravity that holds the syllables together into the whole. The syntax is mainly effected by the collocational order and the inherent kind (which is more grammatical an affair) of syllables. The term 'syntax' and its derivatives are used to indicate the affairs that concern the internal relationship among speech syllables of respective sentences, and the 'sentence patterns' are instituted as the generalized types for sentences in actual uses. References were also made to some phenomena not directly concerning the 'sentence-patterns'.

Now our analysis will enter the sub-syntactical region, where our scope is limited within linguistic microcosms, i.e., syllables. Our sub-syntactical analysis will anchor itself upon the obvious, self-explanatory facts, namely, the syllables with their full meaning and function in the comprehended context. Unless the given subject, i.e., 'a speech-syllable', is already known as a part of a comprehended whole, we shall have no guide to analyse the syllables by, either syntactical or sub-syntactical. What is consistent in our analytical process is this adherence to the higher context, the analysis according to the maximum possible span of context. In fact, some sub-syntactical analysis is done in a practical analogy to a sentence analysis (although some may be mere grammatical analysis). In our discussion of the sub-syntactical affairs, we must bare in mind that the internal condition of a given unit does not determine the status the latter holds in the total syntax.


Unless the context is supplied, we may not be able to tell if a fragment "coming to school by bus" is an adjectival or nomial or adverbial even though we are told that the fragment is a syllable in a sentence. However, if only informed that this stands as a syllable in a context, we may be able to speculate possible mutual relationships within

the syllable regardless of the status in which the syllable stands in the total context. The analysis will be carried out as if the verboid 'coming' were a finite verb of an imaginary sentence, thus we may say 'to school' and 'by bus' are both adverbial elements to the verboid 'come', that is to say, these elements are subordinate to the 'verb-ness' of the verboid. But how can we avoid the inconsistency in asserting, when 'coming' should be found to be gerund in the context, that these two prepositional phrases are 'adverbial elements' modifying the noun (gerund)? How can we account for the fact that because of the noun-ness of 'gerund,' the whole fragment has been instituted as a noun equivalent and eventually a nominal in the context? Essentially syntax is indifferent to the sub-syntactical affairs, while we must draw some analytical facts that can be established without going beyond the bound of individual syllables. We neither think it reasonable to go down direct to the word-level and designate each word indiscriminatorily, according to the so-called part-of-speeches, without a full respect to the constitution of the fragment.


We must also make it clear that what we are proposing is not a fixed classification but a consistent attitude of analysis. A schematic sentence "A likes B", may be further analysed as "A, who likes C, likes B, who likes D" and the relative clauses are sub-syntactical, and suppose if C and D are further qualified by "who likes E" and "who likes F" respectively, what name shall we give to that level of affairs? The process may go on N-th degree This obviously is not the point we are asserting by the term 'sub-syntactical affairs'. We can feel a sympathy towards grammar-school children puzzled by a fact that a phrase may contain a clause "in the room' in a sentence like I live in the room" is an adverbial phrase all right, but how could 'in this room where more than fifty others are together' can still be a phrase when it has a full clause in it?" It is the relational awareness of a unit being subordinate to the other unit in the process of analysis that runs from the higher order of comprehensional unit toward the smaller, i.e. subordinate elements. Suppose we have another nominal of a certain sentence 'The Box that contains B₂ that contains B₃ that contains B₄ B_n', the first product of our sub-syntactical analysis must be the recognition of the largest possible expanse for the highest order of the analysis; thus we shall have the adjective unit beginning with the first 'that' and ending at the B_n, if it ever comes around. The

identical relation may be found within that adjectival clause, the original relationship of the first adjective to the first noun 'box' being now beyond its scope. (As to the question whether this schematic sentence is a praxis or hypotaxis, we shall have another occasion to discuss.) To use a parable, we may say that we cannot peel an onion from within, and that no matter how many layers you have peeled, the act of peeling as such stays identical.

The English onion can be somehow schematically expressed as this:



For a mere sake of contrast, we shall observe the similar situation expressed in Japanese where the phrase will begin with Bn and the progression continues until you come up with the inevitable Box1. The situation is another onion but in reverse order, thus if diagramed:



It is important, however, to notice that the contrast is only in the order of the elements, not in the order of the structure between the English onion and the Japanese onion. When we peel them, you cannot but begin from outside layers.

The head-tightness of English may be observed in this case: The actual item that is to connect itself onto the predicate in English phrase is given at the beginning, while analytically, and perhaps notionally as well, indefinite item, i.e., 'Bn' being placed at the tail. Obviously the longer the phrase, the farther apart are the actual subject and the predicate a fact conducive to the blurring at the tail for haste, so to speak.

In spite of the frequent partial contrasts, the order of the Subject + predicate is generally observed in Japanese. Hence, the said distance in Japanese are always close, while when the phrase is object or complement, a longer suspension is inevitable, where the English counterpart finds it otherwise.

Suppose we have a case to contain a book, we have a noun phrase (noun adjunct) a book case (or book-case), and if we had a larger case that contains such a case may be called 'a book-case case', and if we had another one that contains the 'book-case case' will be 'a book-case-case case' and so on, and in this case, the Japanese counterpart finds it in a complete agreement. The identical article may be named in the reverse order if we use phrasal adjectives, thus 'case for case for case for case for books !' The similar progression may be found in such cases as 'interesting book' 'very interesting book' 'very much interesting book' 'very very much interesting book' 'very very very much interesting book' and so on. If the repetition should offend the reader, perhaps we might replace them with more natural vocabulary, thus: 'Exceptionally very much more interesting book', in which the adverbial units are connected not in parallel but in series, not in parataxis but in hypotaxis.

With above mechanical samples we have introduced one of the two major kinds of sub-syntactical relations namely 'attribution'.


The attribution is the term to designate the relationship between (1) the adjective and the noun or noun equivalent that is modified (or qualified, restricted etc.) directly, and (2) an adverb and the word or phrase directly modified, the modified being adjective, adverb, or perhaps verb.

If one unit modifies, describes, qualifies or restricts the other unit, the modifying loses its inherent potentiality to be a syllable and submerges itself into the modified. To put it otherwise, the modified absorbs the modifying. The readers are kindly referred to our past discussion on adjectivals where we relegated another essential adjectival function of attribution from the syntactical plane. The relative clauses, infinitive phrases, prepositional phrases etc., are so asserting in the syntactical perspective of sentences and it was almost unnatural to drive them out simply because these adjectival elements lose their syllabic independence by the attribution.

A doubt remains as we cannot ascertain if the attribution is a protracted effect of

syntax or a mechanical cohesion self-existing between and among the collocated words regardless of the syntax. Suppose we overhear a consecutive words at a certian point of progress and cease to hear it at another arbitrary point, say, for an instance “..... kind King” Is not our synthetic mentality inclined to connect these ? Even though in the actuality, the sentence could have read as “If not kind, King was happy”

Such is one of the reasons why attribution is rather a grammatical than syntactical affair. Such mechanical, spontaneous joining of words are not effected by the total meaning and situation, But by the collocation. Our mentality does not connect such collocation as “...fortunately king....” though we are thoroughly ignorant of the context. The fact is that the annexation demands the recognition indifferent to the context. A general rule of the attribution is the fact that it is a serial affixation, a multiplication, not an addition. The attribution can be either pre-positional or post-positional, and, whether adjective or adverb, the complex attribution is usually post-positional to the head-word. As a whole, the attributive elements should be considered as the extention of the head-word, or the mathematical exponent cumulative to a value. A ridiculous noun phrase ‘the slightly tall but exceedingly thin fellow there with his hands in his pocket, whom you see now in front of the gate walking towards the bridge’ may be diagrammed as follows:



Where we may not perhaps agree as to the extent the article ‘the’ may encompass. Also notice the parallel (as contrasted to the serial) relationship between the epithets arranged literally in parallel in the diagram above.

Now, for the adverbial attribution, we may refer also to the diagram above. The adverb ‘slightly’ and ‘exceedingly’ directly qualifies the following adjective ‘tall’ and ‘thin’ respectively, while the article ‘the’ does not affix itself to the adverbs in spite of the fact that they are consecutively collocated. The article ‘the’ joins itself onto the

noun unit that begins with adverb and ending in the head-word 'fellow' or perhaps to the very end of the phrase. The somewhat similar situation exists when we say 'a sweet cup of tea', in which we are saying that it is, not the cup itself, but the tea that is sweet, and yet the article 'a' is not numbering the tea, but the cup We may call it a transferred epithet or something the like, a fine back-formation.

To return, when we look at the right half of the diagram, i.e., the epithets to 'the fellow,' we find a thoroughly different kind of adjectival elements which contain some adverbial elements. 'There' could be well an adverb modifying the phrase that begins with 'with' while we have some other prepositional phrases that are adverbial elements if in the full context. The adverb and its equivalents here are not in attribution to other elements. The 'here' I used in the last sentence was, at least, to my consciousness, an adjective specifying those elements in that apropos, and was not an adverb modifying 'are', indicating the place of occurrence.

However, if the readers reflect kindly, there is an important attributive use for adverbials: in the discussion of adverbials, we have stated somehow to the effect that some short adverbs are to be considered attributive to the verb thus losing its independence as a speech-syllable called adverbial. One earlier case was 'not', which is often submerged into the verb in the form of elipsis or annexation, such as 'isn't' or 'arn't' and 'cannot', etc. We have shunned many a troublesome adverbial fragments such as 'at' of the 'look-at' fusion, or such intractable left-overs as 'to' of the "What you want to?" etc. These may also include the host of the verb plus short-adverb clusters but within the reasonable range. We mentioned that without such strong tendency of cohesion, English language might have found it extremely stiff and unexpressive. Such sentence as "Strike it in." draws its force from the abruptness between 'Strike it.' and 'in.' The 'in' retains very much of its 'adjectiveness' or 'complement-ness' by presenting abruptly the resultant state of affairs, yet at the same time, somehow modifies the verb 'strike' as to its direction. The wordlessness of the expression gives the suggestiveness to the speech. Along avoidance of cumbersome 'state-exactly'-type of words for each item of actuality, the English genius found way to cluster adverbs in somewhat round-about way but with full of feeling in it. Thus English puts up with all the new situation by joining together of the old words, and

for all the new nuance of verbs, it adds some extra adverbs. This is not at all an idle observer's view to be laughed away, scorned at, and looked down upon, and made slight of

As for the relative clauses, a slight hint has been given as to the possible and frequent apposition between the antecedent and the conjunction (the very relative pronoun itself), and the appositional relationship between the pronoun and the clause itself. (The discussion naturally invoked the appositional relation between all the thing referred to and the corresponding pronoun etc.)

The point somehow tells us the reason why the relative clause cannot become the complement as adjective, but as noun only. A relative clause, when separated from the head-word, cannot stand as adjective, but becomes a nominal !

The infinitive phrases, or the participial phrases post-posed to the attributed are natural growth since the head-word being most naturally the subject of the verb in the actuality.

The adjectives on the right side of the diagram a few paragraphs above tells us about this situation. The attributive prepositional phrases to the nominal elements (as this 'to-phrase') are the phenomena that perhaps originally was adverbial. The modern tendencies seem to scrupulously select the preposition of such adjectives according to the adverbial uses of the phrase in corresponding syntactical context. Thus 'Plays of Shakespeare' will be re-written upon the urge to be more precise as 'Plays by Shakespeare'.

Because of these tendencies, the prepositional phrases are often bouyant in the speech quite uncertain of its adverbness or adjectiveness.

Such a simple sentence as 'I am not happy' will pose a difficulty if we think ourselves twice : Is the adverb 'not' attributive to the adjective 'happy' or to the verb 'am'. And let us ask ourselves "Is it a theory that determines it or the individual occasion and personal inclination ?" We confront the free-lancing 'adverbials' here again.

Now perhaps we may go into the discussion on the 'subordination,' another of the two sub-syntactical relationship within the microcosm of each speech syllable.

The classification of sub-syntactical affairs by these two terms, i.e., attribution and subordination, is again an arbitrary imposition as any classification is. We would

rather conceive the classification as an analysis of facts in number of factors involved, the definitions and criteria being the coordinates defined by extreme and abstract terms. The actuality is always a relative affair while the definitions are a priori and abstract. A consecutive collocation of words may be considered part attributively combined and part organized in what we call subordination, or it can be decisively one of the two.

Now to define the status of a portion of a speech as 'subordination', we may say that subordination is such a state of affairs in the given unit of speech that we can observe the imposed relationship among its members somewhat analogous and parallel to the syntax of a full speech.

The largest unit and most complete of such series of words in a speech may be called 'clauses' either as independent syllables or as attributive elements in a speech. The so-called dependent clauses are grammatically defined as those collocated words that have subject and predicate, or the like internal structure. We may confront a sentence as this that contains another sentence that contains still another sentence that contains still another sentence The situation is another of the linguistic onion and here again we must reaffirm our basic understanding that 'subordination' is a relative concept, an awareness, but not a de facto classification of linguistic items. (cf. The concept 'subsyntactical affairs', etc., are a set of fixed classification.) In this linguistic progression, the repeated unit 'that contains another sentence' is an attributive element to the preceding noun 'sentence' as was the case with 'Box₁ containing Box₂ containing Box_n', the only difference here being that within this piece of context we cannot help but recognize the presence of an apparent syntax though not for a total speech but for a locality of a speech. The local syntax, or a awareness of syntax-like relationship within a syntax is 'subordination.' The very awareness of the syntax one including the other is the indispensable factor for our argument here. Thus we can further define the relationship among and between the consecutively collocated words of a section of a speech as 'subordinate one to the other' when they constitute a mutual relationship that presupposes a full context within that unit if to be understood. Thus 'that' of the 'that contains still another sentence' can not be understood unless it is taken as the subject of a full sentence identical to the present clause. Likewise, 'contains' is only correctly

apprehended as performing the 'predicative' of the comparable sentence and 'still another sentence' as the object of the imaginary full context. Perhaps we might consider the relationship somewhat expressed by mathematical concept of addition, within brackets which is contrasted against the concept of attribution as expressed by multiplication. The formula will be thus: (Syntactical elements are also connected by plus signs.)

$$\begin{array}{ccccccc} a & & S_1 & & V_1 & & b & & O_1 & & S_2 & & V_2 \\ [\text{This} \times \text{sentence}] & + & \text{contains} & + & [\text{another} \times \text{sentence} \times \langle \text{that} + \text{contains} + \\ c & & d & & O_2 & & S_3 & & T & & V_3 & & e & & f & & g \\ [\text{still} \times \text{another} \times \text{sentence} \times \langle \text{that} + \text{contains} + & [\text{still} \times \text{still} \times \text{another} \dots \end{array}$$

If further simplified :

$$aS_1 + V_1 + \left[bO_1 \begin{array}{c} \text{I} \\ \swarrow \\ S_2 \end{array} + V_2 + \left[cdO_2 \begin{array}{c} \text{II} \\ \swarrow \\ S_3 \end{array} + V_3 + \left[efgO_3 \begin{array}{c} \text{III} \\ \swarrow \\ S_4 \end{array} + V_4 + \left[hijkO_4 \dots \dots \dots \begin{array}{c} \text{III} \\ \swarrow \\ n \end{array} \begin{array}{c} \text{II} \\ \swarrow \\ n \end{array} \begin{array}{c} \text{I} \\ \swarrow \\ n \end{array} \right] \right] \right]$$

Another progression may be :

A knows B who knows C who knows D who knows E N

which can be expressed thus :

$$A + V + B \langle S_1 + V + C \langle S_2 + V + D \langle S_3 + V + E \langle S_4 \dots \dots \dots N \rangle \rangle \rangle \rangle$$

As indicated so far, our subordination is the relationship we expressed in the above formulae by plus marks, (within blackets,) whereas the attributive relations are expressed either by multiplication mark or by direct annexations of exponents. Before one adds the members of the syntax, one has to do all the multiplication, and that at each stage.

We have quoted so far only the cases of subordination where the given context

always has all the indispensable (and perhaps unnecessary) members required for a full sentence-pattern, namely they are all clauses. Subordination, however, is not confined in clausal contexts alone; the similar, though more restricted, situation can be found in variety of other collocations of the words in speeches, namely in phrases and in fragments. To produce a sample off hand here for such is not very difficult: In the last sentence, 'a sample' is not an attributive adjective in modification of the noun (which happens to be an infinitive of a verb), but is the subordinate object to the verb (which happens to be in noun use), even though we are not given the subject in the context. 'Off hand' is a subordinate-adverbial element in modification of the verbal phrase in the form of the infinitive. Syntactically, no adverb can modify a noun regardless of the etimological origin of the latter ... we may replace the infinitive with a gerund 'producing' or even by a noun 'production' (in the latter case 'sample' must be made attributive depriving of its object-hood, and instituting them together 'sample-production.') Likewise we can say 'here' and 'for such' are all subordinate elements to the infinitive and if asked what kind of the function they play within that particular local context, we say they are parallel to so-called adverbials of a full speech or simply 'subordinate-adverbials.'

We must recall to ourselves the fact that we are thus applying a principle of a higher order to the lower order of affairs we are analogically applying the principle that worked in the highest unit of speech to the lower, local and even partial context within the microcosms of speech-syllables.

The head-tightness of English is again found as a working principle in the realm of subordination if we realize the fact that a unit of collocated words combined by subordinate relationship is governed by the first word that corresponds to the fixed-positioned syllables. The 'that' of the last sentence governs the whole adjectival clause indifferent to the individual function and kinds of words and word-groups it contains. The adjective 'indifferent' above subordinates the following elements to render the whole unit an 'adjective' even though we may not know whether this adjective phrase should modify 'the whole adjectival clause' that preceded it immediately, or if it is sublimated into adverbial use. Without doubt, we can tell which it is, but remember, the evidence is not in the phrase, but in the maximum context. The inner

condition of a subordination cannot determine the relative status of that local context in a superior context. In some fortunate cases the conflict is accidentally eclipsed due to the tail-looseness of English. A sample suitable to demonstrate this fact may be the adjective phrase of this sentence governed by the adjective 'suitable'. We may have no problem in designating 'suitable' as an adjective in modification of the noun 'sample', but how about the affiliation of the adverbial phrase that follows? The infinitive 'to demonstrate' naturally governs the noun phrase 'this fact' as its subordinate-object. Is the adverbial element attributively modifying the 'suitable' or subordinately modifying the whole local context, or does it syntactically modify the full context? The adverbial phrase maintains its adverbial-ness at all the three altitudes of speech structure. Adverbial elements are not only free-lancing on a syntactical plane but they free-lance laterally as well!

Ambiguity and confusion are the cost for the agility, yet the subordination often finds some compensation to this in its own way. In the case like:

His sharply rejecting the offer caused a fury.

We confront a difficulty in determining the nature of the relationship the adverb 'sharply' bears to the gerund 'rejecting' (or perhaps to the gerundial phrase led by it.) The adverb 'sharply' is indeterminate — it can be construed either as an attributive modifier to the verb-ness of the gerund, or it can be felt as a subordinate adverb in a corresponding context S(omething) reject(ing) the offer 'sharply'. Being an adverb, the distinction does not however cause much pragmatic confusion.

The prefixation of 'his' to the expanded gerund crowned by an adverb and ending in sub-ordinate object, is the definite sign for the syntactical nominal-hood of the whole segment of the speech thus picked up. Grammatically no one can connect such collocation as '.....his sharply.....' and it is not the adverb 'sharply' but the first word 'his' that indicates the nominal-hood of the segment. But remember 'his' is attributively annexed to the remaining gerundial phrase which is a subordinate assembly. And that none of the subordinate members has the power to determine the syntactical function the phrase is to play in the superior context. If isolated, the phrase 'sharply rejecting the offer' can be a noun-phrase, adjective phrase or perhaps an adverbial phrase, the decision of which depends upon the maximum context and not on the subordinate

situations.

We may also remember that the verb-ness of the gerund 'rejecting' is upheld as a solid noun 'rejection' is avoidable. Suppose we compare these two:

His poor pitching caused a hiss. (1)

His poorly pitching the ball caused a hiss. (2)

where, instead of 'rejecting', 'pitching' is used in order to illustrate the gerundial fluctuation between noun-ness and verb-ness. (1) has the gerund decisively noun, and if the object is to be supplied, it can have it in an adjunct form, thus

His poor ball-pitching caused a hiss.

whereas in (2), the verb-ness of the gerund is maintained highly with its subordinate-adverb and subordinate-object. Thus schematic analysis will be:

[His [⟨poor [pitching]]	caused [a hiss.]
[His [⟨poor [ball-pitching]]	caused [a hiss.]
[His [(poorly) pitching [the ball]]]	caused [a hiss.]
sub-adverb	sub-object

Grammatical phenomena—Accidence: Although this is not the primary scope of our present study, the position and the significance of these phenomena must be settled in the whole perspective.

Grammar minus syntax leaves so little except the accidence, a relative affair Grammar in this sense is the morphological features of words under given or imagined syntactical or subordinate context. The words are the units of actuality for grammar and the clues are taken from their morphological changes in speeches, statistically, towards infinity of synthetic progression.

Some grammatical phenomena are purely intransitive in nature, for an instance the inflexion of nouns according to the number or sex (not gender, at least in English), inflexion of verbs in various ways according to the tense, number and person and perhaps with mood.

Other grammatical phenomena are more or less transitive, or sub-syntactical, the changes of pronouns according to the case (subject and object) for instance.

Some etimological grouping of words may be grammatical, for an instance, verboids as inflections of verbs, adjective pronouns as pronouns, some derivative adverbs as linked with the adjectives etc.

The order in given collocation of words are also semi-syntactical prepositions to precede a noun or its equivalent, simple adjective (not phrasal) to precede the noun it modifies, the auxiliaries in periphrastic exposition to precede the bare infinitive.

Also the statistical and conciliatory classification of words, i.e., what is popularly and conveniently called "parts of speech" classification belongs to the grammatical practice even though much of its terms are extendedly used in the superior syntax. The classification is a gross but useful compromise. A word is a verb, because it has been used as such in myriads of actual speeches, and since it is classified in dictionary as such, you are to use it as a verb. Then you ask what is verb? The dictionary answers that these words listed are verbs in which the one you have is one of the case. One must comply somewhere, but this proposes no ultimate definition. It is immensely unfortunate that the names of word-classification have been first established and then transferred to the syntax, thus from noun we have noun-phrase, noun-clause and noun-equivalents, etc. It also sounds odd when we use a word which is most of the time used as noun, as verb, we say we borrowed a word from a neighbouring family. As long as the speech is comprehensible and syntax is understood, we can use whatever the word in whatever the way we so desire, though risk is on the user.

It is also a dilemma for grammatical phenomena to be connected with the meaning ... because no meaning is definitely determined unless words are in a context. We say "He would.", a perfect sentence in grammatical sense, but we have several, some conflicting, notions suggested, and unless given clue, we practically know nothing. Does an s added to a verb mean that it is an act of the third person singular when the subject clearly indicates it? It has nothing to do with the meaning. Or else, the other s added to a noun should mean that it is singular? Gerund and the present participle, do they carry difference in meaning or in the function? Is the differentiation of **he** from **she** intended to be the distinction in the meaning? Are the prepositions meaning something or simply indicating some abstracted relationship?

To say in a word, the words are not the units of meaning and thus the classification of words should not be done according to the meaning. Any grammatical formula, the idioms, is not a block of meaning so condensed. If “will” forms a phrasal verb meaning that the act is to take place in future, then how is it when we say “would”, does it mean past-future ?

The grammatical phenomena, in our scheme, are in themselves meaning-free, unless a portion of the total meaning is imposed upon them in each actual context, the speech. When we say “Book !” the total import of the speech is compressed into it and it is not the elliptic, or fragmentary bit of some complete expression in words. Unless we know what is meant there, we know nothing except the fact that the word is used in certain sense according to the precedences. It is sheer nonsense to determine, from the form of the word, if it is nominative in subject, or object or even a complement, or if it is a verb, or anything else. We neither know if this is a command, question, or exclamation or anything else. Grammatically “Oh !” is an interjection and is a sentence in exclamation by itself ...what does the word “oh”, unless in a speech, mean ? The grammatical categories such as parts of speech and sentence do not help the situation except that the words are somewhat classified (for what purpose ?) and sentence phrases and clauses are likewise defined (for what purpose ?).

Perhaps the ordinary expression “a word or phrase, or a sentence mean something” is a metaphorical way of saying that such and such meaning of a speech under the context and situation is being dividedly carried by such analytical elements of speech. The expression is still metaphorical in the sense that the load and the carriage are somewhat confusedly identified and gives an impression that what the words or sentence mean by themselves are the all that is there. Hence “Good morning” is a short for “Good morning shall it be with you !” and that **good** by itself means so much and **morning** by itself refers to what period of the day, etc. Grammar knows better than this, but there is no ground upon which it can assert more fact about so familiar a speech like this, unless one knows what it means, and if one knows what it means, the subsequent awareness of distinct words that constitute the speech lose all the original meaning. “Good morning !” uttered under an actual situation is a speech in its own right and there is simply no need of analysis for any practical purpose. If

one fails to comprehend what is meant, no analysis will help him. If demanded, perhaps we could analyse the speech in terms of sound, in terms of vocabulary, and in almost any term for any purpose at all.

These have been perhaps too radical the cases, but the underlying moral is that what is meant by a speech is not always dividedly carried by the grammatical segments of it. And if the relationship is such, there is far worse a chance of being lost if one starts from the segments in the hope to reach the actual import of the speech than looking for the corresponding elements within the speech. Haply one may find them and haply there will be none, but no matter. The total meaning of a speech is, theoretically at least and practically always, carried by the speech as a whole. And if an analysis is necessary for any logical purpose in reference to the meaning, it should not start at the lowest possible level but from the highest possible level, and perhaps you might find the speech utterly un-analysable, yet the speech stands. Consider what is meant by "If you please." in the ordinary context and the history of the meaning carried by each word... The entire meaning was so concrete and understandable that the particular parts of the speech has been abused and pushed away... We call one's attention by saying "Here you are !" what do we mean by that ? if each word has its own meaning ? You might have said now "Well ?" to yourself, but what did you mean by it ? Look into the dictionary. You might consider these cases are not so frequent and they are more or less "corrupt" thing below grammar-level. Such are the reasons why such purely grammatical affair as grammar-less word-groups are ignored by the very grammarians. By the grammar-less word-groups, we mean "good-for-nothing fellow", "New York Sub-way Construction Co. Ltd"., etc., where the cohesion of words are regulated by purely grammatical potentiality of each word. The similar a-grammatical phenomena take place in remote adverbials. "During the movie" "When alone ..." "Me beautiful !", etc poses no problem for syntax, because their syntactical function is clearly known in spite of the internal elipsis or addition or irregularity. And it is some potential cohesion of words themselves that keeps these phenomena somewhat vitally in order. Is it a "two-men bicycle" or "two-man bicycle", and if one is established according to some inherent inclination, what is it ? And when such laws are systematically described and explained, perhaps we may hope to have a **synthetic grammar** that will be somewhat antonymous to this essay which is entitled **Analytical Syntax**.